

Dr. Ismagilova's book on the ethnic problems of Tropical Africa has the distinction of being the first monograph in Marxist African studies to deal with the broad round of these matters in this region of Africa. In her analysis the author has drawn on extensive, varied source materials and literature in various languages as well as on her own personal observations in seventeen African countries.

The value of Dr. Ismagilova's book is that such a study helps to bring out and differentiate the general and the specific in the complex ethnic evolution of Tropical Africa, and to demonstrate the applicability in African conditions of the general laws and patterns of social and ethnic development.

Dr. Ismagilova discusses the role of the ethnic factor in contemporary conditions in Tropical Africa and its effect on political life and the endeavours of governments to implement social and economic measures. Her book reveals the social roots and nature of the ethnic contradictions and antagonisms in this area of the world, discusses the principles set out in African government and party programmes for dealing with the national question, and describes the steps taken by a number of governments in this respect.

Dr. Ismagilova also discusses the special nature of ethnic processes and national integration in Africa, bringing out the close link between ethnic problems and programmes for social and economic reform. She endeavours to delineate possible routes and methods for dealing with the ethnic problems of Tropical Africa, and devotes a special chapter to the ways and means that were employed in the Soviet Union to solve the ethnic problems there. She thinks that Tropical Africa's ethnic problems can be solved by way of consistent and deep-going social reforms, although it will be a lengthy process of social evolution not amenable to facile administrative solutions, and in the long run only possible given a profound transformation of African society.



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**ETHNIC  
PROBLEMS  
OF  
THE TROPICAL  
AFRICA**

**CAN THEY  
BE SOLVED?**

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## Introduction

African states' winning of political independence created favourable conditions for tackling both their social and economic problems and matters connected with the acute problems of ethnic development. The polarisation of political forces within African states, however, primarily over choice of paths of development, is having a considerable effect on realisation of the principles for dealing with ethnic problems proclaimed in the programmes of their governments and ruling parties. The position is also complicated by the interference of imperialist powers and their policy of fomenting interethnic friction and making use of conflicts, and of open or disguised support for separatist tendencies. Exaggeration of ethnic peculiarities, the erection of national barriers (often artificial), a morbid attitude toward national sovereignty, and the stirring up of old wrongs and of past mistakes in attempts to resolve ethnic problems—all occur in Africa and are employed by certain political circles in the interests of neocolonialism.

Increasing attention has been paid in recent years to the ethnic problems of African states, and their past underestimation and even ignoring of them are giving way to increasing understanding of their role and significance in the reconstruction of society. Nevertheless one still finds that ethnic problems are understood only as intertribal hostility, and that the requisite significance is not always attached to them when concrete programmes are being worked out to eliminate actual inequalities in the levels of development of the different peoples. In many cases the national question is not only understood so narrowly but also out of context of social and economic processes, which leads to such complicated phenomena as the Congolese or Nigerian



crises being looked upon solely as manifestations of the hostility of ethnic groups.

African states' experience of independence provides much data for answering many questions, those associated with the processes of ethnic development included. What are these questions?

What effect do ethnic problems have on the socio-economic development and political life of African countries? What are the main trends in the ethnic development of African countries? Are there special features in the forming of nations in modern Africa? What is the explanation of the exacerbation of interethnic relations in a number of countries? What are the reasons for and the character of ethnic antagonisms? What are the social forces behind them? What are the ways to tackle ethnic problems? What is the ideology of tribalism? What effect does it have on solving the most important problems of economic and social development? How is the problem of self-determination to be approached? How are questions of state structure, language, and so on to be tackled? All these and many other matters call for all-round, thorough-going analysis.

In this book on Tropical Africa the author has endeavoured to answer these questions.

A feature of modern Africa is the variety of transitional forms in everything, whether it be economics, social relations, or ethnic processes.

The actual reality of Africa is introducing much that is unique into the working out of the theoretical principles for dealing with various aspects of ethnic problems. The All African People's Conference in Accra in 1958 condemned the artificial boundaries drawn by the imperialist powers and dividing African peoples, and called for their wiping out after proclamation of independence. Life, however, showed the complete impracticability of that; and the Organisation of African Unity, as we know, passed a resolution on the maintenance of existing political frontiers and respect for territorial integrity. The initial, very glowing view of the rapid development of African languages and of their replacing the languages of the former metropolitan countries has also not been confirmed.

In foreign works studying the socio-economic and political structures of contemporary Africa one can find diametrically opposite views. The supporters of one of them put special stress on the specific nature of the development of the Afri-

can continent and assert that nothing in Africa will be as it was in Europe—whether it be the formation of classes or of nations, problems of self-determination, or the one-party system. Representatives of the other view, on the contrary, stress that the same patterns of social development are as characteristic for Africa as for other countries. The truth, it would seem, must be sought in both views. But we must emphasise that many problems cannot be solved in the present state of African studies. Study of the experience of African states' development during their years of independence, however, gives grounds for saying that the general patterns of development really are characteristic for Africa. In addition, the specific nature of the African continent, which is manifested in particular in the mixed character of its economy and the survival of many features characteristic of tribal (clan) society put an essential impress on current processes.

The supporters of yet another point of view are inclined to explain all present-day Africa's difficulties either as the heritage of colonialism or by the intrigues of imperialist powers. The negative role of colonialism and neocolonialism, which has been quite deeply studied by Soviet scholars and by progressive political scientists in other countries, is well known and does not need arguing here. What it is important to note is something else, namely that the imperialists rely, in their policy, on certain political forces within African states and make use of many traditional institutions.

That is why, while taking the views mentioned above into account, it is important to make a concrete, historical study of each African country, including a study of the interethnic relations existing within it. Only such an approach makes it possible to disclose the sources and essence of ethnic contradictions and their role in contemporary political life.

The author deems it necessary to stress that many of the phenomena of African reality cannot be understood without taking the ethnic factor into account. It is not simply a question of the complexity of the ethnic structure of most African states, which faces them with all the problems of a multiethnic state and makes it necessary for them to tackle various aspects associated with the national question. Because of a number of specific features of Africa and of the survival of many archaic institutions of the tribal

system, the ethnic factor exerts an immense influence on the course and character of socio-economic processes and on the political life of African states, and will probably do so for a long time to come.

One can hardly agree with certain social scientists who assert that the present motley ethnic map of Tropical Africa is a passing phenomenon. Despite the intensity of ethnic processes in recent years, their dual and contradictory character (i.e., the existence of integrating and disintegrating tendencies) will seemingly encourage the survival of ethnic variety for a long time yet. The job today is to investigate the ethnic problems and tackle them in practice with reference to the complexity of present-day Africa.

Furthermore, the processes of national consolidation and the degree of detribalisation would seem to be exaggerated in works devoted to study of the colonial period.

The specific features of African society in our day are often explained simply as the effect of colonialism. That view has led to both foreign political scientists and African politicians having an attitude to the traditional structures and surviving institutions of tribal-clan society that is not always correct. Yet many of these phenomena are strong and exert considerable influence on the social development of African peoples.

The role of the traditional rulers, who personify the power of custom and the strength of tribal morality, of tribal unions, and of ethnic self-awareness are quite tenacious and call for serious study. Even the power of traditional chiefs, as events in Ghana and other countries have shown, not to mention everything connected with people's psychology, cannot be destroyed by issuing the appropriate decrees. The chief is the personification of tradition.

The traditional structures, which have been transformed by the effect of colonialism and have absorbed new features associated with African people's struggle for liberation and with the social and economic reforms now being carried out, are a specific feature of Africa today.

The stability of pre-class social relations, the slowness of the changes taking place in the consciousness of African peasants, aggravated by many superstitions, ethnic prejudices and biases, and the fear of innovations, help the traditional rulers (in the person of kings, emirs, and chiefs of various rank) to a considerable extent to preserve their influence. The existence in a number of African states of

kingdoms, emirates, and sultanates not only hampers reform of the state structure and modernisation of the social system, but is also a potential threat to unity, and a focus of tribalism and separatism. The history of African states in recent years provides evidence that tribalist attitudes can develop into outbreaks of fanaticism.

The traditional institutions often make it possible for reactionary circles to utilise ethnic antagonisms and the ideology of tribal separatism in the struggle for power. In that connection political scientists are faced with having to unearth the hidden motives of separatist movements and to reveal the social forces behind them and their political platform and ideology. Study of traditionalism and of tribal ideology at the different stages of development of African states, and the determined struggle of progressive forces against the separatist moods that tend to exacerbate relations between African peoples and occasionally break out into open hostility, therefore acquire special urgency.

Ethnic variety brings to the fore the problem of the constitutional form of social organisation, taking Africa's specific conditions into account. Principles of a federal structure different to most bourgeois federations are being worked out, and a search is going on for new forms of autonomy for ethnic minorities, adapted to African conditions and best ensuring the carrying out of a programme of social development.

Discussion continues about the existing frontiers inherited from colonialism. It is not simply a matter of fruitless disputes about whether the boundaries in their present form are needed or not; practical measures are being discussed to ease the difficulties caused by them, whether they concern border disputes and territorial claims or processes of national consolidation.

The development of African countries since independence is encouraging a more precise meaning for the concept 'nationalism'. In addition to the general features inherent in it, not a few new ones have developed reflecting the present state of social development and specific internal features of the African states. Today's anti-imperialist nationalism has many aspects and nuances. Analysis of its concrete forms and manifestations in the states of Tropical Africa and of its conversion into the political ideology of the ruling parties and governments of several countries also helps us to understand the essence and roots of the various theo-

ries of 'African socialism', and to make an objective theoretical assessment of them.

The fight of progressive parties to carry out an appropriate economic and ideological policy is often explained simply by ethnic contradictions between leaders. Accusations of tribalism are employed by reactionary and conservative circles to oppose measures which are carried out by African governments and which are undesirable to them. It is tribalism, too, that underlies many of the military *coups d'état* in Africa of recent years.

The old racist theories about the inferiority of peoples of the black race, and about their incapacity for self-government, about the 'white man's burden', and so on, have been relegated to the past. In their place have been put new conceptions appropriate to the changing conditions. The slogan of the distinctiveness and exclusive character of Africa's development is widely employed to prove, in particular, the unacceptability of the principles of scientific socialism in African conditions. The term 'tribalism' is bandied about. The principle of self-determination is interpreted incorrectly and the separatist tendencies of individual African leaders are justified. In recent years not a few books have appeared in the West whose authors demonstrate that the one-party system (referring as a rule to Mali, Guinea, and Tanzania) inevitably leads, allegedly, to the dominance of one people and to neglect of the interests of ethnic minorities.

At the present stage, neocolonialists are not always prepared to speak out openly against the socialist path of development and to demonstrate the necessity of capitalism. They are finding new, more flexible forms of ideological penetration. The fight is being waged not so much around choice of the road of socio-economic development as around concrete matters—be they educational reforms or the training of national cadres, language policy or the drafting of development plans for backward areas. The author thinks it necessary to emphasise this point since attempts are sometimes made to gloss over the main problem of the radical socio-economic reforms without which it is impossible to solve the national question, and to neutralise it in a host of other matters.

The edge of bourgeois theories and propaganda is directed against a class approach to the national question. Bourgeois ideologists not only separate ethnic problems from the class aims of the working people but often inflate them, so

channelling existing dissatisfaction into intertribal hostility, and try to prevent the struggle for national liberation growing into a fight against exploitative relations.

A scientific analysis of ethnic problems makes it possible to clarify the general and the specific in the ethnic development of Tropical Africa, to indicate the applicability of the general laws of social development to Africa, to give precision to the principles of self-determination, to disclose the dual character and content of nationalism, to analyse the essence and sources of ethnic contradictions, prejudices and prejudgments, and to help work out the principles of language policy in conditions of ethnic pluralism. Study of the processes of national consolidation and integration, of the breakdown of tribal structures, and of the creation of larger ethnic communities in Africa indicates the various stages that peoples go through in their evolution from pre-national ethnic communities to nations. It is this that determines the theoretical value of studying ethnic problems.

The practical, applied value of investigating the character, rates, and specific features of ethnic processes in Africa is determined by the pressing nature of the problem of building and developing nations at the present stage. It can be of definite help to the governments of African states to determine the principles and methods of national policy. The character of ethnic processes (whether a community is taking shape on the basis of different ethnic components or whether several such communities are being formed within the state's political frontiers) predetermines the government's national policy to a considerable extent. The national policy in its turn can encourage or, on the contrary, hamper development of the processes under way.

Study of ethnic problems can help in working out both the principles and the programmes of the national question, the concrete measures for eliminating tribal discord, and in defining attitudes to archaic traditional institutions, customs, norms of tribal-clan morality, and other survivals of the past that influence the interrelationships of various ethnic groups and hinder the progressive development of society.

During the time I spent in Africa I was frequently asked what was meant by the national question and how it was interpreted in Marxist-Leninist theory. My interlocutors often reduced the national question simply to the contradictions and antagonisms between different peoples, in other words to intertribal hostility. That was quite wrong. The

national question is a big complex of political, economic, ideological, legal, and other problems that arise during a people's struggle for liberation and for favourable internal and international conditions for further development, and also in the course of establishing equal, friendly relations between peoples.

The national question is always subordinate to the main problem of the socio-economic development of society, and has a different content and significance at various stages of historical development.

The concept 'national question' includes the following points: abolition of ethnic oppression (in all its forms) and ethnic inequality; liberation of oppressed nations from the yoke of imperialism, the establishing of real equality, friendship, and fraternal co-operation between all peoples; the free and all-round development of these peoples, and so on.

A scientific explanation of the national question was first given by Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, who wrote in the *Manifesto of the Communist Party*:

In proportion as the exploitation of one individual by another is put an end to, the exploitation of one nation by another will also be put an end to. In proportion as the antagonism between classes within the nation vanishes, the hostility of one nation to another will come to an end.<sup>1</sup>

Their main ideas on the national question can be formulated briefly as follows:

(1) Nations are a product of the historical development of society in the epoch of rising capitalism.

(2) Each nation consists of antagonistically opposed classes—the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, the exploiters and the exploited. Unity of the interests of the classes within bourgeois society is a sham.

(3) National inequality and hostility between nations, and national oppression are a result of the social antagonisms of capitalism and the dominance of the bourgeoisie. Nationalism and chauvinism are the policy and the ideology of the bourgeoisie on the national question.

(4) The proletariat by its class nature is international. National and race restrictions, oppression, compulsion, etc., prevent development of the proletariat's class struggle and hamper the revolutionary working class movement. The proletariat is therefore irreconcilably hostile to bourgeois nationalism, and to each and every form of racial and na-

tional oppression and inequality. In addition it is also hostile to national nihilism as a disguised form of that same bourgeois nationalist ideology. Proletarian internationalism is the policy and ideology of the proletariat on the national question.

(5) The proletariat must fight unconditionally against every kind of national oppression.

(6) National antagonisms, like all other social antagonisms, will disappear with the abolition of capitalism.

Lenin, taking the ideas of Marx and Engels further in the conditions of the new era of imperialism and proletarian revolutions, created a rigorous and integrated doctrine on the laws of development of nations and national relations, and on the national question and the ways of tackling it.

In Lenin's writings the theoretical programme and policy of the Communist Party on the national question was developed for the first time in the history of Marxism. In his articles 'Critical Notes on the National Question' (1913) and 'On the Right of Nations to Self-Determination' (1914) he gave a theoretical substantiation of the Party's programmatic proposals on the national question: namely its position on the equality of nations and the rights of national minorities, on the right of nations to self-determination up to and including secession, on languages and their equal status, on national culture and its class content, on centralisation and autonomy, and so on.

After the Great October Socialist Revolution, the 60th anniversary of which has recently been marked by all progressive humanity, new problems were put on the order of the day as regards national relations. The Russian Communist Party, led by Lenin, developed theoretically substantiated principles for tackling the national question in the new socialist state. Lenin's discovery of a new, socialist type of federation, and theoretical substantiation of its principles, which underlay the building of the multinational Soviet state, and the role of the Soviet national policy, were of the greatest significance in successfully solving the national question and in the revolutionary transformation of society.

The theory of nations and national relations developed by Lenin gave the Soviet Communist Party the possibility, at all stages of the revolutionary movement, of orienting itself profoundly and clearly in all the complicated processes

of the development of national relations, and to apply an internationalist policy consistently on the national question.

The Marxist-Leninist theory of nations and national relations provides a theoretical explanation of the essence and origin of nations, of the historical types of nations, of the social sources of national oppression and national antagonisms in capitalist society, of the ways and means of tackling the national question engendered by capitalism, and of the patterns of development of nations and national relations of different historical type. Thus the theory of the national question is a component of a broader doctrine of nations and national relations. The Marxist-Leninist theory of nations and national relations, which provides a thoroughgoing and consistent theoretical explanation of the essence and origin of the nation, and of its social nature and patterns of development, is the theoretical basis and guideline for developing the programme and policy of the revolutionary party of the proletariat on the national question. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union based itself on this theory, and still does so, in dealing with all problems regarding national relations.

The October Revolution put the Party's programmatic principles on the national question into action, abolished the political system of national oppression that had existed in tsarist Russia, gave all the peoples of Soviet Russia the right to self-determination, and proclaimed the equality and free development of all nations and ethnic groups.

After victory of the socialist revolution the Communist Party faced new problems in the sphere of national relations, problems organically linked with abolishing all survivals of capitalist relations and of creating a new social system. The main problems among them directly concerning the national question were the following: elimination of the age-old backwardness of the previously oppressed peoples and their attainment of full and actual equality in all spheres of social life; the transition of backward peoples who were at pre-capitalist stages of development to socialism, by-passing capitalism; the forms of organisation of the multinational Soviet state and of the Soviet national state system of the constituent peoples; the constitutional relations between independent Soviet republics; ways of overcoming relics of distrust and hostility between peoples and of establishing firm friendship, fraternal co-operation, and mutual help between them; the fight against bourgeois nationalism

and chauvinism; and application of the principles of proletarian internationalism in the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. The Marxist-Leninist theory of the national question and national relations was developed further in the works of Lenin, the resolutions of the Communist Party, and the writings of its leaders, Lenin's disciples. In carrying out its national policy the CPSU is guided by this theory.

Underlying the CPSU programme on the national question is the principle of the right of nations to self-determination, the right of peoples to independent state existence. The principle of the self-determination of nations recognises the right to decide their fate independently not simply for 'civilised' nations but for all peoples without exception. The right to self-determination involves the right not only to separate statehood, but also to independent solution of all matters of its internal organisation, for example, choice of social system, free disposal of national resources, and so on. The principle of self-determination stems not from an obligation to secede but from the expediency of secession. The question of secession is considered subsidiary to the main problem, that of the fight for social liberation. The principle of self-determination raises questions not only of the formal (legal) equality of peoples, but also of their achieving actual equality in level of social, economic, and cultural development.

In consistently seeking the closest unity of the proletariat and working people of all nationalities in the liberation struggle, the Party posed as the most important objective the building of a multinational socialist state after the victory of the revolution. Its propaganda for the slogan of the right of nations to self-determination up to a secession and the formation of independent states, was determined precisely by the need to strengthen mutual confidence between the peoples, to rally them in a single multinational state for the struggle to build a new society. If we demand freedom to secede for all oppressed and underprivileged nations without exception, Lenin wrote,

We do so not because *we favour secession*, but *only* because we stand for *free, voluntary* association and merging as distinct from forcible association. That is the *only* reason!<sup>2</sup>

All peoples are sovereign; they have the right independently, without dictation, without compulsion and pressure by other nations and states, to determine their fate, to resolve all questions relating to the various spheres of their

life and development. As early as 1903 Lenin had written that the Russian Social-Democrats

include in *their* programme not only complete equality of status for all languages, nationalities, etc., but also recognition of every nation's right to determine its own destiny.<sup>3</sup>

Proletarian internationalism is the initial ideological and political basis of the national programme of a Marxist party. The ideology of proletarian internationalism reflects the interests and objectives of the workers of all countries and nationalities in the deepest and most concentrated way. Its principles, above all that of the equality of all peoples and races, underlie the Communist Party's programme proposals and policy in the field of national relations. Its principles underlie the whole system of the Soviet national statehood of peoples and of the united multinational Soviet state.

These principles are as follows:

- the sovereignty and equality of all nations, and of all peoples and races;
- real equality of all nations and nationalities;
- the voluntary and free character of the association of Soviet republics and nations in a single Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;
- the sovereignty of all Union Republics;
- democratic centralism as the form combining the international and national interests of the Soviet nations and nationalities in a multinational state.

Lenin's programme on the national question was a component of the Party's fight for democracy and socialism. It was based on a precise, rigorously scientific taking into account of the interests of the national development of peoples, great and small, and proceeded from the need to subordinate national interests to international ones. The Party's demands on the national question, Lenin stressed, were subordinated to 'the interests of the proletarian struggle' and to the 'supreme interests of socialism'.<sup>4</sup>

The CPSU's experience confirms the conclusions of Marx, Engels, and Lenin that the national question cannot be solved in any country in isolation from its social problems, and that even when the composition of the population is multinational the national question is not the main one, but is significant as a constituent of the general fight for socialism.

The CPSU's experience has indicated that the national question can be tackled consistently on the basis of the

transition to socialism, thus confirming the correctness of one of the most important propositions of scientific communism, which was formulated by Lenin as follows:

It is *impossible* to abolish national (or any other political) oppression under capitalism, since this *requires* the abolition of classes, i.e., the introduction of socialism.<sup>5</sup>

The abolition of national oppression and the establishing of equality and fraternal friendship among peoples are one of the main general features of the socialist revolution inherent in all countries taking the road to socialism. The Marxist-Leninist theory of the national question, and the experience of implementing a programme for resolving the national question in the USSR, are therefore of world historical value.

As regards modern African states, the forms and rates of their further development largely depend on how the national question is tackled, in other words on how quickly they succeed in eliminating national and intertribal discord, in putting an end to various manifestations of tribalism and separatism, in establishing fraternal relations between the various ethnic groups, in resolving the language problem, and in achieving real equality in the level of socio-economic and cultural development of the peoples within one country. A critical analysis of bourgeois, nationalist theories of exclusiveness, tribal separatism, and other concepts has therefore acquired special importance in our day.

The aim of our own research has not simply been to show that there is a national question in Africa, despite the assertions of certain African leaders and bourgeois writers, and that the failure to tackle it is having a considerable effect on the political life of contemporary African states, but also to disclose the roots and nature of ethnic contradictions and antagonisms and to analyse the principles for tackling ethnic problems in the programmatic statements of the governments and parties of African states; to describe measures taken by a number of African countries to resolve the various aspects of ethnic problems; to show a close connection between ethnic problems and the programme for socio-economic transformations as a whole; and to state our own view on possible ways and means of dealing with the ethnic problems of Africa today.

The operation of general laws shows itself in various forms corresponding to concrete historical conditions and



national peculiarities. In spite of all the complexities, and even of some failures, a varied process of social change is taking place over broad areas of the world. The diversity is conditioned by the historical past, by the specific ethnic character and peculiarities of the ethno-cultural traditions of the individual peoples, and by the polymorphism of the ethnic structure of most of the recently formed states. In the author's opinion, a truly scientific analysis of the processes taking place in developing countries is therefore impossible, and miscalculations are inevitable in forecasting them, unless the ethnic factors are taken into account. Such an analysis will help, in particular, to develop a theoretically substantiated policy for tackling the complex national question in African states.

## Notes to the Introduction

1. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party, *Collected Works*, Vol. 6, p. 503.
2. V. I. Lenin, A Caricature of Marxism and Imperialist Economism, *Collected Works*, Vol. 23, p. 67.
3. V. I. Lenin, The National Question in Our Programme, *Collected Works*, Vol. 6, p. 461.
4. V. I. Lenin, A Caricature of Marxism, *Op. cit.*, p. 57.
5. V. I. Lenin, The Discussion on Self-Determination Summed Up, *Collected Works*, Vol. 22, p. 325.

## Chapter One. Forms of National Oppression Under the Colonial Regime

National oppression is a form of social oppression. The main principles of the imperialist powers' policy in governing their possessions found reflection in various forms of national oppression. A characteristic feature of the system of 'direct rule', in French and Portuguese colonies, for example, was assimilation, a condescending attitude to and suppression of the indigenous African culture, banning of the mother tongue in schools and administrative bodies, and the use of French and Portuguese as the official languages. By granting citizenship to a limited number of Africans, in other words by deliberate 'gallicisation' and 'portugalicisation' of the top people of African society the French and Portuguese colonial authorities not only built up social support for themselves in their possessions, but also set some Africans against others. In the British colonies, on the contrary, where the system of indirect rule existed, the African languages were used in the system of school education, and colonial civil servants were expected to know the language of the local population: the traditional African authorities were widely represented in the system of colonial administration in the person of emirs, chiefs, kings, etc. Conscious preservation of the tribal-clan structure and organisation in Anglophone Africa led to ethnic isolation, intensified tribal disunity, and cultivated ethnic prejudices.

In most African countries national oppression was manifested as a rule in a system of racial discrimination in all spheres of life—economic, political, and social. Or rather, there was a close interweaving of colonialism, racial discrimination, and national oppression.

The problems of artificial boundaries dividing common ethnic regions, the fomenting of tribal discord, and a policy of setting one people against another were general features

of the national policy of colonialism. All these were national aspects of colonial oppression. We think, however, that national oppression in the colonial period should be understood in a much broader sense; many of its facets were associated with colonial oppression. In that sense one cannot agree with those writers who draw a line between colonial and national oppression and maintain that the political and economic discrimination against the African population had no connection with national oppression.

National oppression was primarily manifested in keeping Africans out of their own countries' governments, in depriving them of the franchise and free speech, in forbidding them to set up their own organisations, and in the colonial authorities' control over the activity of parties and trade unions. Discrimination in the economic sphere was another form of national oppression. African peasants were prohibited from acquiring land in areas set aside for European settlement and to grow certain export crops at their own discretion. Forced labour and the system of compulsory contracts to work in other countries in fulfilment of inter-government conventions were nothing other than national oppression, since these measures applied only to the native African population.

The colonial authorities' policy in the economic sphere not only intensified the existing inequality in level of socio-economic development between the different peoples and countries, but also deepened it. In some areas roads and industrial undertakings were built, and there were big plantations using advanced technology, while other areas and even whole countries (like Upper Volta, Middle Congo, Ubangi-Shari) were converted by the colonialists into suppliers of labour, and so condemned to perpetual backwardness.

The theoretical justification of racial discrimination, like the exploitation of colonial peoples as a whole, was the theory of the inferiority of black people and their incapacity for independent development. The roots of racial theories go back to the time of the slave trade; their purpose was to justify the exporting of millions of Africans to plantations in America and the West Indies. A black skin was declared the sign of a lower race.

These racial theories took on a new note in the colonial period. Arguments about the white man's civilising mission in relation to Africans were closely linked with racial theo-



ry. It is hardly necessary to cite the numerous statements of the apologists of colonialism, who not only justified the colonialists' actions but demagogically called the whole system of colonial exploitation the heavy burden the white man had allegedly assumed in order to bring civilisation to the Africans. Even forced labour was thus explained as a great blessing.

We desire to make of the native a useful citizen (the Governor of Kenya, Sir H. Conway Belfield, said in 1917) and ... consider the best means of doing so is to induce him to work for a period of his life for the European.<sup>1</sup>

Six years before the proclamation of Kenya's independence Mr. H. Slade, the elected member of the Legislative Council for the Aherdare, declared that the European settlers of Kenya carried 'a tremendous responsibility'.

We are the leaders and teachers of other races. We have taken that responsibility upon ourselves in East Africa for over the past 100 years.

In the interests of all the people of this Colony, we cannot abandon that responsibility and we require other races here to accept the fact that we must for the foreseeable future continue to be their teachers and leaders.<sup>2</sup>

Life, as we know, has introduced vital amendments into those plans.

The resolute opposition of Africans to racial discrimination forced the colonialists to resort to a more subtle justification of their policy. Theories of the inferiority of black peoples were replaced by concepts of paternalism, partnership, the creation of a multiracial society, and so on.

Africans were called children and Europeans were assigned the role of parents. Some colonialists, for instance, speaking of the people of the Belgian Congo, often alleged that they were children who had been put into the care of the Belgian government, and that like all children they had to be looked after, they had to be taught and trained, they needed discipline as in the handling of any children, and that it was impossible to grant them the authority that adults enjoyed who knew how to exercise it.

Some people began to say that there was no racial or colour, but only a cultural barrier. But behind all these new masks there lurked as before the colonial authorities' discriminatory policy in both the economic sphere and the political and social life of African countries. As an example we may cite the Congo, where paternalism was proclaimed

the main principle of colonial policy, and a number of countries in East and Central Africa, where the theory of partnership and the building of a multiracial society was put into practice.

The idea of the white man's superiority was persistently hammered into Africans' consciousness. From childhood they were taught humility and obedience to the white man. At the same time a spirit of the white race's superiority took root in the children of European settlers. The white child in Kenya was taught, for instance, as Mbin Koinange, one of the leaders of the Kenya national liberation movement, put it, that he was the leader, that he would lead. He was trained for this role; it was drummed into him that he had to rule, that his behaviour was perfect, and that people of any other racial group had no right to argue with him.<sup>3</sup>

The result of this policy was not only an 'inferiority complex' and a reverence by some Africans for the white master but also infection of broad circles of the European settlers with racism. Racism has put down deep roots in the consciousness of some of the European workers in several African countries, in particular in South Africa, and for many years that has split the labour movement in Africa. The harsh persecution that Europeans who speak out against racism in South Africa suffer is well known. The colonialists' aim is not to let people of different ethnic origin unite in struggle for their rights, and to divide them by artificially created barriers of racial and national hatred. On the contrary, the fight to overcome intertribal and national discord and to unite all democratic forces against colonialism has always formed an important part of the educational work of progressive parties and organisations.

National discord and racial prejudice are not inborn; they are the result of a certain education. The imperialists not only artificially inflamed national discord between Africans and Europeans, between Africans and Indians and Arabs, but also pursued a policy of setting African peoples against one another. The colonialists and their policy of deliberate retention of tribal-clan relations, support of tribal separatism, and exercise of the 'divide-and-rule' principle are very much to blame for the tense ethnic relations that have existed in several African states since their achieving of independence.

Let us look into some of the forms of national oppression in more detail. Africans were debarred for many years

from taking part in government and Europeans represented their interests in the legislatures. In most countries Africans did not have the franchise. But even when the colonialists were forced to make some concessions, under pressure of the national liberation movement, and in particular to grant the franchise to Africans and admit them to the central organs of power, this right was granted to only an insignificant minority of the population. According to the Constitution of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland of 1953, for instance, which proclaimed the principle of 'multiracial co-operation' and 'partnership', the seven million natives had less than 20 per cent of the seats in the Federal Assembly, and the 300,000 whites—80 per cent. The franchise, moreover, was granted to Africans with definite qualifications—property, age, education, etc. Persons with an annual income of £720, or £480 plus primary education, or £300 plus secondary education could be included on the electoral rolls.

The average income of Africans in employment in 1956 (the journal *East Africa and Rhodesia* reported<sup>4</sup>) was approximately £70 per annum. The average European income for the same year was about £1,100. In 1958, therefore, only 1,500 Africans out of 8 million were put on the voting lists, while 81,000 out of 300,000 Europeans, or one in four, received the right to vote.

In Kenya the African population received the franchise only in 1956. But whereas the Europeans enjoyed universal, equal suffrage, a host of qualifications was instituted for Africans, such as property worth £500, five years' service in the army and police, seven years' work in industry or agriculture, and so on<sup>5</sup>. Africans got the vote only when they had three of these qualifications, while it was specified that no Kikuyu, Embu, or Meru (peoples that had been actively involved in the national liberation movement of 1952-55) would be 'permitted to stand as a candidate unless he has successfully passed the loyalty test'. The population of the northern areas of Kenya (Galla and Somali) did not receive the franchise at all. Thus, out of the six million African population only 126,500 persons were admitted to the electoral registers for the first elections in 1957. The number of such examples could be considerably extended.

National oppression also existed in the economic and other spheres of the life of African peoples.

As we remarked above, national oppression took the form

of racial discrimination in most African countries, and depended on the specific conditions. In the protectorates and trust territories, and in countries where the number of European settlers constituting the support of the colonial authorities was very small, the colonialists were forced to draw African society's upper crust to their side. Colour discrimination was therefore weaker in those countries and did not lead to the promulgation of laws on territorial or other types of segregation. But although there were no special laws in these countries for Europeans and for Africans, the race barrier was felt everywhere: in pay, medical services and the system of education, and in various manifestations of national discord and racial prejudice in everyday life. In the countries with a large permanently resident European population—Kenya, Southern Rhodesia, South Africa—national and racial subjugation was reinforced, and in South Africa and Rhodesia is still reinforced, by legislation.

In Kenya, Europeans constituted less than one per cent of the population but held a dominant position in the country. European farmers and planters owned large and very fertile lands located in the Highlands. In order to legalise the possession of these lands by the European settlers, the colonial authorities issued two orders in 1939—'The Kenya (Highlands) Order in Council, 1939' and 'The Kenya (Native Areas) Order in Council, 1939'. The land in the Highlands was officially proclaimed 'white man's country' and transferred to the exclusive possession of European settlers. Africans and Indians were categorically forbidden to acquire land in that area. Africans were to live on lands—reservations—specially set aside for them.

It was not enough, however, to legalise the possession of lands by European settlers; it was necessary to secure labour for them, that is to force African peasants to work on them. During the years of colonial rule a series of laws and orders in council were issued introducing forced labour and strictly punishing any breach of contract. An ordinance issued in 1910 ('The Employment of Natives Ordinance') had already forbidden Africans to quit a European employer before expiry of their contracts. A sentence of up to six months' imprisonment was provided for leaving work. By an ordinance of 1918 an African could live on a European's farm only on condition that he worked for the owner. For a small patch of ground, usually not exceeding 0.8 hectare, he was obliged to work 180 days a year or more for the

farmer. By an ordinance of 1920 every African male was obliged to work for 60 days a year on the building and repairing of roads and other public works at the discretion of the colonial authorities.

The authorities banned, in the interests of the white settlers, the growing by Africans of such export crops as coffee, tea, and citrus fruit altogether, or limited it. Lower purchasing prices were fixed for Africans than for Europeans. The banking and credit system mainly served European employers. Racial discrimination also existed in the payment of labour—African workers received many times less than Europeans for the same work.

The health and education systems were based on the racial principle. Special schools and hospitals existed for Europeans, Indians, and Africans.

Africans were prohibited from entering many hotels and restaurants; in railway stations there were special waiting rooms and toilets for Europeans and Africans. One could cite many facts of everyday racial discrimination on the part of white settlers during the years of colonial rule, and of their gross violation of the elementary human rights of the peoples of Kenya.

But even in those countries in which the system of racial discrimination was not legalised national oppression existed everywhere—beginning with the system of government and ending with racial prejudice in everyday life.

In the Portuguese colonies a policy of forcible assimilation was pursued. Its theoretical justification was a proposition about the 'great multiracial community' allegedly being consolidated into a single nation.

In accordance with the official doctrine, Angola, Mozambique, and Portuguese Guinea were considered overseas provinces of Portugal, were part of the 'Portuguese national unity', and were to enjoy all the prerogatives of independence and sovereignty. In actual fact they were very real colonies, in which a system of racial discrimination and exploitation of the native population existed.

The status of the overseas provinces of Portugal, which converted them into integral components of the fascist state, allowed Portugal to avoid control over its colonial activity by international organisations, above all by the United Nations.

Formally and juridically the population of the Portuguese colonies was not divided along racial lines but by

degree of 'civilisation': Portuguese citizens (*cidadãos portugueses*)—European settlers and Africans who had received the status of *assimilados* (assimilated); and Portuguese natives (*indígenos portugueses*)—the majority of the indigenous population. The norms of common law and various discriminatory circulars and orders connected with control over movement, the campaign against idleness, and so on, applied to the 'natives'.

Only a few Africans managed to get into the category of 'civilised'. To become 'assimilated' and 'civilised' an African had to speak Portuguese fluently, have an income adequate to support himself and his family, follow a way of life corresponding to Portuguese 'standards', have a 'good character', and so on. Although the Portuguese colonialists tried to demonstrate that cultural development underlay the division of African peoples into 'civilised' and 'uncivilised', the demarcation was in fact made along racial lines, because the most illiterate European was counted 'civilised' simply because he was white, while all Africans came under the category of 'uncivilised' by birth. Furthermore, by an ordinance of 20 May 1954 the Portuguese authorities could deprive 'assimilated' Africans of the right of citizenship and transfer them to the category of 'uncivilised'. More than 99.5 per cent of the population of the Portuguese colonies fell into this category. The right to elect to the Portuguese parliament and the governing bodies of the colonies was accorded only to persons having Portuguese citizenship. It is important to note that not a single African certified as 'civilised' or 'assimilated' could be elected to these bodies because that was the legal right only of persons who were Portuguese citizens by birth.

The intensive economic growth of the Portuguese colonies, however, and the growing national liberation struggle in Angola and Mozambique and revolutionary changes in the neighbouring countries necessitated a transformation of the political and juridical superstructure of Portuguese colonialism and partial changes in the methods of its social policy.

In 1961 Portugal began to carry out a series of reforms that formally equalised the rights of the African and Portuguese population of Angola and Mozambique. In particular the status of 'Portuguese natives' was abolished, as were the norms that legalised the inequality of the indigenous inhabitants in political and social life; although the tax burden

was not diminished, the discriminatory character of the tax legislation was reduced. These measures, however, did not entail abolition of the system of racial discrimination. Although all the inhabitants were accorded the franchise in accordance with Portuguese legislation, an ordinance of 1963 limited participation in elections by quite high educational, property, and other qualifications, and in practice deprived the whole native population of the opportunity to take part in them. Thus the indigenous population did not even formally have the opportunity of making their demands known in state bodies.

In the last years of Portuguese colonialism a new concept of creating a multiracial 'integrated community' and of strengthening ethnic links with the metropolis was put forward. In accordance with this theory a settling of Portuguese in the African possessions began. Stimulation of migration, which was an important part of Portugal's colonial policy, provided not only a social base in the colonies, and their military basis, but also led to an intensification of the system of racial discrimination. This was encouraged by another circumstance, namely the settlers' permanent contacts with South Africa. Quite a few English and white South Africans lived permanently in Mozambique as owners of plantations and industrial undertakings. Many Portuguese had long sent their children to study in South Africa. As a result, the existence of multilateral contacts with South Africa led to an intensification of racial prejudices and racial segregation.

Intensive Portuguese immigration into Angola and Mozambique, supplemented by immigration from the Union of South Africa and later, after 1961, from the Republic of South Africa, not only led to a sharpening of social and racial contradictions but also opened up dangerous prospects. This colonisation corresponded to the interests of the bloc of several Western powers clinging to supremacy in the south, complicated the achievement of national independence by Angola and Mozambique, and hampered their independent development in the future.

Racial discrimination was also manifested in the economic sphere. As we noted above, the indigenous population was not only robbed of the land, but the African peasant was not permitted to grow crops at his own discretion. In each 'economic zone' the peasant was forced by compulsory measures to grow some export crop or another.

The system of racial discrimination showed very clearly in the forced recruiting of labour, the state assuming the role of supplier of hands not only for the European farms but also for the mines of the Republic of South Africa and the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Under conventions and agreements Portugal was obliged to supply up to 100,000 Africans annually to the Union of South Africa from Mozambique and about the same number to the Federation. This was nothing more than a shameful trading in people, a trade that brought the Portuguese colonialists huge profits. Foreign employers were obliged to pay the Portuguese government a certain levy each month on each worker. In addition, the authorities levied exactions of all kinds on the Africans themselves who contracted to work in other countries. A series of laws and ordinances regulated the Africans' work. They were forbidden to quit their jobs before the expiration of the contract, and to leave a boss's farm without the authorities' permission. The African received only a tenth to a twentieth of what a European got for his labour.

Thus, although racial discrimination was not legalised in the Portuguese colonies, it was widely practised. The policy of 'assimilation' and of 'bringing culture to the natives', widely advertised by the Portuguese colonialists, meant in fact a form of discrimination and national oppression.

We must specially note the severe national oppression experienced by the peoples of African countries in the cultural sphere during the colonial period. It was not only expressed in the colonialists' deliberately keeping the African peoples in ignorance; in endeavouring to create support for themselves among the growing African intelligentsia they corrupted the latter ideologically. Africans were educated with a disdain for their cultural heritage; African art was declared to be primitive and elementary. This policy bore its fruits: some individual Africans were ashamed of their origin and of their culture, traditions, and customs. That is why progressive African leaders and statesmen are now posing the question of spiritual decolonisation so sharply and of educating a new man without an 'inferiority complex', who loves his people and is proud of their history, culture, and traditions.

In all the French and Portuguese colonies Africans were prohibited from teaching their children in the mother tongue, and teaching was carried on in the language of the

metropolis. In countries under British domination, some African languages were employed in the elementary school, but they were not developed in any way in further education and teaching was carried on wholly in English. The point was not merely that teaching in the mother tongue was prohibited or limited; all curricula were subordinated to the needs of the metropolis. Speaking of colonial Algeria the French publicist Marcel Egretaud wrote:

Cultural oppression is manifested again in curricula conceived in such a way as to prevent any recognition of the Algerian personality, to leave Algeria's past in the dark, or rather to make one think that it was a country without a past, primitive and uncultured, before the arrival of the French.<sup>6</sup>

In former 'French' Africa, the rector of Ibadan University, Onwuka Dike, said in opening the First International Congress of Africanists in Accra in December 1962, that African children were taught about 'our ancestors the Gauls', and in the schools of former 'British' Africa they studied more about the reign of Henry VIII than about Uthman dan Fodio.<sup>7</sup> Professor Joseph Ki-Zerbo, from Upper Volta, criticising the old curricula, remarked that 30 per cent of all the time in geography lessons was spent on the former metropolis and less than 10 per cent on the geography of the African country concerned. In the whole geography course, on which an academic year was spent, African children were forced to learn about countries with a temperate climate instead of their attention being concentrated on the physical and economic geography of the African continent. It was quite inadmissible, Prof. Ki-Zerbo said, when school-children knew nothing about neighbouring African countries.<sup>8</sup>

Separate schools existed for Africans and Europeans. In some countries this separation was enforced by law. Larger sums were spent on the education of Europeans' children than on developing African schools. In Angola and Mozambique there were no ordinances on the separate education of Europeans and Africans, but in fact such segregation existed everywhere. For the children of Africans there were three-year mission schools 'for natives'. Finishing them gave the opportunity of studying in an elementary school in which all teaching was carried on exclusively in Portuguese, but as a rule few Africans were able to acquire the necessary knowledge to enter one. At the same time the children of Europeans studied in state or private elementary schools.

The curriculum of the schools 'for natives' was much curtailed; the African schoolchild therefore could not transfer to a state elementary school where Europeans studied. Nor could he enter a *lycée*, because children under fourteen years of age only were admitted by them (and the Africans had to study for three years in a preparatory school and at best finished elementary school at 15 or 16).

The lack of schools for Africans and the poverty of parents led to only a few children of school age being able to attend school. In Kenya, in 1956, there were only 3,500 elementary schools and 21 secondary schools for its six million inhabitants. Only a quarter of the children of Africans could attend a primary school. The number of pupils in secondary schools was 0.65 per cent of the children of secondary-school age. At the same time 100 per cent of the children of Europeans attended elementary schools and 84 per cent secondary schools. In Uganda, in 1957, only around 290,000 of the 1,300,000 African children of school age, or 22 per cent, attended school. In 1951 expenditure on the elementary education of an African child in Uganda was only £1.<sup>9</sup>

According to the conference of African ministers of education held in Addis-Ababa in May 1964, 17 million of the 25 million children of school age in countries south of the Sahara were unable even to attend a primary school, and only very few of the eight million pupils remained at school until the completion of elementary education. For the continent as a whole, the number of children covered by school education did not exceed 16 per cent, and in some countries it was only 2 per cent.<sup>10</sup>

The African who, with great difficulty, obtained a higher education abroad, often could not find work on returning to his country.

All that is clear evidence that the colonialists deliberately kept the masses of the people in African countries in ignorance.

Colonial regimes and the system of racial discrimination are still preserved in Southern Africa. Racism, the general feature characteristic of Southern African regimes, arouses the anger and indignation of all civilised mankind. South African reality is clear and convincing evidence that racism is a product of the development of polyethnic and multi-racial countries under imperialist domination, that it inevitably accompanies reaction and serves to reinforce it, and

that it is a means of intensifying the exploitation and national oppression of peoples.

The immense socio-economic and political changes that have taken place in the colonial world since the Second World War, and the collapse of colonial regimes prompted the ruling classes in South Africa to seek new, more veiled forms of colonial exploitation and national oppression. The party in power in the Union of South Africa, the National Party, found this in the policy of apartheid.

The development of the doctrine of apartheid dates from 1947-48 when the National Party decided to unify its demands under a single slogan. The Afrikaner word *apartheid* (segregation) was given a political meaning for the first time.

The aim of apartheid as a policy consists in

preserving and safeguarding the racial identity of the indigenous peoples as separate racial groups, with opportunities to develop into self-governing national units; of fostering the inculcation of national consciousness, self-esteem, and mutual regard among the various races of the country.<sup>11</sup>

The basic principle of apartheid, as proclaimed by the ideologists of South African racism, is the separate existence and development of racial and ethnic groups through the demarcation of special areas for each of them. According to the inventors of this 'theory', its implementation allegedly opens the road to independent development of the peoples inhabiting South Africa, and so resolving the crisis in the mutual relations of the various races and ethnic groups. The term 'apartheid' has now come to be commonly used in academic and political literature and invariably symbolises extreme, harsh forms of racial and national oppression.

The ideas of apartheid are presented by their authors as a continuation of the traditions not of the white population as a whole on an equal basis, but just of the Boers. The inventors of apartheid took every opportunity to single the Boers out, as the 'master people', and to appeal to Boer traditions and nationalism.

In that connection appeals to religion play a special part in the ideology of apartheid, especially to the creed of the Dutch Reformed Church to which most believing Boers (or Afrikaners) belong.

By employing such Boer traditions as religious intolerance and fanatical belief in the literal truth of the text of the

Bible, the ideologists of apartheid often quote the Bible, interpreting it so as to find a justification of racialism. Thus the words 'after their families, after their tongues, in their lands, after their nations', from the enumeration of the peoples originating from the sons of Noah (*Genesis*, x, V. 31), are interpreted as a predestination from on high that every people and every race has its own way of life and path of development, in other words that the European way of life is allegedly not for Africans and the African not for Europeans; each race should develop along its own road. Apartheid is thus allegedly the sole true solution of the racial problem.

The doctrine of apartheid is based on recognition of racial antagonisms and hostility as the natural condition of society. Constant clashes can only be avoided, its theorists claim, by separating the different peoples in different territories.

The ideologists of apartheid constantly frighten the white population with the bogey of the 'black peril'. In order to preserve their racial identity Europeans must, they say, strictly see to the unity of their ranks and severely punish all those who do not observe 'purity of the blood'. Otherwise future economic development will allegedly lead to a mixing of racial and national groups, and that would mean the end not only of whites' hegemony in South Africa but even of their very existence.

Whatever their ideological cover, modern forms of racial discrimination are nothing else than neocolonialism in racial policy, by which the ruling classes are endeavouring to stabilise the social and economic structure of the countries of Southern Africa, and to camouflage the exploiting essence of their policy.

The policy of apartheid proclaimed in the election programme of the National Party in the Union of South Africa in 1947 envisaged the observance of territorial and political segregation and separation of Europeans and the non-European population as a whole by place of residence and, as far as feasible, by sphere of production.<sup>12</sup>

The system of 'Bantustans' worked out on the basis of this programme was to ensure, in the view of its ideologists, 'homelands' for Africans, who would be evicted from zones earmarked for persons of European origin. It was demagogically declared that the African population in Bantustans would allegedly get the chance to work and live in accordance with their own traditions and customs.



The class essence of this policy, which is being carried out in the interests of the dominant minority, is shown by the fact that the richest and most prosperous areas have been declared 'white' regions, while the 'homelands' of the African population have been set up on the basis of already overpopulated and poor reservations.

By preserving the out-lived social structures in the Bantustans, the South African neocolonialists are not only deforming the processes of social and economic development but are also artificially resurrecting obsolete tribal institutions. By creating a privileged position for the administrative top people of the Bantustans, the ruling classes are striving to find social support among them and to draw quite a sizeable stratum of the population into collaboration.

The effect of apartheid on the socio-economic and political processes in South Africa has many aspects and is not limited to those mentioned above. Let us note two other factors.

According to apartheid Africans working for wages in 'white' areas are to be in the position of foreign workers there. They are denied opportunities of creating their own trade unions, of struggling to improve their position, and are completely isolated from workers of European origin. The ruling circles of South Africa thus count on deepening the split in the working class, and on denying the very numerous and experienced proletariat of Africa the opportunity to make its contribution to the national democratic struggle of the South African peoples.

Apartheid slows down and distorts the processes of national consolidation and integration, reinforces tribal exclusiveness and isolation, and leads to the sharpening social conflicts often taking the form of racial and ethnic conflicts and clashes.

Government propaganda systematically, and not unsuccessfully, spreads an atmosphere of racist psychosis among a considerable part of the European population. Intensified racism among one part of the population inevitably evokes a corresponding reaction in the other part, and extremist moods on both sides only complicate the overcoming of racial prejudices and complex interethnic and inter-racial relations, and put obstacles in the way of real national liberation.

Discriminatory legislation governs all aspects of the life of the non-European population of South Africa—residence,

choice of job, movement, family relations, possibility of contacts. The least deviation from the racial rules becomes a crime and is used as an excuse to persecute the non-Europeans. 269,000 people were arrested in 1975 for violation of the pass laws. 224,000 more Africans were sent to the "aid centres" for rehabilitation.<sup>13</sup> In March 1977 the fine for such violation was doubled.

The deliberately provoked atmosphere of racial and national discord instills the poison of racism into the consciousness of millions of people.

In Rhodesia the colonialists have chosen another form of racial discrimination and exploitation of the non-European population of the country, a form proclaimed as 'racial partnership'. The ideologists of Southern Rhodesian racism present their country as a model of harmonious racial development. The policy of partnership, they declared, had entered a new phase, that of integration. The leader of the Rhodesian regime, Ian Smith, has therefore even publicly dissociated himself from the policy of apartheid; Rhodesia, he declared, would not take the road of building a state based on separate development, like South African apartheid.

The actual facts, however, speak otherwise. At first glance there really is no discrimination, for example, in the system of landowning, because the law on land tenure distributes the land equally among the races. But some 45 million acres are assigned to 278,000 whites and the same amount to 6,100,000 Africans. Thus the share of one European is 162 acres while that of an African is only 7.3 acres. Furthermore, according to unpublished government statistics, 71 per cent of the total of Grade 1 land, i.e., of the most arable, is owned by Europeans.<sup>14</sup>

According to the Minister of Internal Affairs of Rhodesia Africans can only occupy posts in areas for the black population below the rank of district commissioner. All responsible posts from district commissioner upward are held by Europeans.

The educational system is divided between Africans and non-Africans, and appropriations for the education of Europeans and Africans are apportioned on the basis of separate budgets. The budget for the 1975/76 school year envisaged appropriating 34.5 million Rhodesian dollars for Africans, while the European division of the budget assigned 44.8 million dollars for the education of Europeans. Considering that

the number of African pupils was 810,000 and the number of European pupils 60,000, we get the following impressive difference: while government expenditure on the education of a European schoolchild is 746.66 dollars, expenditure per African schoolchild is 68.14 dollars, or less than one-eleventh of that.<sup>15</sup>

National oppression, denial of civil rights, and suppression of the indigenous culture have evoked resistance of the African peoples since the first years of colonialism. To one degree or another all their actions directed against the colonialists can be considered a fight against national oppression, a fight that has taken on various forms depending on the level of social development and the intensity of national oppression.

In spite of the banning of use of the mother tongue certain poets and writers continued to publish their work in African languages, and this was a protest against national oppression. The leading Somali poet Uvais Ibn Mohammed al-Baravi, for instance, wrote in his native language using Arabic script. Attempts to create a Somali alphabet and system of writing evoked harsh persecution in some colonial territories.

In Kenya, a broad campaign was initiated in the 1920s to set up schools independent of the colonial administration. These schools, which were often called 'independent Kikuyu schools', since their initiators belonged to the Kikuyu people, were built and maintained by the people themselves at their own expense. Colleges were opened to train teachers. The significance of the independent schools was not simply that more than 400,000 Africans were able to get an education in them, but also that their doors were open to the children of all the peoples of Kenya—Kikuyu, Luo, Masai, and others. Education in a spirit of unity and respect for the different peoples was particularly important in a country in which the imperialist policy of dividing peoples and setting them against one another was practised. After declaration of the emergency in October 1952, however, most of the independent schools were closed by the colonial authorities and many of the teachers arrested.

In spite of the policy of assimilation and the disdainful attitude of the colonialists toward African art, the rich traditions of their distinctive culture were alive in the African countries and being developed, which was manifested in oral folk art, sculpture, music, and dance. The progressively

mindful intelligentsia did much to foster preservation of the cultural values created by the peoples of Africa.

In 1948 a cultural and educational society *Descobremos Angola* (We Will Discover Angola) was founded in Angola, and in 1950 a semi-legal cultural organisation *Academia cultural de Angola*. Their members ran literacy classes in the villages, celebrated national festivals, and organised circles to study illegal literature. On the initiative of the intelligentsia youth competitions were held for the best performance of literary and artistic works, and artistic group *Ngola ritmos* (Angola Rhythms) was founded, and so on—all of which not only encouraged the revival of national culture, but also led to growth of Africans' national consciousness.

The struggle of the peoples of Africa against national and colonial oppression has followed a long road in its development from spontaneous, sporadic actions against expropriation of the land and various displays of racial discrimination to deliberate armed struggle led by mass organisations and political parties for the final overthrow of colonialism and the building of independent, national, democratic states. At first the struggle was limited, as a rule, to the context of a single tribe and the organisations set up had a limited, tribal character. The first organisations of Africans opposing oppression appeared at the end of the nineteenth century. One of the earliest to arise on the Gold Coast was the Fanti Confederacy, which set itself the objective of stopping interference in Fanti affairs. A few years later, in 1897, the Aborigines' Rights Protection Society was founded on the Gold Coast in protest against the proclamation of Africans' land as Crown Lands. A major event in the peoples' struggle in West Africa was the founding in 1920 of the National Congress of British West Africa. While not setting itself the goal of ending the colonial regime, the Congress nevertheless demanded reforms in colonial government, in particular the granting of more rights in government to Africans. It is particularly important that the Congress demanded the ending of colour discrimination in the system of colonial administration.

A major role in the struggle against discrimination and national oppression and for the revival of national culture, and consequently in the fight for national liberation as a whole, was played by numerous societies, organisations, clubs, etc., most of which were founded by members of



the African intelligentsia. Some of them were set up on a narrow, tribal basis, others united people of various ethnic affiliation.

The aims that the founders of these societies set themselves were different, as are their subsequent fates. Some, having developed as cultural-educational or philanthropic associations, which set themselves the objective of ending racial discrimination and improving life conditions within the context of the colonial regime, were converted in time into political parties opposing the colonial regime as such. But however moderate these cultural associations' demands were, they had played a big role in arousing the masses. They helped to mould public opinion, exerted pressure on the colonial authorities, encouraged the spread of liberating ideas and so the growth of Africans' national self-awareness, and paved the way for the setting up of political parties in the future.

The colonial authorities encouraged the founding of societies on a narrow, tribal basis because associations that united the members of a single tribe often propagated the ideology of tribal separatism and prevented the uniting of people of different ethnic affiliations. By encouraging such societies the colonialists employed them to split the liberation movement and to foment tribal discord. That is why progressive African leaders stood resolutely for the setting up of organisations and political parties that united members of the most diverse peoples in their ranks.

The West African Youth Association founded in Accra (Gold Coast) in December 1931 united the youth of different tribes. The Nigerian Youth Movement organisation included members of the Ibo, Yoruba, Edo, Ibibio, and other peoples of Nigeria. This was the first Nigeria-wide organisation in the history of the country to unite members of different peoples.<sup>16</sup> It had branches in all the main centres of Nigeria. One of its main aims, as the Youth Charter published in 1938 said, was to unite the different peoples of Nigeria and to develop national consciousness.

The Nigerian Youth Movement played a considerable part in moulding the national self-awareness of the peoples of Nigeria and in the fight against tribal ideology.

Such mass political parties of the 1950s and 1960s as the Kenya African Union, the Convention People's Party in Ghana, the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons, and others, were of immense significance in the struggle for

unity of the peoples against racial and national oppression. Their invariable demand was the legal banning of racial discrimination as incompatible with the morals and norms of civilisation and contrary to the principles of the United Nations Organisation.

The examples cited are evidence that national oppression evoked active resistance in all countries in Africa—in Algeria and Kenya, Ghana and South Africa, in the Portuguese colonies, and so on. This resistance showed itself in a fight for the extension of African representation in the governing bodies, in a striving to preserve their own culture, in the organisation of schools in the native language, in the setting up of numerous ethnic and cultural associations, and later political parties.

National oppression in its many and diverse forms promoted growth of African national consciousness. The progressive forces of Africa understood that the fight against racial discrimination and for the development of national culture was inevitably combined with the struggle against colonialism and for the democratic transformation of society. Africans know from their own experience, said the Resolution of All African People's Conference held in Accra in December 1958, that racism is an outcome of colonialism, while state independence is a precondition for ending it.

Solution of the complex problems facing the peoples of Southern Africa is only possible along the lines of ending the racist regimes, democratising political life, and abolishing all forms of racial discrimination.

Most of the countries in Africa have already freed themselves from the colonial yoke. Programmes of extensive decolonisation are being developed and are beginning to be implemented in all spheres of life, including that of inter-ethnic relations.

## Notes to Chapter One

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11. Race Relations Policy of the National Party. Cited from *South African Parties and Policies. 1910-1960*, London, 1960, p. 402.
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## Chapter Two. Effect of the Ethnic Factor in Consolidating National Independence and Socio-Economic Development

Ethnic problems have always played an important role in social development. They have many facets and various political, economic, and ideological aspects, including the following: the whole complex of problems associated with both the interrelationships of peoples of different ethnic origins and relations within any one ethnic group; the processes of nation-building; ending of the existing imbalance in the development of the different peoples; the language problems; the development of the ethnic features inherent in an *ethnos*; education of a new man in a spirit of respect for members of other ethnic groups; and the fight against tribal separatism and manifestations of tribalism. As experience has shown, the future development of African states along the road of consolidating national independence and social progress depends on proper tackling of all these matters.

The ethnic problems of each country have their own specific character; and in each concrete period of historical development they may assume a different significance and content. The ethnic factor as such often comes to the fore, as happened during the Nigerian crisis; in spite of its specific character in the individual countries of Tropical Africa, however, there is much in common in them, both in the reasons for the ethnic antagonisms and the ways and means of tackling ethnic problems.

We know what a heavy legacy colonialism left behind it, especially as regards ethnic problems. At the same time, it would be wrong to underrate the significance of this period in the life of African peoples not only from the aspect of the intensification of ethnic processes but also from the standpoint of the interaction of these problems with socio-economic development, which caused a breaking down of tri-

bal relationships and the forming of a class society. The African peoples' fight against the colonial regime evokes a rapid rise of national consciousness and in many ways predetermined ethnic development in today's independent African states.

The dual, contradictory character of many of the processes associated with ethnic development in the colonial era and during the struggle for national independence—in particular the intensifying of ethnic self-awareness—is affecting the solution of ethnic problems now, given independent existence.

The low level of the socio-economic development of Tropical Africa, the incompleteness of the processes of class formation, the mixed character of the economy characteristic of most African states, the continuing domination of foreign monopolies, the retention of many of the archaic forms and traditional institutions of tribal society—all are undoubtedly complicating the ethnic problems. In these conditions social protest often takes the form of ethnic conflicts.

Our analysis of official documents, and of the literature and other material, and our own personal observations in many African states, in particular in Nigeria, Ghana, Kenya, Uganda, and Zambia, confirm that these problems are being posed extremely sharply and are exerting a major influence on the socio-economic and political life of African countries. The complex ethnolinguistic structure is not in itself the cause of the immense role of the ethnic factor in the life of certain African states, but it undoubtedly leaves its mark on various aspects of life and faces governments with a number of problems, namely, the language question and the creation of alphabets for peoples without a written language; the liquidation of inequality in level of economic and social development; and the need to eliminate intertribal hostility and build friendly relations between the different peoples within any one country.

Certain political circles, however, are employing this complicated situation and the consequences stemming from it for their own, purely selfish interests in inner-party and interparty struggles for leadership, and in evolving policies for concrete socio-economic problems.

As we have noted above, the ethnic problems are a complex of political, economic, and ideological aspects. Often, however, they are reduced to tribalism. The term 'tribalism', moreover, itself encompasses different meanings. Some

people understand it very broadly, as an aggregate of surviving archaic institutions and organisations associated with the tribal system, i.e., with a system of kinship, forms of inheritance, traditional ceremonies and customs, the strength of bonds of blood relationship, a sense of ethnic solidarity, and so on. Other give 'tribalism' a narrow sense, namely, a hostile attitude to members of some other ethnic group. The word also means a policy directed to granting certain favours and privileges to persons belonging to the ethnic group of a leader, and to subsidising development plans for 'one's own' area, and so on.

The Nigerian weekly, the Lagos *Sunday Times*, wrote in May 1966 that tribalism was a folk expression signifying fears that one group was establishing dominance over others.<sup>1</sup>

'Tribalism' is also used in the literature to stress the archaic character of social development and the level of ethnic processes.

In the view of some researchers tribalism not only has an ideological significance but is also a political expression of the form of consciousness characteristic of the stage of class formation. C. Leys, for example, writes, citing the example of Kenya:

In Kenya ... tribalism serves both to displace the emerging class consciousness of the most exploited strata of society, especially in Kikuyu country, and to prevent the KPU from channelling emerging class antagonism into a nationwide opposition movement.<sup>2</sup>

Abner Cohen argues that

the phenomenon called 'tribalism' in contemporary Africa is the result, not of ethnic groups disengaging themselves from one another after independence, but of increasing interaction between them within the context of the new political situation. It is the outcome, not of conservatism, but of a dynamic socio-cultural change brought about by the new cleavages and new alignments of power within the framework of the new state.<sup>3</sup>

Arguing with Cohen, the Kenyan scholar Okot p'Bitek writes that it is misleading and confusing

to explain the social ills of Africa, which are, in any case, universal, in terms of so-called phenomenon of 'tribalism'. And for a clearer understanding of our problems, it is suggested that the term 'tribe' ought to be dropped from the sociological vocabulary.

But an even more important reason for dropping the term 'tribe' is that it is an insult. It means people living in primitive or barbaric conditions.<sup>4</sup>

Among the African intelligentsia the English word *tribe* and the French *tribu* evoke a negative reaction, and are associated with something primitive and backward. The expression 'ethnic group' has come to be used more in the academic literature. In fact the concept *tribe* no longer reflects today's level of socio-economic development. How can one call the Yoruba, Ibo, Baganda, and Kikuyu peoples, and many others in Africa, tribes, when a national bourgeoisie, a working class, and an intelligentsia have developed among them? This concept also does not reflect the form of the ethnic community, because a great many African peoples are at a much higher stage of ethnic development, and an active process of the forming of nations is going on among them.

Politicians attribute to 'tribalism' everything reactionary that is damaging national unity and is splitting it from motives of ethnic affiliation. They oppose the concepts 'nation' and 'national', uniting the members of many ethnic groups to tribalism. Some African politicians consider that there can be only one nation in each state—the Malian, Guinean, and so on; and some go further and deny the existence even of different ethnic groups within their countries.

In present-day Africa the ethnic factor is playing a particularly marked role in the activity of parties and organisations. In most of the countries of Tropical Africa the first organisations, and then also the first political parties, were founded on an ethnic basis. In various years in Nigeria there existed the Egbe Omo Oduduwa, uniting Yoruba, the Ibo Union, and other organisations; in the Congo there was the Bakongo Association or Abako (*Association pour le maintien, l'unité, et l'expansion de la langue Kikongo*), in Tanganyika the Bahaya, Sukuma, and other tribal unions, in Kenya organisations of the various ethnic groups (among the Kikuyu, Kamba, Luo, and Baluhya), in Senegal, Guinea (among the Malinke, Susu, and Fulani), and Ghana (among the Ashanti and other peoples), and so on.

The Luo Union in Kenya is an example of the programme of ethnic associations. The following aims were written into its rules: to encourage and support mutual assistance and mutual understanding between all Luo wherever they lived; to find ways and means for developing areas inhabited by Luo in every way, socially, educationally, and economically; to promote and apply customs acceptable to modern civilisation in the life of the Luo; to offer serious resistance

to such alien customs as could injure the Luo; to protect the well-being of Luo wherever they were; to ban any religious sect that might be considered dangerous or undesirable; to co-operate with the authorities in carrying out plans and projects aimed, in the view of the Union, at improving the Luo country as a whole; to set up its own printing shops, bookshops, and libraries open to the people, and to publish newspapers, journals, bulletins, and other material; to build its own hospitals, dispensaries, meeting halls, etc.; to undertake, independently or jointly with other peoples, associations, and local or central authorities, activities that in the view of the Union could promote the economic and/or social progress of the country as a whole and of any part of it, on condition that the latter should not harm any other people whatever or the country as a whole; the Union was to have the right to buy land or to acquire property by other means.

Members of the Luo Union, unlike most other such ethnic organisations, could be 'all adult Luo men and women' and 'any other adult person other than Luo who lives within the Luo community and agrees with Luo customs and traditions' and with the constitution of the Union.<sup>5</sup>

However broad the aims of these ethnic organisations were, they ultimately prevented the elimination of tribal exclusiveness, encouraged a strengthening of ethnic particularism, which led at times to a sharpening of tribalistic frames of mind, and retarded the processes of tribal integration. Yet one can hardly agree with those scholars who, on these grounds, deny the positive factors in the activity of such organisations. There is no doubt that, in spite of their sometimes narrow ethnic base, these organisations and parties played an important role in awakening the national self-awareness of African peoples and in the national liberation movement as a whole, because they were a school of political struggle, the embryo of the building of national parties and social organisations. Ethnic parties were the first form of organisation conceivable in general under the colonial regime, and an inevitable stage in political activity.

Many parties that became major political organisations were, and still are, based on certain ethnic groups. The Yoruba constituted the ethnic base of the Action Group in Nigeria; the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons was based to a considerable degree on the Ibo, and the Northern People's Congress on the Hausa and Fulani. In

Kenya, the Kenya African National Union (KANU) united mainly Kikuyu and Luo members, while the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) enjoyed the support of other ethnic groups—Kalenjin, Teita, and others. In recent years, during the return to civilian forms of government in Ghana, statements appeared regularly in the Ghanaian press about the interparty struggle between the ruling and opposition parties which reflected relations between the Akan and Ewe ethnic groups. In Zambia, there was an ethnic element in the interparty fight of the United National Independence Party and the African National Congress. The many organisations in the Southern Sudan made for great difficulties in coping with that country's pressing problems. They too were founded on the ethnic principle, and their defence of separatist slogans was a blow to the country's unity and weakened the anti-imperialist front.

Parties and organisations based on definite ethnic groups as a rule oppose themselves to the general national interests and hamper both the uniting of all peoples within the state boundaries and the development of society along progressive lines. In most cases, furthermore, these organisations, parties, associations, and movements, whatever they are called, being mostly the spokesmen of the ruling upper strata in the person of the traditional rulers, objectively reflect a past stage of historical development. Ghana can be cited as an example; there the traditional rulers played no small role in organising opposition to the ruling Convention People's Party and to Kwame Nkrumah in general.

In 1954, the National Liberation Movement was founded in Ashanti, the patron of which was the Asantehene or paramount chief of the Ashanti people. A movement in which the traditional rulers of the Ga people played a major role—the Ga Shimbom Kpee Movement in Accra, set up in 1957 and directed against Nkrumah and his party—became a bastion of conservative forces. Other opposition organisations and parties—the Northern People's Party, the Togoland Congress, the Anlo Youth, etc.—also based their activity on narrow ethnic groupings and were usually led by chiefs. The term 'traditionalist' was used to denote their policies and activities, which were distinguished by loyalty to the old order in which social institutions characteristic of earlier modes of production occupied a dominant position.

Ordinances issued in the summer of 1957 banning parties founded on religious and ethnic affiliations forced these

parties to seek more closely organised forms. In October 1957, the United Party was formed. Led by elements dissatisfied with Nkrumah's policy; and although Nkrumah succeeded, at that stage, in overcoming the opposition, such dangerous phenomena as tribalism and the resistance of chiefs, which hindered progressive reforms, continued, however, covertly.

We know what an immense role the ethnic factor played in the activities of the political parties and groupings in the Congo (Leopoldville)—now Zaire—on the eve of independence and in its first years, and what a harmful role ethnic contradictions played during the Congolese crisis. The Congo probably took first place in Africa for the number of 'tribal' parties and associations. In Leopoldville alone, in 1956, Prof. René Lemarchand counted 85 tribal associations and 27 cultural societies, many of which also had a narrow ethnic character.<sup>6</sup> A main objective of these societies was inculcation of loyalty to its tribe. The most active and dynamic of the tribal associations was probably the Abako, which united the Bakongo people and was later converted into a political party. Apart from its main objective, namely unification, preservation, and spread of the Kikongo language, it also helped fellow-tribesmen to find work, organised hospitalisation of the sick, and so on. In subsequent years the leaders of Abako supported the setting up of their own Bakongo state, and did no little harm to unity of the Congo. Joseph Kasavubu and the Abako Party (Alliance Bakongo) led by him expressed the interests of certain circles in the western part of Leopoldville Province, as the *Parti du Peuple* (People's Party) also did. The *Parti solidaire africaine* (African Solidarity Party) reflected the interests of the peoples of the southern areas of Leopoldville Province. Moïse Tschombe, a Lunda by origin, united his fellow-tribesmen in the southern part of the Katanga in the Conakat Party (*Confédération des associations tribales du Katanga*). It was opposed by Balubakat (*Association des Baluba du Katanga*), which was based on the Baluba living in the northern areas of the Katanga. The Baluba of Kasai Province in part joined the Fedeka Party (*Fédération kasaienne*). The Bangala and Mongo of the Equatorial Province were members of the *Parti de l'unité nationale* (National Unity Party). Most of the ethnic groups of Leopoldville, except the Bakongo, Bangala, and Mongo, joined the National Progress Party. Atkar (*Association des Tchokwe du*

*Katanga*) tried to pass itself off as spokesman of the interests of the Chokwe of the Congo, Rhodesia, and Angola.

The only party rejecting the tribal principle was that of Patrice Lumumba, the *Movement national congolais* (National Congolese Movement), whose field of activity was mainly in the Kasai and Eastern provinces.

Lumumba's and other progressive leaders' attempts to put an end to tribalism and to unite the parties in the fight to carry out the important tasks of reconstructing society failed. Without going into a detailed analysis of the reasons for that, let us simply note that the interparty struggle, in many cases, was not a matter of disagreements of principle on the objectives of the national liberation movement and the programme of choice of path of development, but a struggle for personal power between various politicians. The absence in most cases of a developed programme, the weakness and eclecticism of outlook and political orientation, and the absence of political stability in the country forced them to seek support in their ethnic group and to resort to the help of imperialist monopolies and neocolonialists.

In his National Day address on 30 November 1976 the President of the People's Republic of Benin, Mathieu Kérékou, spoke of the baneful role that parties and organisations built on the ethnic principle had played in the country's history. They had, he said, debased, divided, and slighted the people. Tribal and regional political organisations had not only divided the people of Benin but had deliberately disorganised them and preached rejection of struggle against the exploitation of man by man, and they had called for warm concord between social classes and fraternal co-operation of the people with their exploiters.

At the same time a simple statistical count alone of the ethnic affiliation of the members of one organisation or another, and especially of their leading bodies, not only does not provide a complete picture of dependence on the role of the ethnic factor but can also lead to wrong conclusions.

According to the American Africanist Dr. William J. Foltz, the overwhelming majority in the leading bodies of the *Union progressiste sénégalaise* (Senegalese Progressive Union or UPS) in 1962 were Wolof, and after them Lebu and Tukolor. Although the Lebu people, aborigines of Dakar and its environs, constituted only 2 per cent of the population of Senegal, they continue to play a marked role in its political life. At the same time the Serer,

who constitute 16 per cent of the population, and the Fulaani or Poul (15 per cent) were less well represented in the leadership of the UPS in 1962, although Léopold Senghor, by ethnic origin a Serer, was head of the state and the party.<sup>7</sup>

Although Wolof were better represented in the leadership of the UPS than any other group, it would be wrong to call it a Wolof party. On the contrary, the UPS has fought, since the very beginning of its existence, against any show of tribalism and regionalism. Other parties in Senegal—the *Parti africain de l'indépendance* (African Independence Party) and the *Parti du regroupement Africain-Sénégal* (PRA-Sénégal)—also, in Dr. Foltz's view, do not base their work on the ethnic factor.

Richard L. Sklar and C. S. Whitaker, Jr., Americans who have made a study of Nigerian parties, cite the following facts on the ethnic composition of the leadership of the main ones in 1958.<sup>8</sup> The main ethnic group in the leadership of the National Convention of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) was Ibo, who constituted around 50 per cent; 26.7 per cent were Yoruba, 9.9 per cent belonged to other ethnic groups, and only 2 per cent to the peoples of Northern Nigeria. In the Action Group, 68.2 per cent consisted of Yoruba, 7.6 per cent belonged to other peoples of Western Nigeria, 4.5 per cent were Ibo, 15.2 per cent Ibibio, Efik, and other ethnic groups of Eastern Nigeria, and 3 per cent northerners. In the Northern People's Congress (NPC) 32.4 per cent of the places in the leading bodies belonged to Fulani, around 19 per cent to the Hausa and related peoples, 9.4 per cent to the Nupe, 6.8 per cent to the Kanuri, 6.8 per cent to the Yoruba, and 16.2 per cent to members of other peoples of the northern part of the country. The group most represented in the leadership of the Northern Elements' Progressive Union (NEPU) in 1959 was the Hausa (67 per cent); 14 per cent consisted of Fulani, 4.6 per cent of Nupe, 3.1 per cent of Kanuri, and 7.1 per cent of other peoples of Northern Nigeria.

Each of the parties thus represented a different area of Nigeria in its ethnic composition: the NCNC—Eastern Nigeria, the Action Group—Western Nigeria, and NPC and NEPU—Northern Nigeria. This circumstance often presented opportunities for opposition-minded leaders to accuse them of allegedly being the spokesmen of certain ethnic groups—of the Ibo, Yoruba, and the peoples of Northern Nigeria respectively, although a main demand of the NCNC's programme



from its very outset (it was founded in August 1944) had been consolidation of the unity of Nigeria. In 1950, for example, at the All-Nigerian conference to revise the existing Richards Constitution, it was the NCNC that stood for unity while the representatives of feudal circles in the north, the spokesman of whose interests was the Northern People's Congress, supported the principle of dividing the country. The constitution adopted in 1951, known as the Macpherson Constitution, which reinforced regionalisation, signified a victory for the NPC.

During the struggle for independence the NCNC had striven to rally the people of Nigeria under the slogan 'One Country, One Constitution, One Destiny'.

The different social bases of the Nigerian parties were the reason, to a considerable extent, for the disagreements among them. The acute political struggle led to victory for the feudal, conservative Northern People's Congress. At the moment independence was achieved in October 1960, the NPC held 45.5 per cent of the seats in the Nigerian Parliament.

The interparty and inner-party struggle in the first years of independence largely determined the relations between the different Nigerian peoples. Explanation of the reasons for the complicated situation in present-day Nigeria, however, must apparently be sought in what classes' and social groups' interests the Nigerian parties were spokesmen of, rather than in the ethnic affiliation of their leaders and members. It was the domination of the leaders of the NPC, which defended the interests and carried out the plans of the big feudal rulers, emirs, and other members of the traditional nobility, that explains what led in the end to the crisis of 1966-70.

The above examples show that the ethnic composition of the leading bodies of parties is by no means the main thing when one is characterising their activity. Yet this factor often determines the attitude of ordinary people to leaders in Africa today and provides certain political demagogues occasion to foment ethnic antagonisms so as to channel social protest into intertribal hostility.

On the other hand, it would be wrong to underestimate the ethnic factor in the activity of political parties and not to give it sufficient weight. Even progressive African politicians reckon with it both when making appointments and in elections to party and state bodies, and in carrying out

practical measures concerning the economic and cultural development of their countries.

In his *Dark Days in Ghana* Kwame Nkrumah commented on the vitality of tribalism and wrote that even in the Convention People's Party, whose activity had a progressive character, ethnic origin played a certain role in the party and state hierarchy.

Even within the Party itself, there was at times a tendency to condemn or recommend some individual on the basis of his tribal or family origin.<sup>9</sup>

The ethnic factor plays a very big role in countries like Nigeria, the Sudan, Kenya, Zaire, and Ghana.

In Nigeria, for example, the most populous country in Africa (population in 1975, by UN estimates, 63 million), certain peoples had complained of Ibo dictatorship even under British domination.<sup>10</sup> The government of Eastern Nigeria, they said, consisted wholly of Ibo, and that Ibo were appointed as a rule to the highest posts. Hostility to the Ibo found expression in dissatisfaction with the main political party, the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (which changed its name in 1962 to the National Convention of Nigerian Citizens). This party was considered an Ibo party, and at elections to parliament and to other bodies the national minorities often voted against it, giving preference to the Action Group, the political party of Western Nigeria.

The roots of the complicated relations between the Ibo and some peoples in Eastern Nigeria, the Efik and Ibibio for instance, go far back into the past, to the time of the slave trade. The territory of the Ibo, Ekoi, and Ukele had been the source of slaves for the Ibibio, Efik, and other coastal tribes dealing with the European slave traders. At that time the level of development of many of the peoples living in Southern Nigeria was considerably higher than that of the Ibo. They had city-states, ruled by kings; they carried on an extensive trade with European merchants, and crafts were highly developed. All these peoples therefore looked down upon the Ibo with a certain disdain. Now the position has changed; the Ibo have considerably overtaken all the other peoples of Eastern Nigeria in development. The Ibo people have a working class, a national bourgeoisie, and a national intelligentsia. Ibo were actively involved in the political life of Nigeria. They founded such a strong political organisation as the NCNC, which fought resolutely for the

independence of the country. The percentage of literacy among them is higher, there are more specialists among them, and before the January coup of 1966 many Ibo worked in the state apparatus, on the railways, in various companies, and in other institutions in Northern Nigeria. And almost all the officers of the Nigerian Army were Ibo.

In the last years of British rule in Eastern Nigeria there was a strong movement to set up separate states; the Efik and Ibibio, for example, demanded the formation of a Calabar-Ogoja-Rivers state, but there was no unanimity on this matter, some standing for separation from the Ibo, and others opposing.

In Western Nigeria, where two-thirds of the population consisted of Yoruba, the population of the Delta and Benin provinces, where the Edo live, complained to the Minorities Commission (1957) that the government of Western Nigeria gave all its attention to development of the provinces inhabited by Yoruba, and paid none either to economic development of areas inhabited by Edo or to other public needs, like the building of roads, schools, hospitals, etc. The Edo complained that the government of Western Nigeria consisted of Yoruba and that it was impossible for a non-Yoruba to hold high administrative posts.

The Edo had campaigned for some years for separation from Western Nigeria. Dissatisfaction ran so high that the government of Nigeria decided in 1962, after the granting of independence, to carve out a special state in this area, the Mid-Western.

In Northern Nigeria, the area of which is three times that of Eastern and Western Nigeria, and in which half the population of the country is concentrated, there is no people that constitutes the overwhelming majority. The most numerous are the Hausa, who formed only a third of the population at the 1952-53 census, while the Fulani formed approximately 17 per cent and the Kanuri 7 per cent of the inhabitants. All three of these peoples had had a high standard of economic and social development in the past, and had been the founders of powerful states, in all of which Islam had long been disseminated.

Along the middle course of the Niger and Benue rivers a great many peoples live, very different in numbers, language, and level of development. The ethnic composition of the areas that were arbitrarily called the Middle Belt is so complicated that the compilers of the 1952-53 census, the

most detailed and in the general view the most reliable of all the censuses ever carried out in Nigeria, classified its five million inhabitants as 'others'.

In the distant past these areas of Central Nigeria had served as the main source of slaves for the Hausa, Yoruba, Fulani, and other peoples. To save themselves from the slave traders many of the tribes took refuge in inaccessible mountain localities. Long isolation naturally led to preservation of tribal relations and retarded these peoples' economic development.

All the peoples of the Middle Belt came under the North's system of government with its numerous emirs. Religious differences played a significant role in their attitude to the Hausa and Fulani, since the latter, and the Kanuri, are Muslims while the majority of the peoples of the Benue, Plateau, and other provinces have retained traditional beliefs and cults to a considerable extent.

These peoples expressed great dissatisfaction with the existing order and resisted islamisation. The Birom and Tiv came out particularly strongly for separation from Northern Nigeria. The spokesman for their interests became the United Middle Belt Congress, founded in 1955. In 1960 and subsequent years, the Tiv more than once demanded separation. Troops were sent against them, and many of them were arrested.

The national question was also acute in the Kabbia and Ilorin provinces, where more than half a million Yoruba live. The Yoruba are Christians, but they were subordinated to the Muslim authorities of Northern Nigeria, which evoked extreme dissatisfaction in these provinces, whose inhabitants demanded unification with their brother Yoruba in Western Nigeria.

A great many posts in the state institutions of Northern Nigeria were held by Ibo. And although the Hausa, for example, could not manage without Ibo civil servants and skilled workers, relations between them became more and more tense in recent years. After the January coup in 1966 these antagonisms erupted, as we know, into a massacre and mass pogroms. Hundreds of thousands of Ibo were forced to flee to Eastern Nigeria, which was their ethnic territory.

The tragic events that led to the secession of Eastern Nigeria in May 1967 and caused many casualties, and the war against secessionist Biafra, considerably aggravated interethnic relations.



In the *Democratic Republic of the Sudan* more than 12 million of the 17.7 million population (in 1975) consist of Arabs and Arabised peoples.<sup>11</sup> In the three southern provinces—Bahr el Ghazal, Upper Nile, and Equatorial—live more than four million Negroid peoples (Dinka, Nuer, and Shilluk), who speak Nilotic languages and differ radically in language and way of life from the Arab north. By language and culture they are close to the Nilotic peoples living in the northern areas of Kenya and Uganda and in the extreme north-east of Zaire. The situation is further complicated by religious differences; while the Arabs of the north espouse Islam, the peoples of Southern Sudan are Christians; and traditional religious beliefs are also common among them. The Sudan inherited acute antagonisms between these ethnic groups from the past, antagonisms that took shape long ago at the time when Arab traders from the northern provinces sold thousands of Africans living along the Upper Nile into slavery. In the colonial period the gulf between the north and south became even wider and the colonialists used tribalism to consolidate their hegemony in the country.

In the Southern Sudan, the deplorable events associated with the slave trade were deliberately revived in the memories of the Nilotic peoples. In churches, schools, and government institutions, everywhere, the colonial administration and missionaries reminded the southerners that they differed from the Arabic-speaking north and that the northerners were the sons of the slavers.

A policy of Arabisation evoked great unrest in the three southern provinces. Some peoples called for complete secession from the Sudan and the formation of an independent state of Azania, but the majority stood for autonomy within the Sudan. The reform movement in the south had already begun before independence and had had a considerable effect on the country's political life. Over many years there was a state of emergency in these areas; troops were stationed in the south, and from time to time there were clashes with the inhabitants.

The constitution adopted in 1968 proclaimed the Republic of the Sudan a unitary state, Arabic the official language, and Islam the official religion. It is understandable that this complicated relations between north and south even more, and retarded the socio-economic development of the Sudan as a whole. The problem of Southern Sudan called

for urgent solution. The new government that came to power in May 1969 therefore began to pay serious attention to it; in June 1969 the granting of local autonomy was announced, and plans for the socio-economic development and democratisation of these more backward areas of the country were worked out. But the internal political crisis of 1971 again caused tension in the south and prompted the government to take more resolute measures for a political settlement of the situation. In March 1972 an agreement on regional autonomy for the southern provinces of the Sudan was signed in Addis-Ababa.

There are not only definite complications in the inter-ethnic relations of the Arab northerners and the Nilotic southerners, but also among the Nilots themselves.<sup>12</sup> Tribalistic attitudes and separatism have not yet been eliminated, and the smaller ethnic groups complain of the dictatorship of the larger groups. In this connection the return of refugees, most of whom do not belong to the ethnic minorities, has evoked unrest.

The realisation of the agreement on regional autonomy and the carrying out of deep-going socio-economic changes in the south will create conditions favourable to the resolution of this acute problem of the Southern Sudan.

The unresolved nature of the ethnic problem in *Kenya* is playing no minor role in its life.

In Kenya, the population of which was 13.4 million in 1975, there live peoples speaking various languages and differing from each other not only in level of socio-economic development but also in belonging to different cultural and economic types. While the Bantus are agriculturalists, the Nilots and Cushitic peoples are cattle-grazers, and many of them lead a nomadic way of life. There are also differences of religious belief: the Somali, Nyika, and Swahili are Muslims, while the other peoples are either Christians or belong to tribal faiths and cults, again different, say, among the Kikuyu and the Masai.

In addition, Europeans, Indians, and Arabs are permanent residents in Kenya. These groups have continued to play a marked role in the country's economy since independence and exert an influence on the solution of many social and economic problems.

The British colonialists played no small role in complicating ethnic relations in Kenya. During the national liberation movement of 1952-55 they utilised neighbouring

peoples in the struggle against the Kikuyu, trying to isolate the latter from the other peoples. The story was spread, and is still being spread, that the Kikuyu allegedly considered themselves above the others and were striving to obtain a dominant position in the country. The founding of narrow, tribal parties and organisations was encouraged in every way—the Kalenjin Political Alliance, uniting the peoples of the Nandi group; the Masai United Front; the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU), and so on—all of which undoubtedly complicated the ethnic problem in present-day Kenya and made it extremely difficult to solve.

In recent years the sharpening of the internal political situation has been accompanied with an intensification of tribalism. In May and June of 1969, members of the now banned Kenya People's Union (KPU) in parliament accused the government many times of encouraging Kikuyu hegemony and ignoring the interests of the ethnic minorities. The murder of Tom Mboya in June 1969, a leading politician and a Luo by origin, exacerbated relations between Kikuyu and Luo. Kenyan newspapers reported clashes between these ethnic groups in the Rift Valley, pogroms in the Kikuyu quarters in Nyanza Province, cases of the murder of Luo in Nairobi and Mombasa, and the flight of hundreds of Luo families from Nairobi. Concern was also noted among the Baluhya. In Machakos, located in Kamba ethnic territory, there were cases of the burning of shops belonging to Kikuyu. In the Coastal Province attempts were made to revive KADU, which expressed the interests of the ethnic minorities. From August to November 1969 the founding of a host of parties was announced, but they were not registered by the Kenya government. According to the foreign press, some members of the Kenya African National Union (KANU), mainly Luo, resigned from the party in July and August 1969 and joined the opposition KPU. There were reports of the founding of a Gikuyu Superiority Group (GSG). A mass campaign of swearing fidelity to the Kikuyu and KANU began which (according to unofficial reports) embraced the whole of the Central, Western, and Eastern provinces, and part of the Rift Valley. The bourgeois press agencies of Western Europe reported compulsory oath-taking in areas inhabited by the Kamba, Embu, Meru, and Baluhya, which led to interethnic clashes. The Kenya government condemned the oath-taking, and the police were given authority to suppress such ceremonies.

In October 1969, the Nandi Hills' Declaration was published, which spoke of the special rights of the Nandi (one of the Nilotic peoples of Kenya) and contained a call to drive members of other ethnic groups from the land (part of the land in this area was owned mainly by European farmers and Kikuyu). According to the western press Kikuyu farms were attacked. The government issued a special statement that the Declaration had no connection with KANU, the ruling party, and that it preached ill-will and hostility.

The general election campaign in the autumn of 1969 was accompanied with accusations that the Kikuyu were striving to establish their domination.

In the new National Assembly, elected at the end of 1969, groups were formed on a tribal basis, and Luo, Baluhya, and Kamba parliamentary groups exist, which undoubtedly intensifies ethnic separatism.

In the summer of 1970, there were reports in the Kenya press of difficulties in the Kenya Central Organisation for Trade Unions connected with conflicts between Kikuyu and Luo union officials.

In May 1975, certain members spoke in the National Assembly condemning the Kikuyu, Embu, Meru Association (GEMA), which was alleged to be spreading national hostility, especially among students. GEMA's activity has since also evoked resolute protest from the supporters of national unity.

It is not excluded that many of the bourgeois press agency reports were either overstatements or rather tendentious interpretations of the events, but on the whole ethnic problems are playing no small role in the life of Kenya and the government considers the fight against tribalism and the building of real national unity an important aspect of its policy.

The ethnic factor also plays a certain role in the political life of Uganda.

The total population of Uganda in 1975 was 11.5 million. Of the 28 ethnic groups inhabiting the country, the majority speak Bantu languages (Baganda, Basoga, Batoro, Banyoro, Banyankole, etc.).

In addition a substantial part of the population consists of the Acholi, Lango, Iteso, and other Nilotic peoples.

The most numerous of all the African peoples in Uganda are the Baganda (16 per cent of the population). Fendal re-

lations have long existed among them, and they had a strong centralised state with a developed system of administration and a strong army. After establishment of the British protectorate Baganda were employed as vice-regents of the regions and representatives of the colonial authorities among the Nilotic peoples—all of which still affects relations between these peoples.

Since the former President of Uganda, Dr. Milton Obote and his immediate circle were Nilots by origin, the Baganda considered themselves offended. All the years after attainment of independence a sharp struggle for power went on, led by the feudal ruler of the kingdom of Buganda, relying on the Kabaka Yekka Party, and supported by the Democratic Party.

The separatist-minded feudal circles of Buganda called for the secession of this kingdom—the most developed part of the country economically—from Uganda. Their revolt in May 1966 was suppressed. The constitution abolished the former feudal organisation, but the position remained tense, evidence of which was the attempt on Dr. Obote's life in November 1969 and the military *coup d'état* in January 1971.

In following years there have been many reports in the bourgeois press about the anti-Nilotic moods of the Baganda, and about the complication of interethnic relations in the Uganda army, while the mass expulsion of persons of Indian origin from Uganda had wide repercussions. In February 1977 the Western press reported new actions against the Acholi and Lango. The London *Observer* wrote that thousands of members of these ethnic groups had been arrested and accused of attempting a *coup d'état*.<sup>13</sup>

As in other areas of Africa, tribalistic moods, which as a rule affect the top strata of society, are made use of by certain politicians in the struggle for power. Among the people, as far as I can judge from my personal observations, hostility to one ethnic group or another is not met. Certain political demagogues, utilising the low level of development of the population, foment antagonistic contradictions, often basing themselves on the power of traditional rulers, who continue to enjoy considerable influence among their fellow-tribesmen.

The overwhelming majority of the 24.9 million people living in the *Republic of Zaire* (1975) are Bantu—Bakongo, Baluba, Bakuba, and others. The population in the northern and north-eastern areas differ from them both in language

and in level of socio-economic, cultural, and ethnic development; they speak languages of the Sudanese group—Azande, Moru-Mangbetu, Banda, Ngbandi, etc. On the border with Uganda and the Sudan live the Nilotic Alur and Bari peoples.

Some of the Bantu peoples—the Bakongo, Baluba, and Bakuba—had reached a high standard of development long before European colonisation. In the Middle Ages powerful, early-class states existed among them.

The complex ethnic structure, the considerable differences in level of development, certain relationships between the different peoples formed in the distant past, and the efforts of certain politicians to foment tribalistic moods under the pretext of reviving the past might of the Bakongo or other peoples—all these cannot help affecting relations between the Congolese peoples.

Tribal separatism had a negative effect on the national liberation movement in the Congo in the first years of independence.

During the Congo crisis reactionary politicians, supported by neocolonialists, succeeded in splitting the anti-imperialist movement and channelling it into intertribal struggle. True to their policy of 'divide and rule' they set the Baluba against the Balunda and the Balunda against the Baluba, the Bakongo against the Bayaka and vice versa. The crisis is largely explained by the fact that the imperialists succeeded in utilising the ideology of tribalism and separatism, and found support among certain nationalistic leaders. Kasavubu, for example, came out with a plan to set up a Bakongo state. In July 1960, a month after the proclamation of independence, Tschombe declared the secession of the province of Katanga from the Congo; and in August Albert Kalonji proclaimed the independence of the part of Kasai Province inhabited by Baluba. Following on that attempts were made to separate Kivu Province and the Eastern Province.

Parties and organisations founded on an ethnic basis played no small role in these events; and their leaders relied in their activity on fellow-tribesmen and archaic traditional institutions.

Progressive leaders understood the danger of tribalism both for the Congo and for Africa as a whole. Thus Patrice Lumumba, an outstanding fighter for the freedom of Africa, spoke out many times against tribal strife. And it was not by chance that a year before independence, in Decem-

ber 1959, a congress of Congolese political parties in Kisantu carried a resolution condemning all manifestations of tribalism and tribal separatism. The congress called on everyone to fight for unity of the country and to prevent the authorities from setting Congolese against Congolese. Delegates appealed to the Baluba and Lulua not to fall for the imperialist policy of 'divide and rule', and to end the intertribal hostility that was weakening the liberation movement against the colonialists.

The ethnic factor is playing an important role in the present-day political life of Zaire, and certain leaders are still being guided by narrow tribal and regional interests. In June 1975, for example, it was reported that the ethnic factor had played a part in the unsuccessful attempt at a coup.

In *Ghana* (population 9.8 million in 1975) there is a problem between the north, inhabited by Mossi-Grusi peoples, and the south, where peoples of the Guinea group live, who are more developed socially and economically.

Although the north of Ghana is lower in socio-economic development than the central and southern areas, one cannot speak of uniformity in this respect. The ethnic groups of the northern areas have substantial differences between the separate groups in culture, forms of political organisation, rituals and customs, all of which inevitably put their stamp on relations between them.

After the overthrow of Kwame Nkrumah's government in February 1966 and the banning of political organisations, there was a considerable activation of tribal unions and associations, which led to the revival of tribalistic moods and a strengthening of the tribal separatism against which the Convention People's Party had energetically struggled, striving for national unity and the development of national awareness amongst the people. The lifting of the ban on political parties on 1 May 1969 caused a rapid rise in the number of parties; more than 20 parties, some of which had a distinctly ethnic character, applied for registration in the first few days after promulgation of the decree.

Progressive leaders in Ghana spoke with increasing concern about the intensification of tribalism in the country, which revealed itself with particular clarity during the general election in the summer of 1969 and in the work of the parliament itself.

According to the western press the Akan people, including Ashanti, who constitute a majority of the popula-

tion, voted for the Progress Party, which won the election; only Ewe voted for the National Alliance of Liberals, while the Nationalist Party was called the Ga Party from the very outset.

As *The Ghanaian Times* wrote in November 1968, there was not a single member of the Ewe people in the Busia cabinet, although Ewe occupied the highest posts in all important state bodies, heading the police and staffing the intelligence and counter-espionage services.

The heated debates that developed in the National Assembly in the summer of 1970 had a clearly marked tribalistic character. The opposition accused the Progress Party of discriminating against all ethnic groups, except the Akan who constituted the majority in it. The MPs of the ruling party in turn accused the opposition of being Ewe and expressing their 'tribal' interests, while the opposition accused the government of mass dismissals of Ewe from government bodies.

Commenting on the causes of the *coup d'état* of January 1972, the UPI correspondent in Abidjan (Ivory Coast) reported on 14 January 1972 that the coup had been caused by a combination of disagreements between ethnic groups and deepening financial and social crisis.

In the *People's Republic of the Congo* there were several *coups d'état* in the 1960s and 1970s. Their organisers, too, resorted to tribalism as a weapon in the struggle for power. The events of 1958 and 1966 were particularly acute; and in the view of some Congolese statesmen the ethnic factor was not the least important one in several abortive coups. According to the bourgeois press certain political forces are supported by the northern peoples; others rely on the Bakongo living in southern areas, while a third grouping allegedly endeavours to set Lari and Bakongo against Bangala.<sup>14</sup> It is not excluded that tribalists who have been inflaming the ethnic antagonisms between the Bakongo and other peoples of the country had a hand in the murder of President Nguabi.

Ethnic problems occupy an important place in the political life of *Sierra Leone*. Its population is 2,700,000 (1974). The biggest of the 14 ethnic groups in the country are the Mende who (according to some estimates) constitute 36 per cent of the population, and the Temne (around 28 per cent). The Temne speak a language of the Atlantic group, and the Mende one of the Mande group. The other peoples, such as

Kissi, Butoni, Limba, Fulani, Koranko, Kono, and Dyaloŋke are not very numerous.

Among the ethnic minorities are the Creoles—many of them descendants of African slaves repatriated to Sierra Leone at the turn of the nineteenth century. Very soon they occupied an influential position in the country's political and economic life. They have provided many of the political leaders and public figures of Anglophone West Africa, particularly in Ghana and Nigeria. The Creoles number around 30,000. The anti-Creole moods that have long existed in the country are frequently made use of in inner-party struggles. The Creole problem still gives rise to certain difficulties.

The southerners in Sierra Leone, primarily Mende, who occupied a dominant position in both party and government bodies, evoked a hostile attitude in the other ethnic groups, who complained of their predominant influence. The reason for this lay not only in the Mende's being at a higher stage of development but also (in the opinion of Dr. Martin Kilson) in their being supported by the traditional rulers, and in the first place by the paramount chiefs who play a considerable role in Sierra Leonean politics.<sup>15</sup>

With independence, as far as one can judge from the bourgeois press, there is still a certain tension between Mende southerners and Temne northerners, and also between Creoles and the other ethnic groups. A main reason for the conflicts that occur at times is, as a rule, the power struggle between certain political groupings associated with the traditional rulers. Most of the supreme chiefs, who continue to retain a notable place in political life, are exponents of the old tribal structure and mode of production, with its tribal isolation and exclusiveness. The chiefs often express the interests of ethnic groups.

The ethnic factor occupies a major place in the life of *People's Republic of Benin* (before November 1975 *Dahomey*), and an ethnic element has played no small role in the *coups d'état* so frequent in this country. Certain politicians have utilised the differences between the north, inhabited by various Mossi-Grusi peoples, and the south, where people of the Guinea group—mostly eastern Ewe—live, in the struggle for power. The south of Benin, where such a powerful state as Abomey existed in the past, differs considerably in level of development from the north. At the beginning of this century schools had already been set up

in the southern areas in which more children of Africans were studying than in all the rest of French West Africa, Senegal included. The French colonial authorities employed (southern) Dahomeyans widely, sending them to their possessions in West and Equatorial Africa. This part of the population of Southern Benin, long ago drawn into active political life and experiencing the effect of French culture, looked down on the peoples of the northern areas of the country, as the Dahomeyan writer Maurice Glélé has written.<sup>16</sup> In his view, this led to a grudge complex among northerners and a loss of hope. Now when a northerner uses the term 'Dahomeyan' he means a southerner.

In March 1970 the presidential and parliamentary elections in Dahomey were accompanied with stormy events that reflected the tensions between the ethnic groups of north and south. Some people demanded secession of the northern part of the country from Dahomey. Southerners, fearing repression, fled from the north to their home areas. Subsequent events have shown that the unresolved character of Benin's ethnic problems was still being employed by various politicians at tense moments in political affairs to foment intertribal strife.

Interethnic conflicts complicate the internal political situation in *Zambia* and are a reason for inner-party tension. Ethnic relations were particularly exacerbated in 1967 during the election to the Central Committee of the ruling United National Independence Party. The President of Zambia, Kenneth Kaunda, condemned the election campaign as malicious and tribalist. The Bemba, the most numerous people in Zambia, numbering more than a million, have many representatives in state and party bodies, which causes marked dissatisfaction among the Lozi. Certain Lozi politicians, fanning this antagonism, have demanded the secession of Barotseland from Zambia. Tension increased in relations between the Bemba and some ethnic groups in the Eastern Province, mainly the Ngoni.

In view of the negative role in national integration and the creation of political stability of the opposition United Progressive Party and the African National Congress, which were mainly active in the backward Western and Southern provinces, Zambian government banned them and proclaimed the introduction of a one-party system.

President Kaunda succeeded in averting open clashes, but the complex ethnic problems remain.

The ethnic factor complicates the internal situation in *Burundi* (population 3,760,000 as of 1975) and *Rwanda* (where there were more than four million people in the same year). Tension in relations between the main peoples of these countries—the Bahutu and Watutsi (or Batutsi)—which has a long history, continues in our day. Cases of intertribal hostility between the ethnic groups have complicated the internal political life of both Burundi and Rwanda more than once since independence.

In *Chad*, too, the ethnic factor significantly complicates political life. According to UN estimates the population of Chad was 4,030,000 in 1975. Linguistically, the people belong to several groups: the most numerous, probably numbering half the total, belong to the following ethnic groups—Bagirmi, and the related Sara and Kreish, Mbuu, Maba, Mimi, Tago, and others; the Hausa group, which includes the Hausa themselves, Mubi, Kotoko, Masa, and Mandara; the Kanuri group, which includes the Tubu (also known as Tibbu or Tedda), Kanuri, and Zagawa. A considerable part of the population is Arab. The Bagirmi and other peoples who live in the southern areas—in the Mesopotamia of the Shari and Logone rivers—differ in anthropological type (Negroid with a Europeoid admixture) from the peoples of the northern part of the country. They also differ in occupation, way of life, and customs. The main occupation of the Bagirmi, Sara, Maba, and other peoples of the south is agriculture, while the Tubu of the Sahara are mainly pastoralists.

Back in the eleventh to thirteenth centuries the Bagirmi were part of the Sao state. In the sixteenth century they set up the Bagirmi state, in which feudal relations began to take shape. This state lasted until the end of the nineteenth century, when it was conquered by the French. Arabs, Kanuri, Tubu, and Maha constituted the ethnic basis of the mediaeval feudal states of the Lake Chad basin—Bornu and Wadai.

For many years now there have been reports of events in Chad in the foreign press. The unrest there was often referred to as a 'two-pronged revolt'—one prong in the centre and east among the settled Mubi population, and the other in the north among the nomadic Tedda. These areas are the most backward part of the country; more than 90 per cent of their population is illiterate. The gulf between the southerners and northerners in level of socio-economic

and cultural development is getting deeper all the time. All the top officials come from the south. In an interview with *Jeune Afrique* a Tedda leader had the following to say about the sources of existing antagonisms:

Since 1960 the Chad government has followed a discriminatory policy in favour of the South and to the detriment of the other regions. Thus the South has been 75 per cent provided with schools, and the North and the East-Centre only 5 per cent. The government no longer cares about doing what it can to improve and develop cattle rearing, which is the only sure and permanent economic stand by of the nomad population of BET (the huge Bourkou-Ennedi-Tibesti department which alone covers two-thirds of the territory). That could not help provoking a serious imbalance in the training of cadres.<sup>17</sup>

The arrival of southern officials who not only did not know the local conditions but who, according to official sources, committed many mistakes and abuses, led to an uprising in June 1965. The government used French troops to suppress the Tedda's revolt. The protracted internal political crisis in Chad, also associated with the aggravation of inter-ethnic relations, and the difficulty and hopelessness of carrying on military operations made it necessary, however, to work out a new policy for the Tedda and Mubi, a policy that has officially been called 'national reconciliation'.

In a White Paper published by the Chad government about these events serious shortcomings in the collection of taxes were named among the causes of the nomads' unrest. The White Paper put much of the blame for the existing difficulties onto the French colonialists, who had paid no attention, when setting up the system of administration, to such traditional institutions in Chad as sultanates and the tribal chieftaincy system.<sup>18</sup>

The ethnic factor is playing a certain role in the political life of Upper Volta, and present relations between the Mossi people and certain ethnic groups are alarming supporters of national unity. It was not fortuitous that President Lantana several times stressed the danger of interethnic contradictions during his visit to Bobo-Dioulasso in March 1977, and called for strengthening of national unity.

In Guinea the Fulbe are giving difficulties. The Fulbe (Peulhs) are about a third of the population; most of them live around Fouta Djallon. They are not an autochthonous people, having arrived in the area of present-day Guinea in the sixteenth century. They gradually subjugated the aborigines, the most numerous of whom are the Dialonké. In the



eighteenth century the founding of a Fulbe state went hand in hand with wars against the Dialonké, Maliuké, Sousou, Kissi, Koranko, and other ethnic groups. The religious factor has also played no small role in exacerbating interethnic relations since most of the Fulbe were Muslims and intolerant of infidels.

The French colonial administration had widely relied on Fulbe chiefs to fight the Democratic Party of Guinea, and had tried to maintain the 'regionalism' of this ethnic group. After abolition of the institution of chieftaincy in Guinea the traditional Fulbe rulers were deprived of their old power and lost their privileges, but continued from time to time to voice their dissatisfaction with the new regime. The feudal elements and bourgeoisie among the Fulbe are sowing discontent among the people, alleging that the main posts in the government and party apparatus are held by Malinké, with whom President Ahmed Sékou Touré is linked by origin. These moods are exploited by internal reaction and by neocolonial circles interested in weakening the revolutionary democratic government and strengthening the separatist tendencies of sections of the Fulbe aristocracy.

On 9 August 1976, addressing a session of the Central Committee of the Democratic Party of Guinea concerned with unmasking and condemning the anti-government conspirators of 14 May 1976 (who were all Fulbe by ethnic origin), President Sékou Touré once more stigmatised Fulbe separatism, certain Fulbe circles' striving to seize a dominant position in the country, and their attempts to poison the young generation with the venom of racism and particularism, and to inculcate a sense of superiority toward the other peoples of the country.<sup>19</sup>

All the DPG members condemned the conspirators. Some difficulties yet remain. Certain circles of the Fulbe aristocracy are nourishing plans that run counter to the interests of Guinea's unity.

In *Angola*, the population of which (according to UN estimates) is around six million, the ethnic factor played a significant role in political life and the fight to consolidate independence. Although all the peoples of the country speak Bantu languages, they are divided into linguistic groups: Congo Bantu (35 per cent) and Western Bantu (64 per cent). The languages of these groups differ from one another and most of them are not mutually comprehensible. According to some figures, there are eleven major peoples: Ovimbundu, Bam-

bundu, Bakongo, Balunda, Wachokwe, and others. The most numerous are the Ovimbundu people (around two million), the Bambundu (approximately 1.8 million), the Bakongo (700,000–800,000), and the Wachokwe and Waluena (500,000).

In addition to the indigenous population there were nearly half a million Portuguese in the country in 1975. The presence of so large a number of permanently resident Portuguese, with their policy of racial discrimination and racial prejudices, made the national question extremely complicated.

The Soviet Africanist V. M. Tynrin thinks that the Ovimbundu's complicated relations with the Waluchazi, Waluimbe, and other ethnic groups arose during the slave trade, when the Ovimbundu sold the population of the interior into slavery.<sup>20</sup> During the slave trade the Wachokwe raided their neighbours and supplied slaves to the Ovimbundu and other coastal tribes.

Up to 1961 the Ovimbundu displayed almost no hostility to their northern neighbours the Bambundu and Bakongo. The situation altered when, as a result of ethnic hostility provoked by colonialist agents, clashes occurred between the Ovimbundu working on the coffee plantations in northern Angola and Bakongo extremists.

As a result of colonial division individual peoples have found themselves within the confines of different states: the Bakongo live in northern Angola, Zaire, and the Congo; the Balunda live in Angola, Zaire, and Zambia; and the Ovambo in Angola and Namibia.

Natural leanings to reunification are often utilised by certain political circles to foment tribalistic and separatist attitudes.

The ethnic factor played a significant role in the Angolan liberation movement and aggravated the existing ideological differences. Each of the movements was reported to be based on a definite ethnic group.

As we remarked above, the Abako Party in Congo (Kinshasa)—now Zaire—put forward a plan for creating a Bakongo state. The leadership of the National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA), the ethnic base of which was the Bakongo, was closely linked with this party. The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) was based on the Ovimbundu. As for the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), although its main ethnic base was often said to be the Bambundu, it put forward

general, national aims, in contrast to the UNITA and FNLA. The use of interethnic antagonisms by neocolonialists, the stirring up of old grievances, and the fomenting of separatist moods weaken the national liberation movement and channel what is essentially social protest into a context of intertribal hostility.

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In many African states, as in the liberated countries of Asia and Latin America, the army has begun to play a bigger and bigger role, above all the military intelligentsia, i.e., the officers. In the past 15 years alone there have been around 40 military *coups d'état* in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.<sup>21</sup> The army is intervening more and more in the politics of emerging countries.

In a backward society the army is a social institution outside the traditional society. Even in an economically and culturally backward country the officers, by the nature of their service, are obliged to familiarise themselves with technical progress in other countries, and are interested in modernising the army. The officer caste is acutely sensitive to the gap between the needs of social development and the existing situation. The lack of efficiency and slow tempos of decolonisation lead to social tensions and create conditions for the army's intervention in politics, but the ethnic factor also plays a certain role in military coups.

We shall touch specially on the role of the ethnic factor in the army and in the military *coups d'état* carried out since independence in a number of African countries.

A peculiarity of African armies is their ethnic composition: they are not recruited from all the peoples living in a given country. In the view of G. I. Mirsky this disparity is a result of the national policy of the colonial authorities.<sup>22</sup> The officer ranks in the British possessions in West Africa were recruited, as a rule, from the more developed population of the southern areas of Ghana and Nigeria, while the other ranks were recruited from culturally more backward ethnic groups. In Ghana, for instance, 92 per cent of the officers, on the eve of independence, were ethnically from southern and coastal areas, i.e., from a more cultured environment, while 62 per cent of the soldiers were from the north.<sup>23</sup>

In Nigeria, the overwhelming majority of the officer ranks in 1960 were Ibo, i.e., also from the more developed

areas. The American Africanists Prof. James S. Coleman and Belmont Brice, Jr. have observed that

there were important political reasons for selective recruitment of 'other ranks' from the more politically quiescent, less nationalistic, groups. One of the major functions of the military establishment was to suppress internal uprisings and disturbances. It was far safer to recruit military personnel from those tribes and areas least likely to be involved.<sup>24</sup>

The English writer William Gutteridge, characterising the situation in East Africa, wrote that the preference in recruiting seemed to be for illiterates on the grounds that they are more amenable to discipline.<sup>25</sup>

Therefore, according to him, there was an insignificant percentage of Baganda in the battalion of the Royal African Rifles in Uganda although they were one of the most developed peoples in the country. And in the police in Kenya the representation of Kikuyu, active participants in the fight against British colonialism, was less than a tenth of one per cent. There were also few Kikuyu among the soldiers. The overwhelming majority of the officers came from the Kamba. And although many of the military coups that Africa has suffered in the past decade have been caused by unresolved socio-economic problems and a protracted internal political crisis, the unsoundness of many of the leaders' promises and the broad masses' disappointment with the first results of independence, the acute dissatisfaction with corruption and the appearance of *wabenzi* (as they called people in Tanzania who owned expensive Mercedes, and so on)—not the least role in almost all the coups was played by ethnic antagonisms. Given the isolation of the trade union movement, the existence in many countries of a host of parties frequently reflecting the interests of certain ethnic groups, the army (as Mirsky thinks) could have played the role of a national body, but the influence of the ethnic factor and the isolation of the officers from the rank-and-file associated with it broke the cohesion of the army at critical moments.

There was an ethnic factor in the long internal struggle in Burundi between the Hutu or Bahutu and the Tutsi or Watutsi. In October 1965, a unit of the army led by Hutu officers attempted a *coup d'état*. On 28 November 1966 a military *coup d'état* was staged in Burundi. The dissatisfaction of the so-called middle strata—employees, officers, and the intelligentsia—with the power of the traditional aristocracy



cracy, whose mouthpiece was King Ntare V, ended in abolition of the monarchy and a victory for the military led by Captain Michel Michombero, a Tutsi by ethnic origin.

The spring of 1972 and the following years were hard times for the people of Burundi. In April 1972 ex-king Ntare V returned to Bujumbura (Usumbura) from exile. On arrival in the country he was arrested and accused of plotting a *coup d'état*. During an attempt to free him, he was killed.

Subsequent events led to a marked aggravation of relations between Tutsi and Hutu. It must be noted that the bourgeois press reduced the events in Burundi simply to the traditional hostility between the agricultural Hutu and the cattle-raising Tutsi, and was full of reports of the ethnochauvinism of the Tutsi and of mass intertribal slaughter.

It would be wrong, however, to reduce these events simply to tribal conflicts, although the ethnic element undoubtedly played a significant role in them. In fact, it is obviously a matter of the attacks of feudal-conservative circles, supported by the old monarchist regime, on the policy of the Michombero government. But, as always happens during a sharpening of internal political situation in times of crises, certain political forces succeeded in fomenting ethnic contradictions.

The complexity of relations between Hutu and Tutsi continued in subsequent years. The press reported a sharpening of relations and the maturing of a conflict situation in May-June 1975 in the province of Bururi. In 1 November 1976 a group of army officers carried out a coup and overthrew the Michombero government. The Supreme Revolutionary Council became the highest state body.

In March 1967 there was a *coup d'état* in Sierra Leone. The Prime Minister Albert Margai, a majority of the army officers, and of the members of the ruling People's Party were Mende. They were opposed by the All-People's Congress led by Dr. Siaka P. Stevens, whose supporters were Temne. And although one must seek the root of the coup in the failure to solve many political, economic, and social problems, those involved utilised the tension between the main ethnic groups of the country, the Mende and the Temne. The National Reformation Council set up after the coup, and which functioned as a provisional government, included equal number of these two ethnic groups.

Tribalist moods and the fanning of discord between the

population of north and south is a constant concomitant of the coups that have taken place in Dahomey (now Benin) and Togo.

The ethnic factor played a special role in the events in Nigeria during the military coups of 1966 and the crisis of 1966-70 as a whole, and at times assumed predominant significance.

At the time Nigeria attained independence the overwhelming majority of the 300-odd officers were British. Of the 81 Nigerian officers, 60 were Ibo by origin.<sup>26</sup> Half of the other ranks of the Nigerian Army had been recruited in remote areas of Northern Nigeria and around 25 per cent in Eastern and Western Nigeria. After the attainment of political independence, when power in the country belonged, in essence, to northerners, the proportion of soldiers recruited in northern areas increased and reached nearly 70 per cent. Administrative and technical posts were mainly held by Ibo.<sup>27</sup>

The military coup of 15 January 1966 carried out in Kaduna by Ibo officers led by Major Chukwuma Nzeogwu was preceded by long years of internal political crisis, and an acute struggle between the leading parties—the Northern People's Congress, which represented the interests of the northern feudal elements, the ruling circles of the Federation of Nigeria, and the National Convention of Nigerian Citizens, supported by the population of Eastern Nigeria. The long interparty and inner-party struggle, the tense atmosphere in Nigeria, in which dissatisfaction with the existing regime of the Federal Prime Minister Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa and his supporters, and the government's inability to cope with the problems facing the country was more and more sharply felt; and the mounting contradictions between the backward, conservative north and its domination by emirs and feudal rulers, and the south, where capitalist relations were becoming more and more developed—all was inevitably bound to lead to an explosion. A group of junior Ibo officers, objectively reflecting progressive tendencies and opposed to the regime of the feudal, conservative north, seized power in the Federation by means of a coup on 15 January 1966. The Federal Prime Minister and the premiers of Northern Nigeria (Sir Ahmadu Bello) and Western Nigeria (Chief Samuel Akintola) were murdered. Power passed into the hands of the army. The aim of the new regime—Major Nzeogwu declared at a press conference in Kaduna—was the building of a strong, united nation, free of corruption,

nepotism, tribalism, and internecine struggle. The new regime, however, did not succeed, for a number of reasons, in carrying out its plans for normalising the Federation. The absence of a worked-out programme for the reconstruction of society, and lack of support among the broad masses apparently played a not unimportant role in this. The January coup had an essentially upper class character. The feudal, conservative strata of Northern Nigeria used their influence among the backward Muslim population and fomented religious and tribal hostility to southerners; the main blow was struck against the Ibo, since Major Nzeogwu and General Ironsi who soon replaced him were both Ibo. Subsequent events took on a really tragic character and were accompanied with acute aggravation of the ethnic problems. General Ironsi's attempt to rally the country and solve the ethnic problems by Decree No. 34 suffered complete defeat. The abolition of the federal state system and creation of a unitary one with a strong central authority evoked strong resistance from the traditional rulers of the north, who did not want to lose their power and privileged position. Five days after promulgation of Decree No. 34 a mass pogrom against Ibo was organised in the towns of Northern Nigeria. The outbreak of religious fanaticism cost the lives of thousands of people coming from Eastern Nigeria. On 29 July a mutiny of Hausa soldiers broke out in Ibadan, where General Ironsi was at the time. He was murdered and many Ibo officers shot.

Leadership of Nigeria's affairs passed to Lieut.-Col. (later General) Yakubu Gowon. The sharpening of ethnic contradictions led to a new orgy of ethno-chauvinism. On 26 September 1966, pogroms against Ibo, which began in the town of Jos, spread to other towns in Northern Nigeria. In a few days thousands of Ibo were murdered (30,000 according to the British weekly *The Economist*).<sup>28</sup> Hundreds of thousands of Ibo, abandoning their property, fled from all ends of the country to their homeland in Eastern Nigeria. Their stories of atrocities in the north led to a growth of hostility to northerners. A heating-up of Hausa began in the towns of Eastern Nigeria. Subsequent events led to the secession of Eastern Nigeria in May 1967 and its withdrawal from the Federation. And although the struggle against seceding Biafra ended in victory for the Federal Government, the war led to a sharpening of ethnic antagonisms and of existing difficulties.

In summing up what we have said, we must emphasise that, for all the importance of the ethnic factor and the place it assumed during the Nigerian crisis, it was a subsidiary factor. The main cause of the events of 1966-70 lay both in the failure to solve socio-economic problems and the incapacity of the Balewa regime (due to class interests) to tackle them, on the one hand, and in the policy of imperialist monopolies, aimed at splitting the unity of Nigeria and grabbing its rich natural resources.

And although the Federal Military Government has tried, in the period since the civil war, to achieve an improvement of interethnic relations, the unresolved character of the socio-economic problems, however, and the mounting corruption, also affected ethnic relations. Demands for the forming of new states on an ethnic principle became more and more insistent; General Gowon was accused of striving to strengthen the power of the small ethnic groups; rumours were spread of new Ibo plans and of their striving to secede, and of the existence of a secret organisation KBA (Keep Biafra Alive).<sup>29</sup>

At the end of June 1975 a new military coup was carried out in Nigeria, as a result of which Gen. Gowon's government was overthrown. The new government was headed by Brigadier (later General) Murtala Mohammed, a Hausa by origin, a circumstance that was again deliberately used by certain forces to revive old fears of the domination of southerners by Muslim northerners. Fears were expressed that management of the common services of the northern states might prove the basis on which the more populous and united north would allegedly be able to take on the role of a powerful force to repulse some alleged threat from the south. These fears were strengthened when demands were again made for transfer of the capital to Kaduna in the north.<sup>30</sup> The proponents of employing the ethnic factor again became active.

The dissatisfaction of the right-wing forces with the progressive measures being carried out in the country, aimed at fighting corruption and graft, and with the anti-imperialist foreign policy of General Mohammed's government, developed into open opposition. On 13 February 1976 a coup was attempted, as a result of which General Mohammed was murdered. The attempted coup itself, however, was quickly liquidated. The Federal Military Government was headed by Lieut.-Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo, a Yoruba. He has

stressed that it would maintain the previous political line developed by the Supreme Military Council under General Mohammed. In the middle of February 1976 thousand-strong demonstrations were held in Lagos and Ibadan in support of the government. Those taking part carried posters and banners with slogans condemning the conspirators and expressing solidarity with the Supreme Military Council of Nigeria. The Federal Government declared, in a statement of 18 February 1976 on the course of the investigation into the circumstances of the attempted coup, that it had been reactionary in essence and that neither religious nor ethnic motives could justify it.

G. I. Mirsky's analysis of the reasons for military coups and the role of the army in the countries of Tropical Africa quite convincingly leads to the conclusion that

the armies in Tropical Africa, despite what their leaders solemnly declare, are not immune to the disease of tribalism. The accession of the army to power, therefore, cannot be a means of ridding a country of evils whose roots go deep.<sup>31</sup>

One cannot agree with certain scholars who write of the existence of traditional enmities between the ethnic groups in African states.

The expression 'interethnic conflicts' has crept into the literature in recent years.<sup>32</sup> It can hardly be considered successful. In most cases the conflicts have an upper-class character, and do not involve the mass of the people much. But occasionally the use of tribalistic frames of mind by certain political forces (most often in the struggle for power) and the fomenting of discord between ethnic groups can lead to open hostility and create an impression of hatred of one people for another. In our view, therefore, 'interethnic conflicts' is only admissible as a term in the description of events that have a really mass character.

The complicated set of problems stemming from the socio-economic imbalance and unevenness in the development of the various peoples, inherited from colonialism, puts serious obstacles in the way of national integration and is a rich medium for political demagogues of every kind, and for their claims about the domination of one people by another and suppression of the interests of ethnic minorities. The ethnic factor can be used by them to inflame tribalistic and chauvinistic moods, which are sometimes accompanied with outbreaks of fanatical hatred for the members of some other ethnic group.

## Notes to Chapter Two

1. The Lagos *Sunday Times*, 22 May, 1966.
2. See C. Leys, *Underdevelopment in Kenya: The Political Economy of Neocolonialism 1964-1971*, London, 1975, p. 252.
3. See *Man*, New Series, Vol. 4, No. 2, London, 1969, pp. 230-31.
4. See Okot p'Bitek, *African Religions in Western Scholarship*, Kampala, (1971), p. 14.
5. See the *Constitution and Rules of the Luo Union* (mimeographed).
6. See René Lemarchand, *Congo (Leopoldville)*. In: J. S. Coleman and C. G. Rosberg, Jr., *Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1966, p. 569.
7. William J. Foltz, *Senegal*. In: J. S. Coleman and C. G. Rosberg, *Op. cit.*, p. 30.
8. Richard L. Sklar and C. S. Whitaker, Jr., *Nigeria*. In: J. S. Coleman and C. G. Rosberg, *Op. cit.*, p. 612.
9. Kwame Nkrumah, *Dark Days in Ghana*, London, 1968, p. 66.
10. See *Colonial Office. Nigeria. Report of the Commission Appointed to Enquire into the Fears of Minorities and the Means of Allaying Them*, London, 1958, pp. 47-48.
11. Here and subsequently the data on populations are taken from the United Nations *Monthly Bulletin of Statistics*, October 1976, Vol. XXX, No. 10.
12. See *New Middle East*, May 1973, p. 21.
13. See *Observer*, 13 February, 1977.
14. *Africa Confidential*, 1968, No. 16 (p. 5) and No. 22.
15. Martin Kilson, *Sierra Leone*. In: J. S. Coleman and C. G. Rosberg, *Op. cit.*, pp. 103-104, 113.
16. Maurice A. Glélé, *Naissance d'un état noir*, Paris, 1969, p. 38.
17. *Jeune Afrique*, 15 June, 1971, pp. 30-31.
18. *West Africa*, 22 November, 1969, p. 1424.
19. See *Horoya*, No. 2235, 15-21 August, 1976, Conakry, pp. 16, 18.
20. See V. M. Tyurin, *The Socio-Ethnic Conditions of the Development of the National Liberation Movement in Angola*. In: *Borba za osvobodzheniye portugalskikh koloni v Afrike*, Moscow, 1975, pp. 78, 89, 90.
21. G. I. Mirsky, *The 'Third World'. Society, Power, and the Army*, Moscow, 1976, p. 4 (in Russian).
22. G. I. Mirsky, *The Army and Politics in Asian and African Countries*, Moscow, 1970, p. 225 (in Russian).

23. See John J. Johnson (Ed.), *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries*, Princeton, 1962, p. 373; *Nation*, 21 March, 1966, p. 320.
24. James S. Coleman and Belmont Brice, Jr., *The Role of the Military in Sub-Saharan Africa*. In: John J. Johnson (Ed.), *Op. cit.*, p. 371.
25. William Gutteridge, *Armed Forces in New States*, London, 1962, pp. 39, 57.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 46.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 36-37.
28. *The Economist*, 18 March, 1967.
29. *The Christian Science Monitor*, 4 August, 1975.
30. *Ibid.*
31. G. I. Mirsky, *The Army and Politics in Asian and African Countries*, Moscow, 1970, p. 297 (in Russian).
32. See for example V. B. Iordansky, *Tropical Africa: On the Nature of Interethnic Conflicts*, *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya*, 1967, Nos. 1 and 2.

### Chapter Three. The Nature and Roots of Ethnic Tensions and Conflicts

What is the nature of ethnic antagonisms and contradictions? And what are the real causes of the sometimes complex relations between the members of the various peoples in the countries of Tropical Africa?

It is impossible to answer these questions without knowing the ethnic history and the peculiarities of the cultures of the African peoples and the many institutions of African society surviving to this day that are manifested both in the great role of chiefs and other traditional rulers and in the customs and norms of tribal ways and morality. We also need to analyse the forms and methods of colonial domination, which produced social and economic shifts in Africa, the duality and contradictory character of ethnic processes, and the vast number of transitional forms in the field both of economic and social relations and of ethnic development. Only the aggregate of all these facts relating to each country provides the key to understanding the nature of ethnic prejudices, and can help answer what are the essence and social roots of ethnic contradictions and conflicts.

In the final analysis the antagonisms between peoples of different ethnic origin boil down to socio-economic causes. In some countries, however, at a certain period of historical development—most often in conditions of internal political crisis and sharpening of the power struggle between politicians representing the interests of different social strata of the population—factors of a subjective order often come to the fore: among them ethnic biases and prejudices (which, as we know, die extremely hard) play a far from minor role.

What are these ethnic prejudices? In Africa one comes up against them quite often. Certain stereotypes have de-

veloped in relation to one ethnic group or another. The ethnic stereotype, as various studies have shown, is not a generalisation of real features inherent in a people, but is a derivative of the social situation concerned and of historical survivals. In Kenya, they told me, for example, that Luo were allegedly domineering and tried to lead, that Bahya were very good organisers and had a 'flair for planning'. One can find many examples in literature in which one people or another is characterised as 'aggressive'. Such biases undoubtedly put an impress on human relationships and can give rise to conflict situations, when it is a matter of emotionally hostile tone and a general negative orientation toward a given ethnic group.

Any particular ethnic stereotype is a product of concrete historical development, economic conditions, and social structure. The studies of many sociologists bearing on problems of racism and ethnic prejudices provide evidence that the greatest intolerance is characteristic of those social strata that are afraid of economic competition and lack confidence in tomorrow. This insecurity engenders fears and a continuous search for potential enemies and competitors.

Let us take some of the commonest points of view on the nature of ethnic prejudices. In the UNESCO *Dictionary of the Social Sciences* we read:

*Prejudice* is a negative, unfavorable attitude towards a group or its individual members; it is characterised by stereotyped beliefs; the attitude results from processes within the bearer of the attitude rather than from reality testing of the attributes of the group in question.<sup>1</sup>

In the American handbook *Human Behavior* by Bernard Berelson and Gary Steiner prejudice is defined

as essentially a hostile attitude toward an ethnic group, or a member thereof, as such.<sup>2</sup>

In a textbook of social psychology published in the USA prejudice is defined as

an unfavorable attitude toward an object which tends to be highly stereotyped, emotionally charged, and not easily changed by contrary information.<sup>3</sup>

Thus, despite certain differences, all these definitions stress the existence not only of a stereotype expressing an attitude to a given phenomenon but also a general, hostile attitude to everything alien or foreign, including another ethnic group as a whole. The attitude is involuntary and is

not realised by the subject himself. Most importantly, it is very stable in character.

The Soviet philosopher Igor Kohn defines ethnic prejudices and their sources as follows in his article on the psychology of prejudice in the magazine *Novy Mir*:

Whether people want to or not, they inevitably comprehend and evaluate alien customs, traditions, and forms of behaviour through the prism of their own customs, and of the traditions in which they themselves have been brought up. This tendency to look at the phenomena and facts of another culture and of another people through the prism of the cultural traditions and values of one's own people is also what is called 'ethno-centrism' in the jargon of social psychology.... Alien customs sometimes seem not only strange and absurd but also unacceptable. That, of course, is as natural as the differences themselves between ethnic groups and their cultures, which have been formed in very different historical and natural conditions.

A problem only arises when these real and imagined differences are elevated into the main thing and converted into a hostile psychological attitude to some ethnic group, an attitude that estranges people and is psychologically and then theoretically generalised as a policy of discrimination. That is what ethnic prejudice is.<sup>4</sup>

In investigating the roots of ethnic prejudices Prof. Kohn thus emphasises that they do not lie in the biological peculiarities of people and the peculiarities of their psychological habit of mind, but arise through the effect of psychological and social factors.

Another Soviet writer, E. A. Bagramov, sharply criticising the views of bourgeois psychologists, writes that racial and nationalistic prejudices have their own history and class roots.

Being the reflection of an exploiting system, racial and similar prejudices remain stuck in people's consciousness while they are fed by exploiting relations between different social and national groups of people.... Prejudices are therefore primarily a social (and not a psychological) problem.<sup>5</sup>

In everyday life ethnic prejudices, some writers affirm, are generally based on personal dealings with members of some other ethnic group. With time the negative emotions that arise from unfavourable contacts with separate individuals take on the character of pre-conceived ideas or prejudices and are already extended to all members of this ethnic group. A conflict situation is thus generalised and

reinforced, and a hostile attitude, subordinated to a general, emotionally hostile mood, is developed.

Although the flimsiness of the individual psychology explanation of prejudices has been pointed out by scholars,<sup>6</sup> and on the whole refuted by science, it is obviously impossible to deny this factor altogether in the origin of ethnic prejudices.

During the Nigerian crisis, when anti-Ibo moods were intensified, such features of the Ibo as ambition, forcefulness, capacity for rapid adaptation, thirst for education, initiative and enterprise, which would have aroused an attitude of admiration for individual Ibo and for the ethnic group as a whole in other conditions, paradoxically became the object of the hostility of other peoples in the conflict situation.

The danger of ethnic prejudices is not only that they estrange peoples and promote friction between ethnic groups, but also that they actively encourage the isolation of national minorities and the development of tribalistic frames of mind and an emotionally charged attitude to their own language and peculiarities of culture.

Prof. Kohn has drawn attention in particular to this aspect of ethnic prejudices. Small ethnic groups, especially those discriminated against, display greater cohesion, in his view, than big nations, because the discrimination itself encourages this cohesion. A negative attitude to national minorities develops in them an acute sense of their own exclusiveness, which naturally brings them closer together and forces them to support each other. This is not connected, he writes, with any specific psychic or racial features; he wittily remarks that if redheads began to be persecuted tomorrow, then the day after tomorrow all redheads would begin to support one another, and this solidarity would be cemented not by their hair colour but by the hostile attitude of the rest of society.<sup>7</sup>

Many bourgeois scholars seek the sources of ethnic prejudices and biases in the subjective world of the individual rather than in social relationships. Some, starting from the irrationality of ethnic prejudices, thus explain them by peculiarities of personalistic psychology. The American psychologist G. W. Allport sees their cause in a tendency of the human psyche to mistaken generalisations and animosity.<sup>8</sup> One such theory is the theory of frustration and aggression, which consists in a state of tension and irritation—

aggression—being evoked by negative emotions of some sort. It seeks relief, and any person may become its object. The theory of frustration or thwarting is employed in social psychology when the cause of difficulties existing in some ethnic group is sought in another group. The Dahomeyan sociologist Maurice Glélé, for example, explains the complex attitudes of the northern peoples of Dahomey to southerners precisely by this theory.<sup>9</sup>

Ethnic interrelationships become especially aggravated during an internal political crisis. According to the theory of frustration, irritation may be taken out on any object, but in fact it is directed against a people toward whom a hostile prejudice already exists; the conflict situation simply gives rise to other, frequently more aggressive forms. The origin of ethnic prejudices is thus not explained by the theory of frustration, although it helps to some extent in understanding their mechanism.

There are also theories that explain the origin of ethnic prejudices from the angle of psychoanalysis, for example the theory of projection and the theory of authoritarian personality, which are based on Freud. They explain prejudice as a phenomenon of deep-lying features of the personality formed in early childhood. These theories, however, also do not expose the social roots of ethnic prejudices, although they do, to some extent, bring out the connection between ethnic prejudices and anti-democratism, dogmatism, and ethno-chauvinistic psychology.

In the acute struggle against colonialism, nationalism had negative features (emphasis on the exceptional character and specific features of the psychology allegedly inherent in peoples of the black race) as well as positive features (rousing and uniting the African peoples in the fight against colonial oppression). The kind of 'black' racism and Afrocentrism expounded by certain nationalistically minded African leaders, is explained primarily by the reaction to oppression in the years of colonial rule. Conceptions of the exceptional nature and distinctiveness of the development of the African peoples objectively encouraged estrangement and the inculcation of new forms of ethnic prejudice—a hostile attitude to all whites—in the masses. This ethnic stereotype already existed and the white man was associated in the African's consciousness with colonialists and oppressors. The theory of Afrocentrism only gave it ideological substantiation.

Progressive African leaders resolutely oppose any preaching of 'black' racism and advocate co-operation of the peoples of different races.

When ethnic prejudices become the norm of social behaviour, they not only divide people but divert them from real social problems, in that way helping the ruling upper strata to keep the masses in subjection. History shows examples of ethnic prejudices having been elevated into an officially accepted standard. The anti-semitism of fascist Germany was such a social norm, and also racism in the era of colonialism.

Ethnic prejudices and biases are frequently employed by reactionary classes to consolidate their own position.

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In some cases the hostile relations between peoples of different ethnic origin arose in the distant days of the slave trade. Thus the northern areas of Ghana, Dahomey, and Nigeria, and the southern areas of the Sudan were for long sources for obtaining slaves. The inhabitants of the coastal areas of the Guinea coast raided the interior and carried off thousands of people, who were then sold to European slave traders. In Ghana, for example, the Fanti and Ashanti were actively engaged in this. As recent research has revealed, in the 18th century the Ashanti, moreover, impelled the Dagomba people to engage in slaving, levying an annual tribute of 200 slaves on them.

In other cases peoples who had once created highly developed state formations looked down on their more backward neighbours. A pertinent example is the relationships between the Ashanti and the northern peoples of Ghana, between the Baganda and the Nilotic peoples in Uganda, between the Hausa and the peoples of the Middle Belt in Nigeria, and so on.

The policy pursued by the colonialists also had considerable influence on the ethnic problems in African states. The policy of indirect rule in the British possessions encouraged preservation of tribal-clan relations, consolidated traditional chieftaincy and tribal separatism, which subsequently developed into tribalism. The tribalistic frames of mind of the Ashanti in Ghana and the Baganda in Uganda can serve as examples. The policy of assimilation followed in the Francophone countries aggravated the attitude to

the native language and culture, which is undoubtedly having an effect on policy under independence.

It is well known what a disastrous effect the segregationist policy of the British authorities had on relations between the Arabic-speaking peoples of Northern Sudan and the Nilotic peoples of the south of the country, a policy pursued over a long period and aimed at cutting one part of the Sudan off from the other.<sup>10</sup>

Unevenness in people's socio-economic development also had an effect, and still does, on the relations between them, since it led (and leads) to a rapid growth of separate areas, even within the territory of a single ethnic group. When it was a matter of different ethnic groups this gap in level and rates of socio-economic development, which was manifested in greater prosperity, the development of a transport system and of education, and in a rise in cultural standards, inevitably caused tension in the relations between different peoples that put its stamp on political life. Voices began to be heard alleging that the authorities were mainly paying attention to a certain ethnic group, although in fact these phenomena were the consequence of objective factors in a number of cases and not at all the result of a deliberate policy aimed at developing a certain ethnic group as a counterweight to its neighbours. When the ethnic affiliation of the more prospering ethnic group and of the administration coincided, talk began to be heard about this people's domination and suppression of the interests of ethnic minorities. In such a situation a slight occasion was enough to spark off ethnic conflict.

The African sociologist R. Odingo, writing about Uganda, has said that the ethnic heterogeneity of that country is particularly obvious. There are considerable differences between the separate districts, in consequence of which there is an acute sense of regionalism. Mr. Odingo calls regionalism the greatest obstacle to national development.<sup>11</sup>

The unevenness of socio-economic development led to the British administration's posting more literate Baganda, right from the early days of colonial rule, to areas inhabited by more backward peoples, including Nilots, as deputies or vice-regents, tax collectors, and other officials of the colonial administration.

In Ghana, members of the peoples of the south—Ashanti, Fanti, and Ewe—were sent to the more backward northern areas. In Guinea, the French authorities sent the more



literate Fulbe to work among Gerze, Toma, Konyagi, and Bassari as civil servants. In Northern Nigeria, on the eve of the January coup of 1966, a high percentage of the employees of companies and transport undertakings, and of teachers and civil servants were Ibo from Eastern Nigeria.

Because of this an idea of the Fulbe as lackeys of the colonialists is common among the Gerze, Toma, and other peoples, and of the Baganda among the Lango, Acholi, and others. Unevenness of economic development also led to the rising of Ewe and Fanti bourgeoisie in Ghana, for example, struggling for power. At the same time the feudal rulers of the Ashanti in Ghana, or the tribal-clan leaders of the Tuareg in Mali, feudal circles of the former kingdoms of Buganda, Ankole and Toro (in Uganda) are trying to maintain their old privileges. In the power struggle of the various political and social forces methods like the fomenting of tribalistic and ethno-chauvinistic moods, and of inter-tribal and religious hostility, are employed.

At the sittings of the commission set up in March 1969 by the Togo government to study the north-south problem it was emphasised that the economic and socio-cultural imbalance between the regions of the country produced

social upheavals which often turn into tribal and ethnic conflicts, aggravated by the shortage of jobs and the people's very small purchasing power.<sup>12</sup>

In analysing the reasons for the Tuareg uprising in Mali in 1963-64, or the internal political situation in Chad, one must obviously not simply take account of the separatist moods of certain Tuareg chiefs and of the traditional rulers of the Tedda and the use made of them by certain political circles. In this case one can speak of difficulties caused by the intertwining of factors of a socio-economic and of an ethnic character. Attempts to alter the traditional, age-old mode of life of the proud and warlike Tuareg nomads, with their sharply developed sense of independence and dignity common both to the aristocratic leaders and to the rank-and-file members of the tribe, encountered resolute resistance. The tribal-clan leaders enjoy complete authority, as they used to do, and exploit their fellow-Tuaregs; and any attempt to interfere with their rights evokes a marked negative reaction.

The policy of setting one people against another and of encouraging the setting up of parties and groupings on an

ethnic basis followed by the colonialists and neocolonialists has also played no small role in complicating relations between African peoples.

During the national liberation movement of 1952-55 in Kenya, for example, the British colonialists fanned tribalistic moods and set the other peoples against the Kikuyu. In the years since independence some political demagogues have opposed the Luo to Kikuyu. During colonialism the French authorities in Guinea did much to raise the Fulani (Fulbe) people who live in Fouta Djallon against other ethnic groups. According to the French Africanist Jean Suret-Canale, the colonial administration relied on Fulbe chiefs in the struggle against the Democratic Party of Guinea (*Parti démocratique de Guinée*) and tried to preserve this ethnic group's 'regionalism'.<sup>13</sup> During the Nigerian crisis neocolonialists deliberately stirred up hatred of the Ibo, and on the contrary set Ibo against Hausa and against ethnic minorities in Eastern Nigeria. Much harm was done to the liberation movement of the Congolese people by neocolonialist fomenting of discord between the Bakongo, Baluba, Bayaka, and other ethnic groups. In the People's Republic of Congo, the Bakongo are constantly opposed to the northern peoples; and since the late head of state Marien Ngonabi came from the north, imperialist propaganda claimed that there was domination by northerners. In Ghana, certain political forces counterposed the Akan and other peoples of the south and central areas to the northerners, and so on.

When analysing the reasons for ethnic conflicts and prejudices one must also take account of phenomena associated with traditional tribal institutions. The role of traditional ways, and of various rituals and customs is unusually strong even in our day. They include, for example, the tribal unions in the towns, which govern the life of their fellow-tribesmen, and the existence of moral standards by which a man is obliged to give every possible help to a person of the same ethnic group as himself.

The so-called *nduku* system continues to play a big role in Africa, i.e., the system of 'fellow-tribesmen' or 'tribal brothers'. As we have already remarked, each man is obliged by tradition to help and assist his fellow-tribesmen. In many African ministries and other state institutions, therefore, posts are occupied by kinsmen of the minister and other principals, and up to a dozen or more relatives may be seen in their homes.

In his book *Dark Days in Ghana*, Kwame Nkrumah wrote of the survival of tribal institutions and of the role of tribal ethics in contemporary African society.

I had to combat not only tribalism but the African tradition that a man's first duty was to his family group and that therefore nepotism was the highest of all virtues. While I believe we had largely eliminated tribalism as an active force, its by-products and those of the family system were still with us. I could not have chosen my government without some regard to tribal origins and even, within the Party itself, there was at times a tendency to condemn or recommend some individual on the basis of his tribal or family origin.<sup>14</sup>

The failure to resolve economic and social problems, unemployment, lack of confidence in the morrow, and the absence of political stability—all united people of the same ethnic origin and forced them to cling more closely together, especially in the towns where everything was strange and unfamiliar to a person coming from the village in search of work or to study. The feeling of ethnic solidarity was given organised form in all kinds of tribal unions and associations of fellow-countrymen. When one examines the back pages of such a serious English political weekly as *West Africa*, one finds a host of announcements of meetings and gatherings of the members of Nigerian societies and unions in London and other British cities. Apart from the Union of Nigerians in Great Britain and Ireland, there are unions founded on a narrow ethnic basis, e.g., the UK branch of the West Ibo Front, the Rivers State (Nigeria) Students' Union, the Eastern Urhobo Students' Union, and others. The different tribal groups of the Yoruba even have their own organisations, like the Egbe Omo Ife, Egbe Omo Egba, Egbe Omo Ekiti, the Ila-Orangun Society, the Ijesha Union, and so on. Some Nigerian associations in Britain unite people by religious affiliation, like the Muslim Association of Nigeria.<sup>15</sup>

There were Ibo organisations, usually led by members of the intelligentsia, in almost every village. They had various names, for example, the Ibo Patriotic Union, the Ibo Youth League, the Aguata Progressive Union.<sup>16</sup> All were considered branches of the Ibo Union. Every inhabitant was obliged to be a member of the union. The main job of these organisations was raising the well-being of the Ibo people, building schools and hospitals in their villages, and so on. Tribal unions also existed among the other peoples, and undoubtedly played a big role in inculcating love of

their people and of their culture and traditions, but there was also a danger of their inculcating a sense of separateness from other peoples.

The existence of tribal unions can, to some extent, be an obstacle to the strengthening of national unity. Their negative role worries progressive African leaders who are fighting tribalism and separatism. That is why all tribal organisations have been banned in Nigeria.

The growth of tribal unions in the years after independence led, in the view of the Nigerian newspaper *West African Pilot*, to a reinforcing of tribalism and other sectionalist feelings and to an undermining of national loyalty and moral.<sup>17</sup>

The different clubs and organisations performing the role of 'mutual aid funds' hold up the process of detribalisation to some extent: in Nigeria they are known as *esusu*, in the central areas of the Congo as *kitemo*, among the Fang of southern Cameroon as *djana*, in Dahomey as *ndjonu*, among the Hausa in Nigeria as *adashi*, and so on. Most of them exist in the towns. They advance loans or credit to fellow-tribesmen, and give help with funerals. Gordon Wilson and Michael Banton have written about such societies in Mombasa and Freetown.<sup>18</sup> Their members perform many of the functions in the alien land that are usually performed by the family or close relatives in the village. By operating continuously, and by helping only members of their ethnic group as a rule, they promote a consolidation of ethnic solidarity and tribal isolation.

In many areas of West Africa the secret societies and unions characteristic of tribal-clan society still survive. In our day their role and social function are changing; while preserving customs and ceremonies of hoary antiquity, they are at the same time adapting themselves to the new conditions. The French Africanist, Prof. Georges Balandier, cites curious facts of how the *Rassemblement démocratique africain* reinforced its influence in certain areas of the Ivory Coast by using the Poro secret society.<sup>19</sup> The American scholar Dr. Martin Kilson had also written about the use of secret unions in the activity of the Sierra-Leone People's Party.<sup>20</sup>

Among the Ibibio in south-eastern Nigeria there are men's and women's unions. The four main men's secret unions are the Ekpo, Idion, Ekon, and Ekpe. Unfortunately, there are very few facts at present about their activity or

about their internal structure and functions. It is only known that the Ekpo Society was expected to defend the interests of the tribal aristocracy. Its members could only be members of the prosperous upper strata of Ibibio society.

The best known example of the women's unions is the Ebre. Its members can be women of any age. It supervises the behaviour of its members, and carries on educational work among teenagers.

The role of traditional rulers in the political life of the country is often underestimated, but the chiefs still exert considerable influence on it. They call on their subjects to vote for a particular candidate for elective party and state bodies or, on the contrary, to vote against him, to pay or not to pay taxes, and so on. In Ghana, by some accounts, there are 300 supreme chiefs and around 3,000 chiefs of lower rank. A major role played by the numerous oba, emirs, and other traditional rulers in Nigeria is well known. Utilisation of the traditional rulers can apparently help official bodies to carry through many measures of national and cultural development.

The following examples will give some idea of the role of the traditional authorities. In Sierra Leone, on the eve of independence, more than 200 paramount chiefs alone were listed. In addition there were many chiefs of various rank who enjoyed and still enjoy great influence and are widely represented both in the government and in the party leadership. The Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP), Dr. Kilson has noted,

... has relied upon such traditional institutions as paramount chiefs, tribal authorities, and Poro societies to ensure it adequate political support. When political need arises, these groups are called upon to gather audiences of chiefdom subjects, to instruct peasants to vote for SLPP candidates....<sup>21</sup>

Dr. Kilson underlines that many people have become members of the SLPP not of their own free will but because they have been ordered to by the tribal authorities.

Various political meetings are also often organised by party workers through the traditional authorities and are held in the palaces and residences of chiefs.

In the 1957 general election 72 per cent of the SLPP candidates, 33 per cent of the United Progressive Party's candidates, and 59 per cent of all candidates were linked with the traditional authorities either by origin or by family connections.

In Ghana, after the 1966 revolt, around 130 chiefs were deprived of power by special decree. A stormy discussion developed in the local press around the future of the institution of traditional rulers. It is significant that the overwhelming majority of those taking part supported retention of chieftaincy. In the view of the government newspaper, *The Ghanaian Times*, many leaders agreed that chieftaincy as such should be retained but felt it necessary to block the road to chiefs in politics.<sup>22</sup>

The *Daily Graphic* wrote in June 1973 that chiefs' authority should be used for the good of the people in all regions of the country; only so, it felt, could a strong, solid, united state be built.

The following facts are evidence of chiefs' role in the political life of contemporary Ghana. In February 1972, at a meeting of the National House of Chiefs in Kumasi, Asantehene Opoku Ware II (Paramount Chief of the Ashanti)

appealed to his fellow chiefs to present a united front to help solve Ghana's economic and social problems.<sup>23</sup>

The head of the National Redemption Council, the military government of Ghana, Col. I. K. Acheampong,

assured a delegation from the National House of Chiefs ... that the NRC would not interfere in any way in chieftaincy matters.<sup>24</sup>

The Paramount Chief of the Dagomba Traditional Area, Ya-Na Yakubu II, appealed to the military government to remain in power and not to

bow down to pressure from any group of politicians since they only 'sow seeds of discord, promote tribalism and foment trouble among kinsmen only to serve their selfish ends'.

Speaking on the 'Operation Feed Yourself' campaign being waged in the country, he said that he was prepared to grant land to all who wished to till it.<sup>25</sup>

In August 1974, the Chairman of the National House of Chiefs, Asantehene Opoku Ware II, supported the further development and strengthening of relations between Ghana and the Soviet Union, declaring that Ghana needed the help of Soviet specialists to carry out its programme for increasing food production.

According to a report in *West Africa*, the Upper Volta Chiefs' Union held a meeting in February 1970 (at which

the emperor of Mossi, who bears the title of Moro Naba, presided) to discuss urgent matters of the political life of Upper Volta connected with plans to go over to a civilian form of government.

It was decided that every chief could follow the political party of his choice until the parties' position became known; if no party gave the chiefs the importance they deserved, they would put forward their own candidates in general and local elections.<sup>26</sup>

Maintenance of the traditional authorities as an institution in conditions in which they support reactionary social forces that are preventing development of a country along the path of consolidating national independence, can encourage a strengthening of ethnic isolation, retard rapprochement of the various *ethnos*, and hamper the development of integrating processes. At critical moments aggravation of tribal separatism, vectors of which are the conservative elements in society, can lead to ethnic conflicts and harm unity of the country.

The author of an article in *Jeune Afrique* in May 1970, A. Lawnis, remarked that in Upper Volta, for example, one must bear in mind, in addition to the existing mosaic of political parties, the role of the traditional authorities, who were always ready when circumstances permitted to revive ethnic rivalries.<sup>27</sup>

To understand the reasons for certain ethnic conflicts it helps to know the historical traditions and background. Among the Masai of Kenya, for example, as among many other nomadic peoples, legends of the creation of the world are handed down from clan to clan and from generation to generation. According to these legends the god once allotted cattle to one of his sons. This son was the ancestor from whom the Masai trace their descent. They therefore consider themselves the owners of all cattle; and if neighbouring peoples, say agricultural Bantu, possess them, they do so (in the Masai's view) illegally. This explains the frequent raids of the warlike Masai on Kikuyu and Kamba. There are frequent clashes over cattle between the Turkana of Kenya and the Karamojo, who live in Uganda. Some time will be needed, and above all much educational work, in order to alter still existing customs of the ancient past. The existence of certain norms laid down by the tribal-clan nobility and hallowed by tradition, often prevents the government from carrying out socio-economic measures aimed at improving

the life of nomads and semi-nomads and drawing them into a settled way of life.

Some Masai, for example, have begun to settle down and take up farming. But this encounters a certain resistance from the tribal-clan elders, and Masai clans like the Tyamus and Il-Gishu for whom farming has become the main occupation, are not considered 'pure' by the 'traditionalists'. Among the Masai of the southern areas of the Rift Valley the expression 'to go into Kikuyu' is quite common as a way of speaking contemptuously of their ruined fellow-tribesmen who have lost their cattle and been forced to take up farming.

I was told in Kenya that the expression 'he digs land like a Bantu' is still considered abusive among the Masai.

The custom of swearing fidelity to the tribe, gods, etc., also has its origin in the past of the tribal-clan system. These oaths are usually taken on joining the secret societies that exist among many African peoples. In Kenya, during the national liberation struggle of 1952-55 (which has passed into history as 'Mau-Mau') oath-taking played no small role and was used by the members of the movement against the colonialists. We have already remarked above that there were reports in the Kenyan press in 1969 of many ceremonies of swearing fidelity to the Kikuyu. These ceremonies had a mass character and embraced the whole Central, Western and Eastern provinces, and part of the Rift Valley. Members of various ethnic groups, including Kamba, Baluhya, and Embu, were sometimes forced against their will to swear fidelity to the Kikuyu, which complicated relations between them and even led to clashes. The government of Kenya condemned the actions of the extremists, and the police were categorically instructed to suppress such ceremonies.

One must also note the great role in the life of African peoples, especially of the rural population, of traditional beliefs and cults, black magic and white magic, that have come down to our day from tribal-clan society. Decision-making, and equally all the most important moments in people's lives, are usually accompanied with various charms and spells, sacrifices and offerings, ritual dances, and the use of sorcery of every possible kind.

Ancestor cults, which play a particularly important role in the religious views of most of the peoples of Africa, are an indication of the immense significance that ties of blood kinship and archaic traditions still have.

The tenacity of the traditional religions also explains the great place that the votaries of cults, witch doctors, and sorcerers have in African society. It is very significant that they frequently combine their main 'speciality' with administrative, and even party, activity, the supernatural power ascribed to them helping them in their administrative work with the masses. During the time I spent in Kenya in May 1969 I was told that among the Baluhya, for example, 'rain makers' took part in the meetings of parties and organisations, and that officials sometimes relied on them when undertaking certain measures.

Totemistic ideas and myths, especially connected with the beliefs and customs of African peoples, are common in their everyday life. Surviving forms of totemism are displayed, for example, in the worship of some animal, and in the survival of food taboos.

The absence of a single African religion and the existence of a host of different religious notions and cults lead to each African people's having *its own* cults and special ways of observing them, in spite of certain common features (the existence of archaic totemistic notions, ancestor cults, etc.).

The territorial distribution of African religions, moreover, is sometimes limited not merely to closely related ethnic groups but to separate tribes, and even to their subdivisions. The Yoruba, Ashanti, Baluba, Baganda, and other peoples that have created their own states have their own pantheons.

Frederick Engels, characterising the pre-Christian religions of the ancient world, wrote:

The gods thus fashioned within each people were national gods, whose domain extended no further than the national territory which they were to protect; on the other side of its boundaries other gods held undisputed sway. They could continue to exist, in imagination, only as long as the nation existed; they fell with its fall.<sup>28</sup>

His words are fully applicable to African religions.

The strict division of deities, cults, totems into 'ours' and 'theirs' or 'foreign' reinforced the isolation of the different peoples and erected certain barriers between them. The preservation of certain features led in turn to a fixing of certain peculiarities of life and culture within each isolated group, and with time to the formation of dialectical differences in language and the development of a stereotype

of behaviour. The preconditions were created for the moulding of self-consciousness and of the counterposing of 'ours' and 'theirs', in other words, isolation encouraged the rise of ethnic prejudices and biases.

Autochthonous traditional religions play an essential role in the life of African peoples. Their adherents, according to the Soviet Africanist B. I. Sharevskaya, constitute about 60 per cent of the population of Tropical Africa.<sup>29</sup> At the same time one cannot accept the statements of some foreign Africanists who argue the priority of a religious, mystical basis in African culture and try to discover the distinctive features of this culture in religious traditions. In the view of M. M. Griaule all African behaviour is ruled by myths, in other words by religious ideas, and to demand that Africans abandon their autochthonous religious traditions would be equivalent to cultural genocide.<sup>30</sup>

Dr. Sharevskaya rightly criticising such views, writes that Griaule's conception

accentuates and idealises those aspects in the culture of the peoples of colonies that represent the most archaic elements in their ideology, elements retarding development, and consequently reactionary.<sup>31</sup>

The preservation of local traditional cults, together with the spread of Christian-African sects in many areas of Tropical Africa, existing as a rule within some one ethnic group, encourages conservation of backward tribal-clan organisations and ethnic particularism, and hampers national integration in many ways.

Such are the essence and the social roots of ethnic prejudices and the reasons for the complex ethnic relations in Tropical Africa. Analysis of them makes it possible to understand why the ethnic factor plays such an important role in certain African states.

As a rule, there are a number of factors in each African country, which leave an imprint on the relations between various ethnic groups.

The crises in the Congo or Nigeria, for example, cannot, by any means, be reduced simply to ethnic factors, although the national question had a dominating influence. A conglomeration of social, economic, historical, ethnic, and religious factors underlay the Nigerian crisis of 1966-1970.

In analysing the situation in Nigeria, we must bear in mind above all the struggle for democratisation of the country; the offensive of the national bourgeoisie against the dom-

ination of Northern feudal rulers; the protracted political crisis and the extremely aggravated inner-party and inter-party struggle; the ambitious interests of individual politicians and their fomenting of tribalistic moods; the contradictory character and duality of ethnic processes, in which there is—together with a striving for unity—a contrary tendency to separateness; employment of the ideology of tribalism and tribal separatism by neocolonial circles interested in strengthening their positions; the struggle of imperialist monopolies for the oil riches of Nigeria and the contradictions between the various foreign states.

The general economic backwardness of most countries in Tropical Africa and the domination of foreign monopoly capital, the weak class differentiation, the illiteracy of the peasantry, the burdensome load of past ideas and prejudices associated with the institutions of tribal-clan society, the absence in some countries of social forces and parties with a clear programme for the development of their country by consolidating political independence and social progress that could rouse the masses to struggle for progressive development and channel their dissatisfaction with existing socio-economic structures into conscious class struggle—all this leads to the broad masses' protest having frequently developed, and perhaps again developing, in the form of hostility to a certain ethnic group whose members occupy a majority of the key positions in the leadership of one state or another. What is in essence a social protest thus takes the form of 'intertribal' strife.

## Notes to Chapter Three

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21. *Ibid.*
22. See *The Ghanaian Times*, 12 December, 1966.
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## Chapter Four. Ways and Methods of Dealing with Ethnic Problems

As political forces polarise and the struggle for economic and political independence sharpens, it is most important to evolve a correct national policy, as history has shown. Each African country, of course, has its own objectives, determined by its concrete historical conditions, and is seeking its own forms and methods of dealing with the various aspects of the national question.

While ethnic communities exist there will also be the interests of each ethnic group alongside national interests. Ethnic nihilism and ignoring of the needs of the separate peoples when drawing up and implementing economic and social development programmes can, just like reactionary forms of nationalism and chauvinism, not only do immense harm to the development of interethnic relations but also retard the movement for national and social liberation.

Only exclusive attention to the interests of various nations can remove grounds for conflicts, can remove mutual mistrust.

Lenin said in an interview with Michael Farbman, correspondent of the *London Observer* and the *Manchester Guardian* in 1922.<sup>1</sup>

It is therefore important to review the principles for dealing with ethnic problems in the programmes of governments and ruling parties, and the conceptions and points of view of leading politicians on the roads and methods of eliminating interethnic strife, establishing friendly relations between peoples of different ethnic origin, and creating real national unity. It is also of great value to analyse the measures for concrete implementation of these programmatic principles.



## I. Principles for Dealing with Ethnic Problems in Government and Party Programmes

Principles for dealing with ethnic problems are set out in various documents of African governments and political parties, including constitutions, party rules, resolutions of party congresses and conferences, and the speeches and writings of heads of state and party leaders. All these contain programmatic proposals relating to the basic rights of citizens, attitudes to chauvinism, tribal discord, and discrimination, and to regionalism, separatism, and the problem of national minorities; they also define the role and tasks of parties in the development of national self-awareness and rousing of the masses to struggle to build a new society.

In addition to general, theoretical conceptions and general principles relating to the role of ethnic problems in modern Africa and methods for dealing with them, many of the documents define the objectives of national development for a country.

The main principles for dealing with ethnic problems in Tropical Africa are primarily reflected in the constitutions of the states there. Analysis of these constitutions shows that proclamation of the principle of equality of all peoples within their political borders is characteristic of them. Thus the law prohibits any racial and ethnic discrimination, and also propaganda for separatist attitudes.

The main aim of all the governments of Tropical Africa is proclaimed as the uniting of the various ethnic groups and the creation of truly national unity.

'Any act of racial discrimination, as well as any propaganda of a racist or regional character, is punishable by the law,' says Article 45 of the Constitution of the Republic of Guinea.<sup>2</sup> In order to forge and consolidate the unity of Guinea

it (the Republic) will combat all tendencies to and manifestations of chauvinism that are considered to be serious obstacles to the realisation of this objective.<sup>3</sup>

The Republic of Mali, the Constitution of 1974 reads, guarantees equality before the law for everyone, without distinction of origin, race, language, sex, religion, or belief....

Any act of ethnic, racial, or religious discrimination, as well as any regionalist propaganda likely to infringe the security of the State or the integrity of the Republic's territory, are punishable by law.<sup>4</sup>

In the Constitution of Kenya it is written:

Every person in Kenya is entitled to the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual, that is to say, the right, whatever his race, tribe, place of origin or residence or other local connection, political opinions, colour, creed or sex.<sup>5</sup>

In November 1974 the People's Republic of Benin officially adopted a line of building a society of socialist orientation on the principles of Marxism-Leninism.

The 1977 Constitution of the People's Republic of Benin distinguishes three main stages in the Benin revolution, viz., the revolutionary movement for national liberation, the people's democratic revolution, and the socialist revolution. It emphasises that the road of development elected by the country is socialism. The philosophical basis of the Benin revolution is Marxism-Leninism, which must be creatively adapted to the conditions in Benin. The state exercises a revolutionary dictatorship with the aim of creating a people's democratic dictatorship through consistent implementation of the line of the masses.<sup>6</sup>

Revolutionary rule, the constitution says, is based on broad national unity of all the revolutionary and patriotic forces and social strata of the country, on the basis of an alliance of the workers and peasants.

The underlying principles for settling ethnic problems are proclaimed in Article 3, which states:

The People's Republic of Benin is a unified, multinational state. All nationalities are equal in rights and duties. Consolidation and development of their union is the sacred duty of the state, which ensures full flourishing of each of them in unity through a just national policy and inter-regional equilibrium and balance.

Any act of regionalism is strictly forbidden.

All nationalities enjoy freedom to use their spoken and written language and to develop their own culture. The state actively aids nationalities living in underdeveloped localities to reach the economic and cultural level of the whole country.<sup>7</sup>

Freedom of belief is proclaimed (Article 12), and the equality of all citizens (Article 121).

In the programmes of most parties of African states there are no special sections devoted to the national question and dealing in particular with how to end tribal strife and organise co-operation between the different peoples in the country, with policy in respect of national minorities, with the parties' attitude to the problem of self-determination, and so on. The sole exceptions are the programme of the Sudanese Communist Party, in which the main principles of the problem of the south are put forward, and the 'Maximum Programme' of the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), in which a special section is devoted to the national question.

The party programmes and speeches of state leaders and politicians in African countries are permeated with ideas of combating tribalism and the need to consolidate national unity.

As a rule, all the programmes start from one premise: that there is a single Kenyan, Algerian, or other nation. This principle, in fact, dismisses the problem of ethnic minorities.

In taking the danger of the effect of the ethnic factor on the activity of parties into account, and the danger of tribalism and the ideology of separatism for economic development and social progress, many parties resolutely reject building their party bodies on an ethnic basis.

Great significance is attached to ideological work in combating tribalism, and the need is proclaimed to carry out a policy in regard to cadres in which the main thing would not be ethnic connection but professional qualifications and political reliability. But there is a tendency, for all that, to provide for the representation, if not of all the ethnic groups then of the main ones, in the leading bodies of parties and states.

At the Fourth Congress of the Cameroon Union in 1962 the President of Cameroon, Ahmadou Ahidjo, had already called for ending the system of tribal cells within the party. Later, when, as a result of great efforts, interparty contradictions were successfully overcome, and the Cameroon National Union was founded in 1966, Ahmadou Ahidjo saw the main job of his party in consolidating and cementing national unity.<sup>8</sup>

In his presidential message to the nation on 20 May 1973, on the occasion of the anniversary of the United Republic of Cameroon, Ahmadou Ahidjo declared the main

task of the ruling party, the Cameroon National Union, to be constant strengthening of national unity and even development of all regions of the country.

The Second Congress of the Cameroon National Union, held in February 1975, again drew attention to the need to consolidate national unity and called on the party to continue to fight against manifestations of tribalism and against subversive forces and factionalism.

The President of Cameroon, Ahmadou Ahidjo, has spoken many times about the immense danger that tribalism represents for the future of the country, and had noted the need to settle ethnic matters, stressing that national unity is the *sine qua non* of improving the life of Cameroonians. The Cameroon National Union therefore endeavours to draw the youth to its side, and fights tribal self-awareness so as to engender and strengthen the idea of the nation through natural development from a host of different cultures.

The party is a necessary condition for consolidating national union, President Ahmadou Ahidjo again stated at the fourth session of the National Council of the Cameroon National Union in January 1977.

The rules of the Senegalese Progressive Union (renamed the Socialist Party of Senegal in December 1976) state that membership of the Union is incompatible with belonging to any ethnic or regional organisation of a political character.

In Burundi, the Party of Unity and National Progress (UPRONA), in putting forward anti-imperialist and anti-feudal slogans, considered tribalism one of its main enemies.<sup>9</sup>

The President of Sierra Leone, Dr. Siaka Stevens, said in a message to the nation in August 1974 that

the kind of nation he has been working for is an integrated Sierra Leone in which all the tribes would merge together for development, and for betterment of the country as a whole.<sup>10</sup>

President Mobutu of Zaire has emphasised, in an interview with *Jeune Afrique*, that

in our work of national construction personal matters, friendships, and tribal ties should not be taken into account.<sup>11</sup>

The rules of the Democratic Party of Guinea (DPG), adopted in 1969, proclaim the party's main aim to be the creation within the country's borders of 'a strong and prosperous, democratic and socialist nation'; and to build a so-

cialist society in which there would be social equality, progress, and peace. Article 4 of the rules, which defines the duties of party members, calls on them

to struggle against ... racism, chauvinism, regionalism ... to contribute by every means to consolidating the power of the Republic of Guinea, and tirelessly to fight for peace and friendship between peoples.<sup>12</sup>

Great importance is attached to the struggle against tribal separatism and to consolidating national unity in the programmes of the National Revolutionary Movement (NRM) of the Republic of Congo (Brazzaville) (renamed the Congolese Party of Labour in 1969). In the NRM Charter adopted at a plenum of its Central Committee held in February-March 1966, it is resolutely stated that

the party must fight against the clan spirit that divides members into groups that are often antagonistic.<sup>13</sup>

This policy was to be carried out in all spheres, including the selection of cadres and reconstruction of the army.

The Congolese nation consists of all Congolese citizens, whether living on the territory of the Republic or not. The Congolese people is one and indivisible.<sup>14</sup>

The NRM Charter stressed the need for earnest educational work among the public, wide dissemination of revolutionary ideas, and the training of cadres in the spirit of socialist ideology.

These provisions were developed and concretised in subsequent party documents, primarily in the resolutions of the NRM's Central Committee. In a resolution on methods of leadership adopted in 1966, for instance, the Central Committee condemned a tribalist and regionalist approach to appointments to responsible posts or during tenure of office. The resolution also condemned any narrow nationalism that had the aim of infringing the principles of proletarian internationalism and led to political adventurism and demagoguery.

The rules of the Congolese Party of Labour (CPL), adopted at the end of 1969, proclaimed Marxism-Leninism the theoretical basis of its ideology and activity. Article 6, defining members' duties, specially stressed that they

resolutely combat regionalism, tribalism, liberalism, and fractional work in all their forms.<sup>15</sup>

The January 1971 Plenum of the CPL Central Committee, defining the then stage of the Congolese revolution as one of a national, democratic, people's revolution, called on all party members to consolidate its ranks and leading role in all spheres of life and to fight resolutely against bourgeois and tribalist ideology.

The new version of the CPL Programme, adopted at its Second Extraordinary Congress in December 1972, considered the then existing stage of the national, democratic, people's revolution to be a transitional phase needed to prepare for the next stage, that of building socialism. The CPL set itself the aim of becoming a class party and the leading detachment of the working class. Its final goal was establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The Programme envisaged a non-capitalist path of development on the basis of the principles of Marxism-Leninism.

The late President of the Congo, Marien Ngonahi, speaking at the national conference of democratic and patriotic forces, called by the CPL in July 1972, said that the national democratic revolution set itself the aim of building a socialist society, an aim that could only be achieved by uniting all forces, social strata, and classes that had common interests in the fight against the common enemy. He considered that, in order to attain these aims, they must put an end to imperialist influence in the country, relegating internal contradictions to a secondary plane, in particular antagonisms on tribalist and regionalist grounds.

The experience of Tanzania is of great interest for solution of the ethnic problems in developing countries, especially study of the policy of the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU).

TANU's first rules, adopted in July 1954, stated that one of its aims was to combat tribalism and all isolationist tendencies among Africans.<sup>16</sup> In the rules of 1965 this point is not there.<sup>17</sup> The new rules reflected the changes that had taken place in the intervening eleven years. Whereas the main job facing TANU in 1954 had been the struggle for independence and the need to rally all the peoples of Tanganyika in that connection, by 1965, when political independence had been won, the struggle against tribalism had ceased to be one of the party's most important and pressing tasks, and it faced the concrete tasks of carrying through social and economic reforms.

In February 1977 it was decided to dissolve TANU and

the Afro-Shirazi Party and to found the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (Revolutionary Party).

At the ceremony proclaiming the new party President Nyerere said that TANU and Afro-Shirazi had brought political freedom, had created the basic structure needed to build socialist society, and had laid the foundations of socialism and democracy. The task of Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) would be to consolidate the institutions already created and to employ them more effectively to achieve the country's aims. President Nyerere also stressed that the CCM must pay more attention to the economic development of Tanzania.

The equality of all human beings is proclaimed in the rules of Chama Cha Mapinduzi, as its creed; the rules also stress that socialism and self-reliance are the only way of building a society of free and equal citizens.<sup>18</sup>

Among the aims and tasks of the party, the rules note the following:

to ensure that the government and all public institutions give equal opportunity to all citizens, women and men alike, irrespective of race, tribe, religion or status; to ensure that in our country there is no injustice, intimidation, racial discrimination, corruption, oppression or favouritism; to continue to fight against colonialism, neo-colonialism, imperialism and all kinds of discrimination.

The section of the rules on leadership stresses that a leader

must be a person who likes to spread the benefits brought about by our independence to all the citizens for their benefit and for the development of the nation as a whole.<sup>19</sup>

In the programmatic documents of the Kenya African National Union (KANU), the ruling party of Kenya, no little significance is attached to ethnic problems. In the rules adopted in 1966 it is written:

KANU shall strive for unity and understanding among all the peoples of Kenya—breaking down tribal, linguistic, and racial and cultural barriers. It will be the responsibility of leaders of KANU to educate all the people of Kenya to appreciate the need to build a nation out of the sovereign state.<sup>20</sup>

Characterising KANU's policy in the foreword to the party manifesto of 1963, President Jomo Kenyatta emphasised that

there will be no place in the Kenya we shall create for discrimination by race, tribe, belief or any other manner.<sup>21</sup>

KANU's programme proclaims the following principles with a direct bearing on ethnic problems:<sup>22</sup>

(i) the exercise of democratic freedoms—freedom of the individual, of worship, meetings, etc.—shall be guaranteed;

(ii) each citizen must think and act as a Kenyan, independently of his origin;

(iii) oppression by minority or majority shall not be permitted;

(iv) everyone is obliged to co-operate in the creation of national unity;

(v) divisions of tribe or party, colour, custom, caste, or community, age or faith or religion shall be subordinated to the national effort.

The programme did not consider tribal and racial antagonisms inevitable but that the building of a single nation united by common aims and embracing many different peoples was possible, although the existence of tribal and racial differences hampered national development.

KANU has no desire to suppress the diverse cultures and communities which go to make up our nation. Indeed it is fundamental to our desire to create a truly AFRICAN society that local customs, arts, and social patterns should be preserved and modernised.

Our people must be proud of their heritage... That is why we foster the resurgence and adaptation of all that is valid for the twentieth century in our indigenous cultures.

On the other hand the government will not tolerate the sabotaging of the national effort by those who would play upon tribal or racial differences.<sup>23</sup>

Characterising KANU's policy toward the Masai, Kalenjin, Turkana, Boran, Gabbra, and other peoples, the manifesto said that Masailand and the Northern Province would have a special place in the development plans drawn up by a KANU government. In addition to improvement of water supplies, the building of roads, and the development of veterinary services, the people of these areas would be taught modern methods of stock raising.

The job of the educational system would be to foster the building of national unity, and the best means for that (in KANU's view) was rejection of the racial principle in education.

In the programme of the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), a document that had made a definite contribution to the theoretical position adopted by

the revolutionary democratic parties of Africa, there was a special section on ethnic problems. The programme guarantees equality of all the ethnic groups in Angola, sets the aim of consolidating their alliance and fraternal mutual aid, speaks of the possibility of granting autonomy to ethnic groups living compactly in a certain area, grants the right to each people to use its mother tongue, create a system of writing for its language, and develop its culture. It specially emphasises the need for solidarity with all the peoples of Africa struggling for independence.<sup>24</sup>

The Programme of Action adopted at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the MPLA in October 1976 defines the objectives of the party at the present stage of development. Only the socialist road of national construction, it says, makes it possible to abolish exploitation of man by man completely. The main objective of the present period is declared to be national reconstruction. There is only one road for the MPLA—that of building a socialist society on the basis of the teachings of Marx, Engels, and Lenin.

One of the main tasks posed by the Programme is the final elimination of all signs of racism, tribalism, and sectional tendencies. There is nothing fortuitous about that. The ethnic factor continues to play an important role in the political life of Angola, and is being exploited by imperialism and the internal reactionaries to fight the progressive regime, as was shown, in particular, by the attempt at a *coup d'état* by a group of factionalists on 27 May 1977.

Speaking in the Northern Cuanza Province in February 1977, Agostinho Neto, President of the People's Republic of Angola, noted that the MPLA had always fought to rally the people of Angola, and had resolutely opposed racism, regionalism, and tribalism, which divided the people.

The 1st Congress of the MPLA held in December 1977 passed a resolution reorganising the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola into the MPLA-Party of Labour. It has adopted a programme setting forth the aims and objectives of the struggle to build in Angola a society free from the exploitation of man by man. The programme emphasises that the MPLA-Party of Labour will be guided by the principles of Marxism-Leninism and scientific socialism in all its activities.

In his New-Year address to the Angolan people (1978) Agostinho Neto said that the transformation of Angola into a people's democracy with a view to build socialism in a

longer perspective makes it necessary that all the people take an active part in working for a closer national unity and struggling against any forms of racial, tribal and parochial strife.

The People's Revolutionary Party of Benin (PRPB) emphasises in the rules adopted in August 1977 that its goal is complete and final liberation from foreign domination and from all forms of exploitation of man by man, and the building of a society of people's democracy as a stage on the road to creating a socialist society on the basis of the principles of Marxism-Leninism. The PRPB is a class party, and is the vanguard of the proletariat and of all exploited classes and sections of the country. The rules stress that the PRPB is a party of the oppressed and exploited working masses, and that it is faithful to the principle of proletarian internationalism. They require members strictly to follow the party's Marxist-Leninist political and ideological line, to fight without regard of self for the interests of the people of Benin, and resolutely to combat all manifestations of regionalism, tribalism, corruption, sectarianism, and petty bourgeois liberalism, and to be models of a conscientious attitude to work.<sup>25</sup>

The PRPB's declaration on the general line and main stages of the Benin revolution includes the following points as its minimum programme: revolutionary education and development of the class consciousness of the working people; effective use of the propaganda media to educate the popular masses in, and win them for, the ideology of the proletariat, and to eliminate bourgeois ideology. It sets itself the aim of carrying out agrarian reform and creating new forms of agricultural co-operatives.

Special stress is laid on the need to mould a new man, an internationalist devoted to his native country.

The programme of the Revolutionary Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO), the vanguard party of the alliance of workers and peasants, adopted at its Third Congress in February 1977, poses the aim of building a people's democracy in the People's Republic of Mozambique and of abolishing capitalism.

The leading role in the party, its Programme states, is taken by the proletariat. The party is leading the people along the road of carrying through further revolutionary democratic reforms and finally abolishing the exploitation of man by man, and of providing conditions for laying the

political, material, and ideological foundations of socialism in the People's Republic of Mozambique. The party's general line is based on the fundamental principles of scientific socialism, with the principle of proletarian internationalism as the guiding one.

The Programme considers one of the main tasks to be the moulding of a new man, collectivist in spirit, who has assimilated all the riches of modern science and culture.<sup>26</sup>

In Sierra Leone the All People's Congress resolutely opposes tribalism and disintegration. Its Manifesto declares that it unites 'all sections of the populace without discrimination and regardless of tribe, creed or race'.<sup>27</sup> While appreciating that 'every individual should be proud of his tribe', the Manifesto declares that the All People's Congress 'is resolved that tribalism will not be used as a political instrument of disunity'.

'In other words,' it says, 'we are out to build and consolidate one national citizenry.' To that end its energies 'will be directed to complete eradication of tribalism in the politics of Sierra Leone'.<sup>28</sup> Unity, it says, means strength.<sup>29</sup>

In Ethiopia the Provisional Military Administrative Committee, in the first days of its assuming power, declared the equality of all citizens irrespective of ethnic origin and religious faith.

The *Programme of the National Democratic Revolution of Ethiopia* published by the Provisional Military Administrative Committee (PMAC) in April 1976 sets the aim of completely abolishing feudalism, imperialism, and bureaucratic capitalism in Ethiopia, and of laying a strong foundation 'for transition to socialism'.<sup>30</sup> Article 5 of the Programme states:

The right to self-determination of all nationalities will be recognised and fully respected. No nationality will dominate another one since the history, culture, language and religion of each nationality will have equal recognition in accordance with the spirit of socialism.

The unity of Ethiopia's nationalities will be based on their common struggle against feudalism, imperialism, bureaucratic capitalism and all reactionary forces. This united struggle is based on the desire to construct a new life and a new society based on equality, brotherhood and mutual respect.<sup>31</sup>

Since the problem of national minorities had become acute under the monarchist regime, and many ethnic groups, including Somali and Galla, had complained about the dominant position of Amhara in the country, the PMAC con-

sidered it necessary to speak specially about their rights in its Programme.

Nationalities on border areas and those scattered over various regions have been subjected to special subjugation for a long time. Special attention will be paid to raise the political, economic, and cultural life of these nationalities. All necessary steps to equalize these nationalities with the other nationalities of Ethiopia will be undertaken.<sup>32</sup>

The Programme notes further that

given Ethiopia's existing situation, the problem of nationalities can be resolved if each nationality is accorded full right to self-government. This means that each nationality will have regional autonomy to decide on matters concerning its internal affairs. Within its environs, it has the right to determine the contents of its political, economic and social life, use its own language and elect its own leaders and administrators to head its internal organs.

This right of self-government of nationalities will be implemented in accordance with all democratic procedures and principles.<sup>33</sup>

Article 6 of the Programme stresses that

there will not be any sort of discrimination among religions and sexes. No citizen will be accorded special privilege in his or her political, economic and social undertakings on the basis of religion and sex....

Ethiopia's national interest, unity and integrity ultimately depend on the energy of its broad masses.<sup>34</sup>

Commenting on the events in the country and the first steps of the military government the *Ethiopian Herald* wrote in December 1974:

Ethiopian Socialism aims at restoring equality and justice to the Ethiopian people as a whole irrespective of tribe, religion or family affiliations.<sup>35</sup>

Since *Nigeria* is the biggest country in Africa, and since ethnic problems there are very acute and of great significance for its future, we feel it necessary to dwell in detail on the principles worked out by the Military Government to deal with the national question.

The Federal Military Government of *Nigeria* has proclaimed the equality and equal rights of all citizens irrespective of ethnic origin, and maintenance of the unity and territorial integrity of the country, as the principles for dealing with ethnic problems. It firmly opposes secession of any part of the country from the Federation. It is convinced that the creation of states substantially resolves the prob-



lem of the ethnic minorities. No one ethnic group should occupy a predominant position in relation to others. For that reason Northern Nigeria was divided into six states in May 1967, and the non-Muslim peoples of the central areas, who had always complained of the dictatorship of the Hausa and Fulani, were separated from the latter peoples. The same was done in Eastern Nigeria, where the Ibo were separated from the Ibibio, Efik, Ijaw, and other peoples.

The Federal Government has more than once declared its identical attitude to all the ethnic groups of Nigeria, including the Ibo people, the main ethnic group of former Biafra. It guarantees all the peoples equal rights and equal opportunities for economic, political, and cultural development as Nigerian citizens, irrespective of their ethnic origin.

The slogan 'United Nigeria' was and remains the main principle of the Nigerian government's programme on the national question. This policy led to the Federal Government's victory in the civil war with Biafra. The aggravation of the ethnic factor, which was uppermost for a time in the crisis years, also faced the government with the task of very rapidly eliminating the consequences of the war years in the field of relations between the different ethnic groups. For that reason it specially stresses its well-disposed attitude to the Ibo, and has more than once declared that the Ibo are citizens with full rights and that their return to the Federation is to be welcomed in every way. The need to strengthen national unity and to carry out a policy of rapprochement of the various peoples of Nigeria has been stressed. The Federal Government sees as its task the solution of all problems, taking into account the interests of the whole country and of all ethnic groups.

The programme principles for tackling ethnic problems were set forth by the then head of the Military Government, General Yakubu Gowon, in a radio address of 30 November 1966:

We must also discourage any attempt to revive tribal consciousness and worsen Regional animosities.<sup>36</sup>

The Federal Military Government considers the determinant principle of the future constitution of Nigeria to be maintenance and consolidation of national unity and of Nigeria's territorial integrity. The new constitution, which is to be drafted by a representative assembly, should reflect the cherished hopes of all Nigerians and not the political inter-

ests of regional blocs and tribal groups. Only federation meets the country's needs, because confederation does not provide an effective central authority. The Federal Government considered that the common need in Nigeria is that no one region or tribal group should be in a position to dominate the others. The new Federal Constitution must therefore contain adequate safeguards to make such domination impossible. In the stable Federation, no region should be large enough to be able to threaten secession or hold the rest of the Federation to ransom in times of national crisis.<sup>37</sup>

In the government's view the creation of states would ensure normal development and remove fears that some one region or other could be able to dominate the others. The following principles underlay the creation of new states: no one state should be in a position to dominate or control the central government; each state should have a compact territory; convenience of administration; the historical past and the wishes of the peoples living in a given state should be taken into account; each state should take on the function of regional government and successfully carry it out; it was also important for states to be created at the same time. The Nigerian government considered that all these principles, taken together, should be taken into account when forming the states, and that no one principle should be employed to the exclusion of the rest.

In speaking of the methods for dealing with problems, the Military Government specially stressed the use of peaceful means.

It was noted that, in carrying this programme out, the government would select people who incontestably believed in the existence of Nigeria as a federation. Their job would be to help work out the national approach to problems.

In his greetings on the occasion of the Muslim holiday of 11 January 1967 the then head of the Military Government, recalling that tragic events had occurred on that day in 1966, called on everyone to respect the religious feelings and customs of the other peoples and to live in peace and harmony; and to learn to be tolerant toward one another.<sup>38</sup>

One of the lessons of the Nigerian experience, the Military Government considered, was that

irrespective of political, tribal or religious differences, common economic interests strongly reinforce the bonds that hold Nigerians together. The things which unite the people in Nigeria are by far greater than those which divide them.



The tensions in the nation-building processes, in the government's view, should be eliminated by recognising the common interests.

In the struggle for peace and harmony, no Nigerian can remain uncommitted to united effort. In the government's view it is necessary to concentrate more on ways and means of closing the existing differences and tightening the sinews of concord.

The Federal Military Government introduced an important programme of reintegration of the Ibo in November 1968 after the end of the civil war. The authorities, replying to those who expressed doubts, stressed that reconciliation was quite possible. Nigerians had demonstrated their community of interest in maintaining the unity and territorial integrity of the country.

As for the Ibos, the ordinary Ibo had not in any way been responsible for the events of 15 January 1966 and the subsequent period. The ordinary Ibo had not been responsible in any way either for the secession plans or subsequent events.

The Military Government, in developing a programme of national reconciliation, emphasised that the leaders and people of post-war Nigeria, while recognising the ethnic differences in the country, should concentrate on actions that would foster the development of national self-consciousness and of feelings of Nigerian community. Nigeria meant more, for the majority of Nigerians than simply a geographical expression created by the British.

In the government's view it was impossible to consider the problem of national reconciliation simply in an economic sense. National reconciliation also meant a fight for the minds of the people.

In speaking of the lessons of the civil war and of the elimination of its consequences as regards interethnic relations, the government stressed that it was the job of all Nigerians to do everything possible to heal the wounds of the Ibo as a people. At the same time, it said, the Ibo must also draw the lessons from their past mistakes and strive to live in harmony with other Nigerians as equal partners on the road to national progress.

On the day the war against Biafra ended, 15 January 1970, the then head of the Military Government declared that the main task was now restoration and reintegration.

An amnesty was declared for all who had been misled and who had taken part in the revolt. The government guaranteed protection of the lives and property of all citizens in every part of Nigeria and equality of political rights. Every Nigerian had the right to live and work anywhere in the Federation he wanted to, as an equal citizen of a united country. All must henceforth respect one another. There could be no question of there being second-class citizens in Nigeria.

In April 1970 the government outlined a broad action programme for the new historical period, i.e., with the civil war ended and a period of restoration and national reconstruction beginning. The main task of this period, it was said, was to build a great and happier nation. The main objective of the reconstruction plan, therefore, must be (in the government's view) to concentrate efforts on those factors that would unite Nigerians and cement the bonds of the new Nigerian nation. The government declared its desire to build a just and equal society in Nigeria, in which there would be no oppression either of the individual or of ethnic groups. That, it stressed, could only be done within the framework of the new federation and its structure of states, under the purposive and honest direction of the Federal Government.

As regards the Federal Government's policy in respect of states, it was noted that it assumed responsibility for rendering the financial help that states needed so as to give them the chance to stand on their own feet and play an effective part in nation-building. It was emphasised that special attention would be paid to extending the system of elementary and secondary education in backward areas. The Federal Military Government guaranteed defence of the interests of all citizens, whatever part of the country they lived in.

The Nigerian leaders warned specially against the dangerous consequences of ethnic exclusiveness in dealing with national problems, and more than once have affirmed that every Nigerian should be able to choose his place of residence and work at his own discretion, irrespective of his ethnic origin. Free movement of the population was needed to ensure even development of the whole country in the shortest possible time. The government appealed to all the leaders and ordinary citizens of all areas of the country to help give employment to all Nigerians, irrespective of their ethnic origin and of the state where they were born.

As for political parties, the government declared that there could be no question of a return to parties that would operate solely within a state or have a tribal character. It expressed the hope that over the next few years Nigerians, working together for the good of their country, would develop the definite national ideology, aims, and objectives of Nigerian society. Only by taking national aims and objectives into account could political parties be a positive factor in nation-building.

Thus the Federal Government not only set forth the principles for dealing with ethnic problems in Nigeria, but also gave a developed programme for their solution, and outlined a concrete programme of action to establish proper relations between the different ethnic groups through overcoming the consequences of the Nigerian crisis and through reintegration of the Ibo; it also worked out the criteria that should underlie the creation of states, and defined the role of students and the universities in nation-building and consolidating national unity.

The Federal Military Government has more than once stated that it considers maintenance and consolidation of Nigeria's national unity and territorial integrity to be the determining principle of its policy. That is reflected in the draft of a new constitution published in 1976, which notes that the constitution must express the cherished wishes of all Nigerians and not of individual regional blocs or tribal groups.

The draft constitution stresses 'the federal character of Nigeria and the need to promote national unity' and 'a sense of belonging and loyalty among all the peoples of Nigeria' (Article 8).<sup>39</sup>

The motto of the Federal Republic of Nigeria is to be 'Unity and Faith, Peace and Progress'. The draft constitution calls for active encouragement of national integration [Article 9 (1)].

Under Article 9 discrimination on 'grounds of place of origin, religion, sex, status, ethnic or linguistic association or ties shall be prohibited'.<sup>40</sup> Article 11 provides that all citizens should have 'adequate opportunities to secure suitable employment', and 'adequate facilities for social, religious and cultural life' and 'equal and adequate educational opportunities'.<sup>41</sup> The state, it says, 'shall not adopt any religion as the state religion' (Article 17).<sup>42</sup>

The draft constitution forbids discrimination against cit-

izens on the basis of place of origin, ethnic group, or religious opinion, or the according of 'any privilege or advantage' on such grounds (Article 35).<sup>43</sup>

With the aim of promoting national integration the draft constitution says that the state shall 'provide adequate facilities for and encourage free mobility of people . . . throughout the country', 'encourage intermarriage among persons from different places of origin, or of different religious, ethnic or linguistic association', 'promote or encourage the formation of associations that cut across ethnic, linguistic, religious or other sectional barriers'.<sup>44</sup>

The draft also emphasises the need to 'foster a feeling of belonging and involvement among the various peoples of the country to the end that loyalty to the Nation shall override sectional loyalties' (Article 9).

The national ethic is proclaimed as 'discipline, self-reliance, and patriotism' (Article 18).<sup>45</sup>

The draft states that 'every person shall be entitled to freedom of thought, conscience and religion' (Article 31). And special emphasis is put on freedom for every citizen to move throughout Nigeria and to reside in any part thereof'.<sup>46</sup> zen 'to move throughout Nigeria and to reside in any part

Analysis of the theoretical propositions and philosophical conceptions contained in the writings of leading African statesmen, and in their speeches and statements on important occasions in the home and foreign policy of their states, has great value for assessing the principles and methods for dealing with ethnic problems.

*Jomo Kenyatta*, President of Kenya, one of the outstanding leaders of the national liberation movement of the peoples of Africa, has more than once expressed his view in his articles and speeches (many of which have been published as an appendix to his book *Suffering Without Bitterness*) on the principles and methods of treating ethnic problems that are contained in the programme of KANU. He has spoken out particularly firmly against tribalism, inter-tribal strife, separatism, and tribal particularism, calling them dangerous enemies in the way of building a united Kenyan nation.<sup>47</sup>

In a programmatic article in April 1963 devoted to defining the aims and methods of building the future society of Kenya, he wrote:

I have always believed in a non-tribal, non-racial approach. This is KANU's policy also. It does not mean that we wish to suppress or oppress any particular tribe or race. Indeed,

the presence of different groups in our nation provides us with the opportunity to build a rich culture from these diverse elements.

The position of every citizen, according to the Bill of Rights, will be safeguarded by the Government. Every citizen, whatever his tribe or race, must think and act as a Kenyan.<sup>48</sup>

We shall work for a united and integrated nation... Those principles of equality and brotherhood to be followed in the political sphere also apply to economic and social matters... Greed and exploitation cannot be the cornerstones of our nation building.<sup>49</sup>

Jomo Kenyatta categorically attacked the slogan of secession put forward by the politicians of some of the small tribes.

Why should anyone deny the Kalenjin, Masai or Coastal tribes the right to be part of the new Kenya nation? Why should anyone try to deny these tribes the right to participate in and contribute towards the exciting task of creating a new nation? These are questions which I am sure the people will soon ask of their leaders. I have no hesitation in saying that the people will reject petty and negative leadership,

he declared on 20 October 1963, on returning from the London conference on the constitution of Kenya.<sup>50</sup>

Jomo Kenyatta expressed important programmatic principles in relation to the land problem, which is well known to be one of Kenya's most acute problems.

All tribal land is entrenched in the tribal authority and no one can take away land belonging to another tribe.<sup>51</sup>

In the foreword to his book he said:

We have been creating throughout Kenya a family or community spirit that in Swahili is called 'Ujamaa'.<sup>52</sup>

Speaking of policy toward ethnic minorities in his message to the people on 28 May 1963, on the eve of the proclamation of Kenyan self-government, Jomo Kenyatta stressed the equality of all the peoples of the country, and said that it would be

the Government's intention to do away with the terrible poverty of so many of our people. In particular, we must see that the backward areas of our country catch up and keep pace with the more prosperous parts. Special attention will be given to the needs of the Masai, the Somali, the Suk, the Turkana, and other pastoral groups.<sup>53</sup>

In a speech of 21 September 1963 he declared that the government saw it as its task 'to create unity and under-

standing throughout the country'. The government, he declared, was

concerned with the welfare of all the people, regardless of their race or tribe, and this will be the policy of the Government in the future.<sup>54</sup>

All citizens of Kenya, Jomo Kenyatta emphasised, irrespective of their race or ethnic affiliation, had an equal right to work, and no one would suffer discrimination.

We are ourselves a kind of United Nations in miniature. And here, all our citizens have equal respect; all have equal rights and responsibilities, and equal obligations, under the law.<sup>55</sup>

He had always fought against splits, against the absence of unity, and against isolationism, he declared, and his greatest concern was national unity, which he had always considered it necessary to support and fulfil in Kenya.

Nationhood and familyhood must and can be contrived out of our many tribes and cultures,<sup>56</sup>

he wrote.

On the eve of independence Kenyatta and KANU were waging a stubborn struggle against the opposition party KADU (the Kenya African Democratic Union), which was putting forward a plan to divide Kenya into seven areas. Kenyatta and KANU were calling for the creation of a united country with a strong central authority. After independence was obtained KANU and the President proclaimed maintenance of territorial integrity to be one of their most important principles—a principle that was applied in particular during the aggravation of the Somali problem in northern Kenya.

Jomo Kenyatta considered that 'national integrity and national dignity were the staff of the future' of Kenya<sup>57</sup> and 'nation-building', in his view, was 'a matter of patriotism and pride'.<sup>58</sup>

Involvement of the ordinary citizen 'in the progress of the community', he wrote, 'is the foundation on which we shall build our nation'.<sup>59</sup>

Appealing to the youth at the opening of a festival on 16 October 1966, President Kenyatta said:

There are those who have not yet met the challenge of moving from tribal to national consciousness. They do not understand that to earn our fair share of the fruits of the modern world we must be strong. To be strong we must be united. To be united we must treat our neighbour as our brother.<sup>60</sup>

In his first speech as prime minister, on the occasion of the granting of internal self-government to Kenya on 1 June 1963, Jomo Kenyatta had given the call *Harambee!*, which means, in Swahili, 'All Together!' 'Let us all work hard together for our country, Kenya,' he had said.<sup>61</sup> *Harambee!* inscribed on the banner of Kenya, has since become one of the most important principles of the government's national policy.

At the ceremonial proclamation of Kenya as a republic on 12 December 1964, Jomo Kenyatta declared:

The Republic is the people of Kenya. All through the Colonial days, for the purpose of divide-and-rule, we were constantly reminded that we were Kikuyu or Wakamba, or Giriama or Kipsigis or Masai, or English or Hindu or Somali. But now, the Republic has embodied those features of equality and respect which cut through any differences of race or tribe.<sup>62</sup>

At the same time he not only did not deny the existence of ethnic groups in Kenya but on the contrary stressed that

every man has the right to take a pride and interest in his tribe—its history, its culture and its customs.<sup>63</sup>

But, he said,

what we will not permit is the exploitation of tribalism for political ends. Those who try to whip up tribal feelings for political advantage are doing a great disservice to themselves, to their fellows and to the Kenya nation. My Government has allowed tribal social organisations to continue, but some of these have allowed themselves to be used for political purposes. If any society or its officials engage henceforth in political activities or actions calculated to incite tribal politics, its registration will be cancelled.<sup>64</sup>

And he specially emphasised that tribalism had been 'one of our greatest obstacles', during the struggle for independence, and that it had been 'played upon by the colonial regime'.<sup>65</sup>

A policy document of importance for understanding the principles of national policy is Jomo Kenyatta's appeal to the people on the occasion of the proclamation of Kenya as a republic. Their 'obligation and purpose', he said, was 'to build one strong Kenya for the benefit of all'.<sup>66</sup> The constitution of the republic was founded on the principle of national unity, he stressed. It did not recognise any division of the country and contained no complicated clauses relating to artificial differences as regards tribal, racial or economic privileges.

It was most important, President Kenyatta said, to maintain national integrity and freedom, and he called on all Kenyans to struggle resolutely against any internal or external enemy who tried to weaken this unity, stressing the special importance for the future of the republic of a feeling of community and of realising the fundamental call *Harambee!*

Appealing to a delegation of Nairobi citizens of 8 May 1972, President Kenyatta called on them to give maximum support to cultural measures involving different ethnic groups, since (in his view) that was the best way to develop national culture and unity.

The President of Tanzania, *Dr. Julius K. Nyerere*, has set forth his point of view many times in speeches and statements on the problem of building a united Tanzanian nation and eliminating intertribal strife and discrimination, and has stressed the need to inculcate feelings of brotherhood and co-operation among the members of the various ethnic groups. He directly links solution of ethnic problems with socialist reconstruction of society.

In the introduction to the collection of his speeches and articles entitled *Freedom and Unity*, he noted several factors that from the outset determined both the forms and methods of fighting for independence and the policy of the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) on the national question. The chief factors were the following: Tanganyika was not a colony but a trust territory; the multitude of tribal organisations was a kind of groundwork of political organisation; the lack of economic and social development in the country had led to there being 'no really strong local vested interests supporting the maintenance of colonialism'; there was no one tribal group in the country that 'dominated all others in size, wealth and education'; and 'the majority of the people, especially the men, almost throughout the territory' understood Swahili.<sup>67</sup> The combination of these factors, he wrote,

made it possible for TANU to think exclusively in national terms without emphasis on tribal problems. They made it comparatively easy for TANU to eschew tribalism and religious allegiances and to build a real national consciousness.<sup>68</sup>

And although members of TANU were, at first, only Africans (from 1954 to January 1963), the party stood for racial equality from its very foundation.

The objective put forward by TANU was:

the creation of a nation out of more than 120 tribes, out of peoples of different religious and different social groups, and a nation in which race is of less importance than a record of service and an expected ability to give service.<sup>69</sup>

Unmasking the imperialist policy of 'divide and rule', Dr. Nyerere noted that

the argument of tribal differences has always been used by the imperialists to delay our independence.<sup>70</sup>

Whenever Africans asked for the right to govern themselves, he said in his speech at the Second Conference of Independent African States in June 1960,

it has been the imperialist who has told us that we are not ready because we still have tribal, religious, communal, and other differences. At the same time it has been the imperialist who has encouraged these divisions in order to continue to rule a weak and divided people.<sup>71</sup>

The principles of nation-building and of creating a one-party state developed by Dr. Nyerere were applied by the Constitutional Commission and found reflection in the Interim Constitution of Tanzania adopted in July 1965.<sup>72</sup> One section of the Constitution, entitled 'National Ethic', set out the programme of the party and government on the national question and the provisions on the basic rights and obligations of citizens.<sup>73</sup>

President Nyerere emphasised that the ethical principles set out in the Constitution underlay 'the basis of the Tanganyika nation', and that

the whole political, economic and social organisation of the State must be directed towards their rapid implementation.<sup>74</sup>

These principles were as follows:

1. the fundamental equality of all human beings and the right of every individual to dignity and respect;
2. every Tanganyika citizen is an integral part of the nation and has the right to take an equal part in government at local, regional and national level;
3. every individual citizen has the right to freedom of expression, of movement, of religious belief, of association within the context of the law, subject in all cases only to the maintenance of equal freedom for all other citizens;
4. every individual has the right to receive from society protection of his life, and of property held according to the law, and to freedom from arbitrary arrest; every citizen has the corresponding duty to uphold the law, constitutionally arrived at, and to assist those responsible for law enforcement;

5. every individual citizen has the right to receive a just return for his labour, whether by hand or brain;
6. all the citizens of the country together possess all the natural resources of the country in trust for their descendants, and those resources may therefore not be surrendered in perpetuity to any individual, family, group, or association;
7. it is the responsibility of the state, which is the people, to intervene actively in the economic life of the nation, so as to ensure the well-being of all citizens of Tanganyika, and so as to prevent the exploitation of any person, or the accumulation of wealth which is inconsistent with the existence of a classless society;
8. the nation of Tanganyika is unalterably opposed to the exploitation of one man by another, of one nation by another, or one group by another; it is the responsibility of the state, therefore, to take an active role in the fight against colonialism wherever it may exist, and to work for African unity, and for world peace and international co-operation on the basis of human equality and freedom.<sup>75</sup>

These principles were to determine policy for political, economic, and social activity.

The object of the Government (Dr. Nyerere noted) shall be to establish complete equality of opportunity for all Tanganyika citizens in all fields of endeavour.

There shall be no discrimination against any Tanganyika citizen on grounds of race, tribe, colour, sex, creed, or religion...

There shall be no propaganda of group hatred, nor of any policy which would have the effect of arousing feelings of disrespect for any race, tribe, sex, or religion.

All Tanganyika citizens shall be equally subject to the laws of the country...

All Tanganyika citizens shall have the duty to work...

The Tanganyika Government shall have the duty to take all possible action to promote the economic and social well-being of the people and of the nation as a whole, and to build a classless society.<sup>76</sup>

The principles set forth by President Nyerere in the *National Ethic* served as the basis for the Rules of TANU and for the Arusha Declaration adopted by TANU on 29 January 1967, in which the principal aims and objects of TANU were proclaimed to be the following:

to consolidate and maintain the independence of this country and the freedom of its people;  
to safeguard the inherent dignity of the individual in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;  
to see that the Government gives equal opportunity to all men and women irrespective of race, religion or status;  
to see that the Government eradicates all types of exploitation, intimidation, discrimination, bribery and corruption.<sup>77</sup>

The Arusha Declaration once more emphasised the equality of all citizens of the country.

We are Tanzanians (it said) and wish to remain Tanzanian as we develop.<sup>78</sup>

The Declaration, President Nyerere stressed (speaking at the University of Dar es Salaam on 5 August 1967)

refers to men, and to systems—not to members of particular racial or tribal groups.<sup>79</sup>

Many of Dr. Nyerere's speeches and articles are devoted to the dependence of the solution of ethnic problems on the path of socio-economic development. Many times he has stressed that only socialism eliminates the inequality of people, the exploitation of man by man, and creates favourable conditions for the individual society as a whole to flourish. The main thing in socialist society is the individual, irrespective of sex, colour, education, etc.<sup>80</sup> But, he said:

The ultimate success in the work of building socialism in Tanzania—as elsewhere—depends upon the people of this nation ... upon their contribution to it—their work, their co-operation for the common good, and their acceptance of each other as equals and brothers.<sup>81</sup>

'The existence of racialism, of tribalism, or of religious intolerance,' he wrote in the introduction to his collection of speeches and articles *Freedom and Socialism*,

means that a society is not socialist—regardless of whatever other attributes it may have.<sup>82</sup>

We want the whole nation to live as one family (he said during a visit to the island of Mafia in February 1966). This is the basis of socialism. Let us say we want socialism and want to build a socialist state.<sup>83</sup>

President Nyerere said that the essence of socialism was the practical realisation of the principle of equality of peoples.

Emerging countries have no choice but to take the socialist road of development if they intend to develop independently, he said in January 1973 in his message 'The Rational Choice' to the head of the Sudanese Government on the occasion of the 17th anniversary of the Sudan's independence.

In practice, he considers,

Third World nations cannot become developed capitalist societies without surrendering the reality of their freedom and

without accepting a degree of inequality between their citizens which would deny the moral validity of our independence struggle. I will argue that our present poverty and national weakness make socialism the only rational choice for us.<sup>84</sup>

Addressing public and party workers on 1 February 1975 in Dar es Salaam, Dr. Nyerere said that TANU would not turn from the road it had chosen of building socialism in the country. The party would firmly follow the line of creating an equal society free of exploitation of man by man.

In an article 'Socialism Is Not Racialism' published on 14 February 1967 in *The Nationalist*, he wrote:

The man or woman who hates 'Jews' or 'Asians', or 'Europeans', or even 'West Europeans and Americans' is not a socialist. He is trying to divide mankind into groups and is judging men according to the skin colour... Or he is dividing men according to national boundaries. In either case he is denying the equality and brotherhood of men.<sup>85</sup>

To try and divide up the people working for our nation into groups of 'good' and 'bad' according to their skin colour, or their national origin, or their tribal origin, is to sabotage the work we have just embarked upon... We must think about men, and an individual man, not about 'Asians', 'Europeans', 'Americans', and so on...

The Arusha Declaration talks of men, and their beliefs... It does not talk about racial groups or nationalities. On the contrary, it says that all those who stand for the interests of the workers and peasants, anywhere in the world, are our friends. This means that we must judge the character and ability of each individual, not put each person into a prearranged category of race or national origin and judge them accordingly... And each of us must fight in himself the racist habits of thought which were part of our inheritance from colonialism.<sup>86</sup>

Dr. Nyerere attaches great importance for the future of African countries to strengthening the feeling of belonging to one's own national state, of inculcating loyalty to the constitution of the country, to elected leaders, and to everyone who has the right attitude to the nation.

In order to avoid internal conflict and further disunity each nation state is forced to promote its own nationhood,

he said, welcoming the opening of the University of Zambia on 13 July 1966.<sup>87</sup>

He considers the main objectives to be

the development of a nation, in unity, in which every citizen is an equal member of the society with an equal opportunity to contribute to the best of his ability and an equal right to human dignity and respect...



TANU, he said,

rejects racialism and tribalism, just as we reject discrimination based on religion or anything else except loyalty to our nation and our people.<sup>88</sup>

And again:

Our Government and people have stressed the equality of all citizens, and our determination that economic, political and social policies shall be deliberately designed to make a reality of that equality in all spheres of life.<sup>89</sup>

In the present world situation this is something of which Tanzania can be very proud. It is also something which we must live up to and maintain. A citizen of this country is a citizen; that is enough. Let us never forget that fact, and let no one of us ever again betray the people acting as if there were different classes of citizens.<sup>90</sup>

Characterising the government's agrarian policy and explaining the new legislation relating to land use, Dr. Nyerere wrote in a pamphlet *National Property* (included in *Freedom and Unity*):

In the past, when our population was divided into different tribal groups, the land belonged to the particular tribe living on it. In futuro, however, our population will be united as one nation, and the land will belong to the nation. And today just as one man cannot prevent another man from his tribe from using land, so also tomorrow one tribe will not be able to prevent another tribe from using land that is actually the property of the nation as a whole.<sup>91</sup>

In September 1967, in an extremely important statement, in which the objective of building socialism in the countryside by creating 'ujamaa villages' was posed, President Nyerere affirmed the need, in analysing the significance of the socialist reconstruction of the rural areas of the country and the methods of work associated with that, to take account of local conditions, and in particular of the system of farming and land use, the customs of the people, their social organisation, type of family, and religious beliefs.<sup>92</sup> At the same time he noted that local interests must not predominate over national ones.

In explaining the special character of the socialist 'ujamaa villages' being set up, he emphasised that relations of a new type would be formed in them.

The essential element in them would be equality of all members of the community, and the member's self-government in all matters which concerned only their own affairs.<sup>93</sup>

At the UN General Assembly, on 14 December 1961, President Nyerere stated an important proposition relative to national policy:

We believe that it is evil for any people to ill-treat others on the grounds of race. What we are in fact saying is that we shall try to use the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a basis for both our external and our internal policies.

...human brotherhood, regardless of race, colour or creed, is the basic principle which we ourselves, in Tanganyika, and we believe other peoples in Africa and other parts of the world, have been struggling to implement... We shall never compromise with those who deny this basic principle of human brotherhood.<sup>94</sup>

In many of his speeches President Nyerere expresses his own highly negative attitude to racism and racial prejudices and defines measures for eradicating them. In his view any programme for solving the racial problem in Africa will be doomed to failure if political power is reserved for Europeans. While one part of society has a monopoly of political power and uses this power not only so as not to permit the others to share in government but also so as to keep them in a state of social and economic inferiority, any talk about the social and economic development of that category of society as a means for solving the racial problem is hypocritical and stupid.

The solution of the problem of racial conflicts must depend upon the acceptance by all the communities concerned of the principle of social, economic, and above all, political equality.<sup>95</sup>

President Nyerere stresses the establishment on the African continent of justice and peace between all people, irrespective of racial, tribal, or religious affiliation, as a most important objective.<sup>96</sup>

In other speeches, statements, and articles he has more than once returned to the principles that will make it possible to create new relations between people of different ethnic origin. Brotherhood and interdependence, he says,

are still the only basis on which society can hope to operate harmoniously and in accordance with its purpose. Unless they are adopted there will always be an inherent, although sometimes concealed, danger of a breakdown in society—that is, a split in the family unit, a civil war within a nation, or a war between nations.<sup>97</sup>



Everyone joining TANU therefore had to take the oath that he believed in the universal brotherhood of people and the unity of Africa.<sup>95</sup>

Dr. Obafemi Awolowo, an outstanding Nigerian scholar and political figure, has devoted special attention in his books *Thoughts on Nigerian Constitution*, *The People's Republic*, and others, to developing the principles of the country's state organisation, taking account of its complex ethnic composition.

On the basis of Nigeria's experience, and above all of the events of 1966-70, but also drawing on the history of other countries, including the experience of the Soviet Union in solving the national question, Dr. Awolowo has very cogently argued the need of a 'unitary' form of government for Nigeria.<sup>99</sup>

In the peculiar circumstances of Nigeria (he wrote in *Thoughts on Nigerian Constitution*)

only a federal constitution can foster unity with concord among the diverse national groups in the country, as well as promote economy and efficiency in administration.<sup>100</sup>

In *The People's Republic* he developed the principles of the state structure of Nigeria, and national policy, especially from the aspect of constitutional law, in more detail.

The dilemma facing Nigeria is no longer the choice between unitarism and federalism, as it has been earlier, but between confederalism and federalism.

Dr. Awolowo considers that a confederation is not as suitable for Nigeria in present circumstances as unitarism. Under a confederation the central government is completely dependent on the will of the state governments.

Dr. Awolowo suggests a linguistic principle for the division of Nigeria into states. Only in this case, in his view, would it be possible to avoid the political enmities that are inherent in a society in which ethnic and linguistic groups live side by side under a unitary system.

He bases the need for a federation for Nigeria on the following argument.

In any country where there are divergences of language and of nationality—particularly of language—a unitary constitution is always a source of bitterness and hostility on the part of linguistic or national minority groups. On the other hand, as soon as a federal constitution is introduced in which each linguistic or national group is recognised and accorded regional autonomy, any bitterness or hostility, against the

constitutional arrangements as such, disappear. If the linguistic or national groups concerned are backward, or too weak *vis-à-vis* the majority group or groups, their bitterness or hostility may be dormant or suppressed. But as soon as they become enlightened and politically conscious, and/or courageous leadership emerges amongst them, the bitterness and hostility come into the open, and remain sustained with all possible venom and rancour, until home rule is achieved.<sup>101</sup>

An analysis of experience of state-building in several countries, including the Soviet Union, allowed Dr. Awolowo to draw the following conclusions:

- one: if a country is unilingual and uninational, the constitution must be unitary;
- two: if a country is unilingual or bilingual or multilingual, and also consists of communities which over a period of years have developed divergent nationalities, the constitution must be federal, and the constituent states must be organised on the dual basis of language and nationality;
- three: if a country is bilingual or multilingual, the constitution must be federal, and the constituent states be organised on a linguistic basis;
- four: any experiment with a unitary constitution in a bilingual or multilingual or multinational country must fail, in the long run.<sup>102</sup>

Therefore, he writes:

we are now in a position to asseverate, categorically and with all the emphasis at our command, that, since Nigeria is a multilingual and multinational country par excellence, the only constitution that is suitable for its peculiar circumstances is a federal constitution.<sup>103</sup>

By analysing various countries' experience of dealing with the national question, Dr. Awolowo came to the conclusion that many of the defects of contemporary Nigerian society were engendered by capitalism. And he wrote directly that

for Nigeria, there is even one other danger in capitalism. It breeds tribalism.<sup>104</sup>

He developed this important point as follows:

It is generally agreed, even by its most faithful advocates and devotees, that the one and only motive force of capitalism is naked self-interest; and that one of its essential characteristics is impersonal group loyalty. Wherever there is capitalism, then naked self-interest and unabashed group loyalty reign supreme; greed dominates the hearts of men; whilst mutual and destructive antagonisms put on the cloak of orthodox business competition. Portrayed in this way—and it is by no means an inaccurate or exaggerated portrayal—it

should be easy for anyone to perceive the nexus between capitalism and tribalism in the Nigerian context. In its evil connotation, tribalism also represents unabashed group loyalty, or, to put it in another way, tribalism, in the derogatory sense, is the combined manifestation of the naked self-interests of a number of individuals who are bound together by some cultural ties such as language, ethnic affinity, and religion.<sup>105</sup>

The way out lies, in his view, in socialism, in socialist planning and in the implementation of a programme of social justice.

If judicious and comprehensive socialist planning takes the place of the present planless capitalist planning; and social justice—with all that this expression imports—becomes the cardinal aim of our Government, the occasions for the display of naked self-interest and destructive group loyalty (so Dr. Awolowo characterises tribalism—*RNI*) will be considerably reduced, and the need for any group of people to pervert cultural organisations to selfish, sordid, and mutually antagonistic and acrimonious ends, will hardly arise.<sup>106</sup>

Only by putting an end to the defects inherent in the capitalist system, Dr. Awolowo thinks, can tribalism be eradicated.

Defining the country's urgent objectives, he said:

Our objectives are now clear and unmistakable: federalism, democracy; good leadership; socialism—these four. But the most urgent of them is—federalism.<sup>107</sup>

In August 1975 he put forward a plan for a return to civilian government, and called on the new government that came to power after the overthrow of General Gowon at the end of July 1975 to increase the number of states from 12 to 48, all of which should be constituted on a linguistic basis.

The programme of the Democratic Party of Guinea (DPG), in so far as it concerns the essence and principles of the solution of national questions, was set forth by the President of the Republic, *Ahmed Sékou Touré*, in an article entitled 'Ethnic Groups, the Party, and the National Question',<sup>108</sup> in which he stressed the immense harm done by colonialism to the ethnic development of African peoples. At the same time he considered that the need to fight the common enemy—colonial exploitation and oppression—had developed a consciousness of community and unity among the different ethnic groups, as a consequence of which unifying tendencies had been strengthened among the various ethnic groups within a single state. And the premises had been

created for moulding a new, historically evolved, community.

Passing on to an explanation of the principles of the DPG's national policy, M. Sékou Touré wrote:

We must explain the Party's position of principle on the national question. The manifestations of tribalism and of regionalism under diverse and subtle forms, even among tried political cadres, the persistence of all sorts of reflexes of an ethnic character in spite of all the Party's education campaigns; the tendency toward secession almost everywhere in Africa, notably the secession of the Katanga from Congo (Kinshasa), of Biafra in Nigeria, the conflicts of ethnic communities in Sierra Leone, Chad, the Sudan, Ethiopia, and elsewhere in Africa, all require us to reflect on a better approach to the national question. The justice of the solutions found in Guinea to this grave and burning problem underline in a special fashion the transformative quality and the democratic nature of the political and social activity carried on by the DPG.

In fact, is it not this activity that best guarantees national unity in our conditions? The building of the nation and its survival depend fundamentally on unity of the ethnic communities that compose it.<sup>109</sup>

President Sékou Touré stressed the interaction and interdependence of the various ethnic groups existing within the state.

It would be a mistake (he continued) to think that colonialism has engendered the ethnic groups. It had given rise, not to the groups themselves, but to ethnic exclusiveness and isolation. It had been profitable to colonialism to divide the peoples, because it was difficult for them to understand in such circumstances that their true enemy was the colonial system as a whole and not a neighbouring ethnic group.

Only the joint struggle of all ethnic groups against colonialism and for liberation could be crowned by victory. Unity in this struggle should not be on an ethnic platform but on a political one, since the common enemy exercised political domination for all the groups. That was why there had to be a united political national liberation movement of all the ethnic groups. That was why the DPG could not be other than a party of the liberation of all ethnic communities.

In that connection he argued specially that

denunciation of the activity of ethnic groups has never been an act of war against the ethnic communities themselves. Tribalism, regionalism, in a word exclusiveness, is a factor that helped the colonial regime to maintain its domination and that today still helps imperialism to split the African states.<sup>110</sup>

The DPG, he said, constantly educated the masses, showing that the main thing was not the contradiction between the ethnic groups but the contradiction between all of them

taken together and the colonial regime. Experience had shown, he wrote, that the party's struggle had been correct, because it had led to political liberation, to liberation of all the ethnic communities, each of which, by itself, could not have been the architect of its own political liberation.

The survival of each is conditioned by the involvement of all in the birth and development of a wider community, economically and politically more viable, of a national community. That is why the Party has placed the accent, since independence, on the need to observe strict equality between the ethnic communities, while stressing that each will perish as an *ethnos* if it excludes itself from the national community. Development of the national culture by the rebirth of our national languages and their noting down in writing is evidence of the Party's great solicitude, not for the destruction of ethnic communities, but for their true blossoming, which cannot be done except through and in the national community. *To create a harmonious and strong nation, to mould a responsible People, proud and free, that is the noble and exalting mission that must be carried out in full by the Guinean revolution!*<sup>111</sup>

In his writings M Sékou Touré has analysed in detail the methods for dealing with ethnic problems in Guinea. In his view it is necessary to struggle against tribalism, resolve the language problem, pursue a cadres policy, and so on. In Guinea, for instance, no governor or leading official is appointed, as a rule, to an area peopled by his own ethnic group. Ethnic association is also taken into account in appointments to the central authorities and in the party, so that a minister, say, and his subordinates will belong to different nationalities. That, in M Sékou Touré's view, and that of other Guinean leaders, helps avoid tribalism.<sup>112</sup> The DPG is guided by the main objective—to bring together the various ethnic groups and inculcate national (instead of tribal) consciousness.

It is most important, M Sékou Touré writes, for a proper settlement of the national question, to respect the national heritage of each people and to further the economic and cultural development of each ethnic group. At the same time he thinks it necessary to mould a new man, who will no longer counterpose Soussou to Malinké, Malinké to Foulah, and Foulah to Kissi. 'This new man will know that all men are equal.'<sup>113</sup> The Guinean, whatever his origin, M Sékou Touré thinks, no longer represents an amalgam of ethnic groups, but represents the entity called the Democratic Republic of Guinea.<sup>114</sup>

M Sékou Touré links the settlement of ethnic problems and the formation of a Guinean nation directly with revolutionary transformation of society and national democracy.<sup>115</sup>

Sékou Touré's view on the ways and means of solving the national question in African states, and on the principles of national policy in relation to the various ethnic groups, is extremely important in the conditions of polyethnic states. The need for a solicitous attitude to the cultural heritage of each people, and further economic and cultural development of each ethnic group, he stresses, are of great importance for a correct solution of the national question. That is particularly important since one often encounters situations in Africa in which certain politicians and statesmen categorically deny the existence of ethnic groups in their countries. Experience indicates that such a situation leads not only to an ignoring of the special qualities inherent in each ethnic group, but also to the development of an incorrect national policy, the consequences of which can be friction and conflicts on ethnic grounds. This results in a weakening of national unity.

One must say a little about the views of *Kwame Nkrumah*—a major figure in the national liberation movement of the African peoples and of the Convention People's Party in Ghana. In his books *The Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah*, *I Speak of Freedom*, and *Africa Must Unite*, and in his other writings, Dr. Nkrumah set out his point of view on the solution of such matters of national development as the disparity between ethnic and political frontiers, the role of tribalism in political life, and the way to combat it, the problems of African unity, and the forms of state organisation.

Dr. Nkrumah linked solution of ethnic problems with a radical socio-economic reconstruction of society. The basic principles of national policy found reflection in the rules of the Convention People's Party (CPP). The CPP's most important aims and objectives were the following: consolidation of the national revolution by supporting full unity of the nation under a unitary form of state; defence of the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the state of Ghana against internal and external aggression by every means possible; the creation of a prosperous state on a socialist basis relevant to the conditions of Ghana, a state in which all citizens, irrespective of class, tribe, colour, or creed would have equal opportunities, in which there would

be no exploitation of man by man, tribe by tribe, or class by class, and which would strive to develop and safeguard a people's democracy based on universal suffrage of the adult population and on the majority rule.

One of the conditions of membership of the party was that the prospective member did not 'support Imperialism, Colonialism, Tribalism, and Racialism'.<sup>116</sup>

The Convention People's Party, which Dr. Nkrumah led, considered that only socialism made it possible to eliminate Africa's backwardness; in order to achieve prosperity and progress for the whole population the party and government had decided to take the path of socialism, its programme said.<sup>117</sup> One of the demands of the CPP, which stood for equality of all the peoples of the country, was the achievement of national unity through struggle against all factional forces and centrifugal tendencies.

In his writings Kwame Nkrumah specially emphasised the role and significance of the popular masses in the restructuring of society. 'The people are the backbone of positive action,' he wrote in *Consciencism*, setting out his philosophical system.

It is by the sweat of the people's brow that nations are built. The people are the reality of national greatness.<sup>118</sup>

A characteristic feature of Dr. Nkrumah's theory was its Pan-African, pan-continental approach to the pressing problems of the day. The way out of many of the complexities and difficulties, associated in large measure with the heavy heritage of colonialism, he saw in the building of a union of African states. Only African unity could, in his view, help solve such a multi-level problem as the disparity of ethnic and political boundaries. Underlying the 'concept of continental development' there should, in his view, be three principles: a socialist path of development, reliance on one's own forces, and a Pan-African approach to the problems associated with economic development and foreign affairs.<sup>119</sup>

Solidarity of African peoples with the world anti-imperialist forces; peace in the whole world; moral respect for the right of all people to self-determination – so Dr. Nkrumah defined the external conditions needed for the development of the revolution in Africa.

\* \* \*

Such are the main principles in the programmes of African parties and governments that have a direct bearing on ethnic problems. It will be clear from the foregoing that these principles are basically the same for all countries: they proclaim the equality of all citizens, irrespective of race, tribe, etc., and condemn tribalism, while any manifestation of racialism, regionalism, and ethnic discrimination is banned by the constitutions. A number of the programmes also reflect very important principles in regard to the selection of cadres, stress the need for serious ideological work and a raising of the political consciousness of the masses. An invariable demand of all parties is consolidation of national unity.

The concrete forms for carrying out the principles proclaimed in these programmes depend on many factors of a domestic and external character due to the specific peculiarities of the socio-economic and historical development of each of the states of Tropical Africa.

## 2. The Tackling of Ethnic Problems in Practice

The governments of African states are carrying out the main provisions of their programmes. Serious attention is being paid, in particular, to mitigating the role of the ethnic factor in political life. In addition to education work there are laws in several countries aimed at combating intertribal strife and the ideology of separatism, and programmes are being developed and have begun to be carried out to eliminate the actual inequality in development of the separate areas, the tribal principle has been rejected in building armies, and attention is being given to the training of national cadres and the development of a national culture.

The leading statesmen, politicians, and public figures of African states are resolutely opposed to tribalism, pointing out the need for national unity. However narrowly they interpret tribalism (understanding by that only intertribal strife) or however broadly (including under it archaic institutions, standards, and customs of the tribal-clan system and their application in contemporary political life, in addition to interethnic antagonisms), African leaders all realise what

an immense danger this phenomenon presents to future development. Calls to fight tribalism can be found in the statements and writings of almost all the leaders of African countries, no matter what programme of social and economic development they are following.

If there was any cause for the fall of the First Republic of Nigeria (i.e., the January coup of 1966—*RNI*), it was tribalism, the Lagos *Sunday Times* wrote, and until the constitution included a panacea against tribalism in all its forms, neither unitary nor federal government would solve the problems facing Nigeria.<sup>120</sup>

The manifestation of tribalism and a local approach in the selection and appointment of officials evokes great dissatisfaction among the progressive African public.

Tribalism takes very diverse forms. In Kenya, for example, in May-June 1971, after the freeing of the opposition leader Oginga Odinga the revived Kenya People's Union (KPU) started a campaign in the Nyanza Province where the Luo (to whom Odinga belongs) live, under the slogan 'Let us make Odinga a millionaire!' The initiator of this campaign, J. Aboge, a Luo politician, issued a statement in which he spoke of the full support of the Luo for Odinga and called on his fellow-tribesmen to contribute a shilling to an 'Odinga Fund' so as to improve his financial position.

In Zambia, a committee was formed on an ethnic basis in connection with the preparations for the Sixth National Conference of the ruling United National Independence Party, and nocturnal tribal meetings were held. With the aim of stopping such actions President Kaunda forbade ministers, district governors, and members of parliament to travel around the country without prior permission. In the Eastern Province, where peoples of the Malawi and Ngoni linguistic group live, groups were formed whose main aim was to ensure election to the National Assembly in 1973 exclusively of candidates of these ethnic groups.

In April 1967 there was a stormy debate on tribalism in the Kenya House of Representatives. The majority of speakers stressed its immense harm to economic unity of the country. At the same time certain speakers pointed out that there was a large number of ethnic groups in the country and that that fact needed to be reckoned with.

We do not want a malady (tribalism—*RNI*) to overtake Kenya (Masinde Muliro declared), we do not want a Congo in Kenya, we do not want another Nigeria in Kenya, we

would like to see Kenya as a perfect example of an African developing nation... We can only do that today if we accept the facts of Kenya to be what they are, accept that there are different tribes in Kenya, if we accept that these tribes must be welded into one nation.<sup>121</sup>

Many articles and comments on the danger of tribalism and the need to take more vigorous measures have been published in the Kenya press. In the view of the *Daily Nation* legislative, educational, and administrative measures are needed to fight tribalism, but attention should be turned primarily to organisations based on the tribal principle.

In recognition of the necessity to cement national unity and consciousness, the Government should ban all organisations carrying tribal banners. And in future, it should refuse to register organisations of a tribal nature.<sup>122</sup>

In December 1958 the First Conference of the Peoples of Africa in Accra carried a special resolution on tribalism, vigorously condemning the imperialist tactics of employing it and religious separatism to perpetuate colonial domination in Africa. The participants in the Conference called tribalism a vicious system that represented a serious obstacle to the achievement of African unity. The Conference called on political, trade union, cultural, and other organisations to take steps to educate the masses in a spirit of consciousness of this vicious system and so to mobilise them to fight it. The Conference also urged the governments of the independent African countries to pass the appropriate laws and to step up the fight against tribalism by propaganda and education.

The association founded in Nigeria to fight tribalism appealed to the public in September 1968 to put an end to this dangerous phenomenon. It frankly called tribalism a brake on the progress and development of Nigeria. The Nigerian newspaper *West African Pilot* supported the association's demands and advised the government to issue a decree providing severe punishment for the fomenting of tribal feeling.

In the view of other Nigerian leaders the eradication of tribalism will help solve the very pressing problems facing the country. One means of combating tribalism suggested is to adopt one of the Nigerian languages as the language of interethnic intercourse.<sup>123</sup>

In some countries, like Mali and Guinea, laws have been passed forbidding ethnic discrimination and the propagation of separatist ideas.

Statesmen in Burundi have condemned tribalism and called for national unity. 'Our country,' the then Prime Minister Albin Nyamoya declared at a meeting on 17 October 1972, 'does not belong to the Hutu or the Tutsi or the Twa, but to all Burundian citizens.' The tribal names should not be used any longer, he said, so that they would not lead to differences between the inhabitants of one province or another.

Col. Ignatius Acheampong (later General), head of the military government of Ghana, stressed that the January revolution of 1972 was not made in the interests of any one tribe, political party, or group, but in the interests of the whole nation.<sup>124</sup> Commenting on this statement the *Accra Daily Graphic* wrote that all actions and decisions should be guided solely by the national interests and no others.<sup>125</sup>

The head of the government of Rwanda, Major-General Juvénal Habyalimana, called on his fellow-countrymen, in his first radio address on 5 July 1973 in connection with the military's assumption of power, to restore peace and national unity, and said that they must respect each other whatever their tribal or religious differences.

Attempts to foment tribal strife are severely punished in the People's Republic of Congo and several other countries.

The weekly *Etumba*, organ of the Congolese Party of Labour (CPL) regularly publishes articles on the government's and party's resolute determination to suppress any display of tribalism and regionalism. The activities of reaction are directly linked with the splitting activities of imperialist and neocolonialist circles, which rely on tribalist elements within the country.

In a communique of 2 July 1973 on the proceedings of the plenum of the CPL Central Committee devoted to the results of the referendum on the new constitution and the elections to the National People's Assembly and local authorities, it was noted that the bureaucratic bourgeoisie, tribalist elements, left and right opportunists, and all the internal forces of reaction had launched a rabid campaign against the people's authorities. These forces were trying to provoke disorder, employing intertribal and regional antagonisms for the purpose. The CPL noted that the Congolese people, the party, and all progressive forces still faced a long struggle to consolidate real people's power in the country against the forces of reaction, the spokesmen of whose interests were

the bureaucratic bourgeoisie, tribalist circles, and foreign imperialism.

The Congolese government and the CPL considered tribalism and regionalism to be enemies of the revolution and accomplices of imperialism and neocolonialism, an editorial in *Etumba* said.<sup>126</sup>

The President of the Congo, the late Marien Ngouabi, defined regionalism as an extremely reactionary ideology putting the interests of some one locality or ethnic group above those of the state, and warned that tribalists

were organising to try and restore fascist power in the Congo on a tribalist and feudal basis.<sup>127</sup>

Marien Ngouabi believed that the objective causes of regionalism could be removed in the course of the anti-imperialist struggle. Only this prolonged and stubborn struggle would cement the unity of the peoples of the Congo and put an end to regionalism.

The Government of the People's Republic of Angola opposes any manifestation of tribalism or regionalism, deeming it necessary to strengthen national unity in every way.

Angola has launched its reconstruction along socialist lines in the interests of the working masses, President Neto said in August 1977. In spite of the difficulties the people had chosen the road of struggle and national unity regardless of ethnic, language, racial, or religious differences. Only the working class, in alliance with the peasantry, he said, could rally all the country's revolutionary forces around it and ensure national unity.

The MPLA's *Jornal de Angola* regularly publishes articles calling for struggle against intertribal antagonisms and exploitation of the ethnic factor by the forces of reaction to undermine the political stability of the government. In 1977 it published a series of leading articles in which it stated, in particular, that the guarantee of success in building socialist society in Angola was resolute struggle against factionalism, intertribal discord, and anti-social elements, and loyalty to the line of the MPLA.

Let us consider some measures being taken by African governments to tackle the national question.

In *Zambia* political leaders and the press link separatist tendencies and the intensification of tribalism with the racist regimes in South Africa and Rhodesia. The effect of foreign political factors was particularly marked during the prepa-



rations for and holding of the Sixth National Conference of the ruling United National Independence Party (UNIP). As we have already remarked not only were various committees and groups based on the tribal principle activated within the party at that time but leaflets were distributed throughout the country expressing the ethnocentrist demands of certain circles. And commentaries were published in the reactionary press in imperialist countries, approving the activities of these tribalist cliques.

Addressing a meeting in Ndola in February 1968 one Zambian leader said that various foreign powers were trying to divide Zambia and to set the different ethnic groups against one another. The imperialists and the advocates of white supremacy, he stressed, were using local leaders, greedy for power, as their agents to spread this campaign among tribes throughout the country.

The government of Zambia, the ruling UNIP, and the President, Kenneth Kaunda, himself, devote much attention to solving ethnic problems, struggling against tribalist ideology and the stirring up of intertribal strife, and taking measures of an economic, political, and ideological character.

At the Sixth Conference of the UNIP in April 1971 the largest central committee yet was elected, in which the various ethnic groups of the country were widely represented.

In the North-Western Province—which is one of the most backward areas—four power stations have been built so as to supply electricity to outlying areas. In underdeveloped areas a network of small and medium-sized enterprises of the food and light industries have been set up, processing local raw materials.

At the end of June 1975 President Kaunda announced a number of important reforms in the economic, legislative, and cultural spheres, adopted by the government to consolidate the national economy and put a stop to capitalist trends in the country's development.

Addressing a session of the UNIP National Council, he said that all the land belonging to farmers would pass to the state from 1 July 1975, and in future could be rented for a period of 100 years. The party had taken such mass media as the *Times of Zambia* and the *Sunday Times of Zambia*, and film distribution, under its control.

The final objective of the UNIP, he declared, was the building of a humane society in which there would be no

place for private enterprise and in which the means of production and their distribution would be under the working people's control. As regards the possibility of building socialism, he said that that would depend entirely upon the capacity of the party and government to mobilise the masses and weld them into a well organised force. It was not yet possible to do that, in his view, although a beginning had been made; some weight was therefore being allowed to capitalism.

A broad campaign is being waged to draw the working people—members of various ethnic groups—into the drafting of the development plan for 1977-81. The main objective of the plan is rapid development of agriculture in all areas of the country and development of the infrastructure. A development plan has been adopted for the southern provinces so as to raise their socio-economic and cultural level.

The objectives planned by the UNIP for the decade 1974-84 include the need to build industry in backward areas. Attention is being given to the development of education. The programme calls for ensuring training of the youth in Zambia's educational establishments in the spirit of patriotism and international solidarity. Another objective is to preserve the rich cultural heritage. Ensuring the preservation of what is best in the national culture, the UNIP also deems it necessary to fight against traditions retarding cultural development.<sup>128</sup>

President Kaunda's speech and the resolutions adopted at Mulungushi Rock in September 1976 are an important programme that summed up Zambia's development since independence and defined the objectives for the future.

Humanism was declared the national philosophy. President Kaunda said that they had 'declared socialism as an instrument for building a Humanist society.'

He also emphasised that the workers and peasants of Zambia must fight against capitalism and all its manifestations—colonialism, neocolonialism, and fascism, and noted the need to fight against the exploitation of man by man.<sup>129</sup>

There was no room in the UNIP Constitution, the President said on 14 September 1976 at a leadership seminar at Mulungushi Rock, for colonialism or neocolonialism, fascism or racism, or for provincialism, corruption, and nepotism.<sup>130</sup>

Speaking at the closing of the Ninth Session of the UNIP National Council on 24 September 1976 the President again



stressed the need for unity and a spirit of togetherness in fulfilling the tasks facing the country.<sup>131</sup>

The political leaders of *Mali* have called many times for a strengthening of national unity, while fully realising the complexity and difficulty of the tasks of nation-building. At a meeting in Bamako in December 1964 the then President of Mali, Modibo Keita, having remarked that Mali did not have problems of tribalism, emphasised that the inter-relationships of peoples were undoubtedly a serious problem; the national question, he said, was on the agenda, plus the introduction of a national language, the transition of nomads to a settled way of life, and the elimination of the numerous acute conflicts between pastoralists and farmers, especially in the bend of the Niger.

The government of Mali, while attaching great importance to ideological work, considered it necessary to struggle resolutely against every manifestation of ethnic hostility by means of the law. Article 55 of the Criminal Code of Mali reads:

Any intention, any act of a kind to establish or engender racial or ethnic discrimination, any intention or any act having as its aim to provoke or sustain regionalist propaganda of any kind, any spreading of news tending to damage unity of the Nation or the authority of the State, any demonstration against freedom of conscience and freedom of worship liable to set citizens against one another, shall be punished by imprisonment....<sup>132</sup>

The Tuareg uprising in Mali in 1963-64 made it urgently necessary to deal with the problems of the nomadic and seminomadic population. Plans were adopted to develop the cattle-raising areas, which envisaged the sinking of wells, improvement of cattle breeds, and the taking of various measures to develop education in these desert and semi-desert areas. In April 1969 an economic conference of the Gao region was held at which, in particular, the settling of the nomads was discussed.<sup>133</sup> Experience has shown that all talk about a united Malian nation and about the absence of ethnic contradictions and complications will remain empty declarations unless a correct national policy is followed, in particular to eradicate existing inequality in the levels of socio-economic development of the various ethnic groups. Experience has also shown that it is necessary to develop special methods and forms of work in order to involve the nomadic population in the country's affairs.

The National Liberation Military Committee that came to power in Mali in November 1968, and the Democratic Union of the Malian People founded in September 1976, stress the need to rally all the peoples of Mali and for the rapid creation of an independent economy. The party's rules state that these aims will be achieved by establishing and maintaining the atmosphere of agreement, solidarity, and social peace, and by raising the people's economic, social, and cultural standards.

The military government is paying much attention to developing the economy. Notable results have been achieved in agriculture, but serious damage was done to stock-raising and traditional farming by the four-year drought, during which around 80 per cent of the country's cattle perished.

In 1974 Mali started on its second five-year plan of economic and social development (1974-78), under which a third of the capital investment envisaged is earmarked for agriculture. To help stock-raising and the nomadic peoples, the plan provides for continuing irrigation of the pastures of the drought zone, the sinking of wells, and the building of animal husbandry centres. It devotes much attention to developing the infrastructure, and poses the objective of improving communications between the various parts of the country, and of building an extensive network of motor roads and railways.

The National Liberation Military Committee severely punishes displays of separatist tendencies.

The government of *Kenya* has more than once declared its intention to pay attention to the development of backward areas of the country, and in particular to the northern part inhabited by Galla, Somali, and Turkana, but also to the Rift Valley, Uasin Gishu, and Nzoia, where various ethnic groups of the Kalenjin live, and to areas inhabited by the Masai and by the Pokomo (along the Tana River).

In the difficult days of the tense situation in the North-Eastern Province, when the Somali question had not been settled, President Kenyatta, in his address to the National Assembly on 15 February 1967, outlining the government's programme for the next few years, had stressed the government's desire to put an end

to bloodshed, misery and waste, so that our people in the north-eastern areas may play a full part in our Government's plans for development, and so that they may enjoy peace in the area and share in full the benefits of our national prosperity.<sup>134</sup>

In the arid areas of the north, north-east, and south of Kenya much attention is being paid to building irrigation schemes and wells, and steps are being taken to improve pastures and introduce modern methods of farming.

Help is being given to the inhabitants of the coastal areas and to the population around Lakes Baringo and Rudolf to develop fisheries. A hydropower station at Kindaruma enables an extensive tract near the Tana River to be irrigated and developed.

Kenya's development plans envisage help to the population of backward areas in developing their resources, obtaining education, and organising a health service, and also the encouragement of emigration to more developed regions of the country. The government has drafted projects for granting loans and credits to the poor areas on advantageous terms.<sup>135</sup>

The building of the Kitale-Lodwar-Fergusson Gulf highway, which links central Kenya with the west shore of Lake Rudolf (one of the most inaccessible areas) will make it possible to exploit the lake's rich fish resources.

The government intends to carry out a wide range of measures to irrigate the arid areas of the country. It is proposed to build the irrigation systems as public works. Plans were drawn up to build a major water source based on the resources of the Galana River in the Coastal Region. The government is aiding the building of canals and dams.

In Kenya, where there are not a few difficulties in dealing with ethnic problems, the government, and President Kenyatta himself, are paying much attention to combating tribalistic attitudes. The government had developed a broad propaganda campaign with the slogan 'There are no tribes—only Kenyans!'

During my visit to Kenya in May 1969 I had many talks about these problems with people of various ethnic affinities and different religious convictions. As a rule members of different ethnic groups do not entertain hostile feelings for each other. In one and the same state institutions members of the Baluhya, Kikuyu, Kamba, Luo, and other peoples work side by side. Not far from Nairobi, in the Thika area, where around 99 per cent of the population are Kikuyu, a Kamba woman worked as a social worker, and in Nyeri, also located in Kikuyu territory, the same post was held by a Baluhya woman. They both spoke Swahili, but were successfully learning Kikuyu. According to them the Kenya

government specially sent members of the Baluhya, Luo, and other peoples to work in areas inhabited by Kikuyu, Kamba, and other peoples, and vice versa. Certain political forces, however, were using the ethnic element to incite tribalistic attitudes, and were setting one people against another—Luo, for example, against Kikuyu (the two largest peoples in Kenya). This policy of ethnoc Chauvinistic psychosis led to a clash between Luo and Kikuyu in the Kisumu area in October 1969 and created tension in interethnic relations in subsequent years.

In circumstances of ethnic and linguistic diversity, the Kenya government's language policy is very important. For several years since 1970 Swahili has gradually been becoming the official language of the country. This step will undoubtedly promote national consolidation and have an immense effect in transforming the system of education and the training of cadres.

The government has attached great importance to nation-building and the education of citizens without ethnic prejudices and biases, and to reform of the education system. The programme drafted by the commission on educational questions is aimed at moulding national self-awareness, and at creating and consolidating a feeling of Kenyan community.

'Cultivation of a sense of belonging to a nation and a desire to serve the nation' is how the commission defined the objectives that were to be the basic principles of school education.<sup>136</sup> Its recommendations said:

Race-conscious, or tribe-conscious teachers are of no use to Kenya... In future, we need teachers whose horizon is national rather than tribal, and who are therefore capable of communicating their own lively interest in the nation to the children under their charge.<sup>137</sup>

In *Senegal* the population, which numbers around four million, includes various ethnic groups—Wolof, Serer, Tukulor, Fulbe, Malinké, Soninké, and others—all of them peoples speaking different languages belonging to various linguistic families. Both written sources and the author's own observations witness that Senegal has no problems of tribalism, at least not clearly expressed ones, and no cases of acute intertribal hostility and estrangement, and that the ethnic factor apparently does not play a vital role in political affairs. One of the main reasons for this is the policy of the ruling Socialist Party of Senegal (SPS) led by

L. S. Senghor, which opposed tribal attitudes and the creation of any organisation whatsoever on a tribal principle.

The scholars, statesmen, and public figures of Senegal note that ethnic origin is not taken into consideration in making appointments or in drafting policies for economic and social development. The governor of the important district of Saint-Louis, for example, declared to me in a conversation in September 1969 that the development plan envisaged the carrying out in particular of a programme to improve the area's agriculture. He stressed that it was absolutely a matter of indifference to him what ethnic groups lived in this district, since the aims and objectives were the same for all.

One of the principal aspects of the national question in Senegal is eradication of the inequality of economic and cultural development of the various peoples. For a long time the most backward area was Casamance, populated by Balante-Bandjoun, Manjaco, and other ethnic groups who also live in neighbouring Guinea-Bissau and the Gambia. Casamance differs considerably from the rest of Senegal not only in level of development but also in language, culture, customs, and way of life. A plan was drafted and adopted in 1969 to develop this part of the country, a plan that envisaged in particular substantial capital investment in developing the economy and the transport system.<sup>138</sup>

After the end of the war with Biafra a period of reconstruction began in *Nigeria*—to eliminate the consequences of the difficulties caused by the war and political crisis.

The Federal Military Government insisted on the need to consolidate national unity and carry out a policy of rapprochement of the various ethnic groups. It has often declared that the Ibo, who formed the ethnic basis of Biafra, are equal citizens and that their reintegration will be welcomed in every way.

The socio-economic reforms being carried out by the government are directed at developing industry, agriculture, and education, at reducing dependence on foreign capital, and at developing the state sector.

The national economic development plan for 1975-80 envisages consistent ensuring of economic independence and limiting of the rapacious activity of Western monopolies.

Nigeria is carrying out a policy to ensure genuine sovereignty over natural wealth. In November 1969 a decree established state control over the exploration for and ex-

traction of petroleum. In the middle of 1974 the Nigerian government acquired a controlling block of shares in all foreign oil companies operating in the country.

As a result of the unprecedented oil boom Nigeria not only passed from the traditional agrarian raw material specialisation in the world economy to a new fuel and power specialisation but also became (in a very short time) one of the biggest oil producers and exporters in the world. Oil constitutes more than 90 per cent of the value of its exports. In five years oil income rose from £200 million to £3,000 million in 1974,<sup>139</sup> which has given Nigeria a firm financial basis for carrying out reforms in all spheres of life.

The third national development plan for 1975-80 has opened a qualitatively new and more complex stage in Nigeria's struggle for economic liberation. During it a structural reconstruction of the economy is to be begun with the aim of converting Nigeria into an industrial-agrarian country. The objective of creating the basic branches of heavy industry—iron and steel, oil refining, petrochemical, etc.—has been posed. All the undertakings of these industries, according to the plan, are to belong to the state and to constitute the nucleus of a state sector. It is also planned to increase state control over the most important branches of the Nigerian economy and the main natural resources.

Implementation of these plans will open up the way to making Nigeria the industrial centre of Tropical Africa.

A policy of speeding up 'nigerianisation' of the managerial and technical staff of undertakings belonging to foreign capital is also envisaged.

The national development plans pay much attention to raising the economic and cultural level of backward areas, their measures being aimed at eliminating the existing inequality of the different peoples.

Attention is being paid to developing agriculture and the transport system, and to building industrial undertakings in the various states. In the backward, arid North-Eastern State, for example, the plan drafted in 1974 provides for expenditure of 20 million naira on irrigation works. The carrying out of these measures will not only enable production of traditional food crops to be increased but will also make the growing of rice and long-staple cotton possible. A target of extending the area of irrigated land in the state to 40,000 hectares by 1980 has been set.

In Gongola State the government's efforts are directed

to improving the infrastructure. It proposes to build 12 motor roads in 1977-78 and several grain elevators.<sup>140</sup>

The Federal Government intends to spend over 193 million naira on carrying out programmes to develop co-operatives within the context of the third development plan.

The national plans provide for federal help to the states in the training of national cadres. Special attention is being paid in this connection to improving education in the northern states, which are considerably behind the level of the southern states; according to the Nigerian Commissioner for Education, Chief Eke, 70 per cent of the children in the south attend school, but less than 10 per cent in the north. The Nigerian government, he has said, is therefore aiding the six northern states to carry out plans to introduce free primary education. Reforms envisaging the setting up of 'a universal system of education in the country with a uniform syllabus and system of teaching throughout the country'<sup>141</sup> are thought by the government to be a key means of achieving stability and unity in the country.

Raising of the educational standards of the people in the northern states, and the evolution of formerly backward peoples will make it possible to smooth out long-existing contradictions and tension in the relations between northerners and southerners.

The Federal Government is paying much attention to training the young generation in the spirit of unity and loyalty to the national interests. It intends to build two Federal or 'Unity' Colleges in each of the 19 states, in which members of the various ethnic groups will study together. The founding of these colleges is part of its programme of bringing Nigerians together.

In order to alleviate the acuteness of the national question and to diminish the role of the ethnic factor, the government of Nigeria is undertaking a complex of measures of a socio-economic, cultural, and ideological character. Ethnic and religious discrimination and tribal hostility have been banned. A special order (1966) banned all parties and organisations based on ethnic principles. In November 1969 this order was enforced against 119 different ethnic organisations.<sup>142</sup> Steps were taken to enforce not only juridical equality but also actual equality by giving all-round aid to develop backward areas. Some educational work is being carried on to eliminate tribal animosity and tribalist ideology. The national service instituted by the government in

1973, which provides for compulsory direction of all university graduates to work, mainly in rural areas, is expected to play a big role in this.

Members of the Federal Government periodically visit outlying areas with the aim not only of explaining its plans and policies to the people but also of carrying on ideological, educational work aimed at combating tribalism, strengthening unity, and extending collaboration between the peoples of Nigeria.

The reorganisation of the armed forces, and above all the restationing of units, can be regarded as a measure against intertribal strife. This action, as was explained at a press conference at the beginning of September 1974, was aimed at excluding opportunities for the influence of political and tribal forces in the army.<sup>143</sup> Military units will be formed from now on from members of different ethnic groups, and army commanders will be regularly transferred from one area to another. Military areas will not be drawn on an ethnic principle. These measures are all the more important since, as we know, the ethnic factor played a considerable role in the Nigerian army. As we noted above, three-quarters of all officers in 1960 were Ibos. The overwhelming majority of the infantry (up to 70 per cent by some estimates) were recruited from the northern areas in the years of the First Republic. Specialist and administrative appointments were mainly held by Ibo.<sup>144</sup>

The reorganisation of the army was intended, if not to eliminate, at least to mitigate the role of the ethnic factor in the armed forces and to ensure unity and cohesion of the country.

In order to weaken the role of the ethnic factor in political life, the Federal Military Government is endeavouring to appoint members of ethnic groups from outside a state as the staffs' commissioners. In the states themselves there are tendencies to appoint persons of different ethnic origin and political convictions to administrative bodies. In the North-Eastern State, for example, there were members of the different ethnic groups of the state in the administrative apparatus, although the majority of the population consists of Kanuri and Fulani. Among the commissioners of the state executive council there are members and responsible officials of the former opposition parties, the Northern People's Congress and the Northern Elements' Progressive Union, and also of the Middle Belt Congress, representatives

of the traditional rulers, and even a direct descendant of the royal dynasty of Borno, civil servants, a London law graduate, and so on.<sup>145</sup>

Since the end of the civil war in 1970 the Federal Government has attached paramount importance to normalising the situation in the East-Central State, which had formed the nucleus of Biafra, and to the reintegration of the Ibo. It has spent big sums on restoring the war-shattered economy, and on building new industrial undertakings, hospitals, and schools. As a result, it had succeeded by the autumn of 1970 in restoring school attendance to the level reached in 1965. School fees were reduced. According to the then state administrator, Mr. Ukpabi Asika, school attendance had been increased by 100 per cent. An important step had been the abolition of segregation in education; all children were now studying together irrespective of their social position.<sup>146</sup>

The administration and police on the East-Central State consist entirely of Ibo.

According to the press the attitude toward Ibo has been normalised in most states, and Ibo have returned to jobs in the northern states.

Close co-operation between the states, mutual aid, and exchange of experience are of enormous importance for the future organisation of interethnic relations. Active economic and cultural contacts and the increasing mobility of the population are leading to a consolidation and deepening of integration processes in all spheres of life. The languages of interethnic communication are becoming more and more common, and the level of bilingualism and trilingualism is rising. The press reports, for example, that Hausa is spreading in southern states, particularly in the former Mid-Western State. In the Western State it was decided to make study of one Nigerian language (apart from the mother tongue) compulsory in primary schools.

The building of a Nigerian culture absorbing all the diverse cultures of the separate ethnic communities is of great importance for integration. The holding of national art festivals and the organisation of reviews of the amateur art of the different Nigerian peoples is not only encouraging development of their cultures but is also inculcating respect for the achievements of other ethnic groups. In 1971 the first festival of Hausa culture was held in Kano. Special attention was paid at it to the language problem, and study

of the local languages was declared to be a most important task at the present stage of cultural development.

The popularity and mass character of these undertakings can be judged from the following figures: 600 persons took part in the finals of the fourth festival of national art held in Lagos at the end of December 1974 and the beginning of January 1975. Representatives of all states demonstrated the art of various Nigerian peoples. During the festival Nigerian scholars and cultural workers discussed the problem of national languages and their role in preserving and developing the very rich cultural traditions.

Nigerians' participation in the Second World Black and African Festival of Arts and Culture in Lagos in January and February 1977 gave a big stimulus to development of the distinctive cultures of the various ethnic groups. Problems of importance to African states were discussed at the many colloquia in which scholars from different countries took part, in particular matters dealing with the language problem and working out a language policy that would take account both of the interests of particular ethnic groups and of the state as a whole, and also problems of the interaction of the various cultures and co-operation in science and culture.

Nigerian statesmen and politicians are searching for ways for as rapid a solution as possible of economic and political problems; among the latter the finding of forms of state organisation is very important, especially forms of autonomy and of relations between central and local authorities.

The Nigerian politicians Obafemi Awolowo and Anthony Enahoro were unanimous (in talks with the author in Lagos in February 1969) in stressing the need for a united Nigeria and a strong central power. The form of state organisation gives rise to most controversy, whether Nigeria should be a federation or a confederacy. In Dr. Awolowo's view, about which we spoke above, and in the view of supporters of a federal system, only a federal constitution can ensure unity and co-operation of the peoples of Nigeria in its specific circumstances, and can make direction of the country effective and economically viable.<sup>147</sup>

Many parties and organisations favour a further dismembering of the large regions. The National Convention of Nigerian Citizens considered it necessary to divide the single Eastern Region into four. In Northern Nigeria the United

Middle Belt Congress had demanded a Middle Belt state, but the main parties of the north, the Northern People's Congress and the Northern Elements' Progressive Union, were against.

The Nigerian Youth Congress had put forward a demand to end the existing division of the country into regions and to form twelve national areas, or so-called states, in their place. This reform would have made it possible to make each of the administrative units more ethnically homogeneous.

In May 1966 the then head of the government, General Ironsi, issued Decree No. 34 abolishing the federal system of government and introducing a unitary one. All parties and political organisations were proscribed. Since a unitary state with centralised power was a blow to the traditional authorities, primarily to the emirs of the north, this measure evoked stormy protest from the reactionary forces. The ethnic factor was employed in the struggle; because General Ironsi was an Ibo, rumours were spread that the reform of the government was leading to Ibo hegemony. Mass pogroms of Ibo began in Northern Nigeria. At the end of July General Ironsi was murdered by northern soldiers. The new authorities immediately announced the repeal of Decree No. 34, and restored a federal structure. Questions of state structure and the matter of the states became problem Number One. A particularly sharp struggle developed in the second half of 1966 in the All-Nigerian Constitutional Conference.

Some politicians, in particular Joseph Sawuan Tarka, leader of the United Middle Belt Congress, and Tunji Otegboye, leader of the Socialist Workers' and Farmers' Party of Nigeria, considered it expedient to divide the country into nine states.<sup>148</sup>

Chief Obafemi Awolowo, head of the Action Group, presented a plan in its name for discussion, to divide the country into 18 states. The National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC, later renamed the National Convention of Nigerian Citizens) in Eastern Nigeria, and the Action Group in Western Nigeria, came out for the forming of new states and their separation from the existing regions. The Action Group in particular called for the formation of three new states, Mid-Western, a Middle Belt State, and a Calabar-Ogoja-Rivers State.<sup>149</sup>

By supporting the formation of new administrative units,

the Action Group and the NCNC counted on strengthening their positions in their fight against the parties of the north by attracting the ethnic minorities to their side. Since each of these parties expressed the interests of certain classes and strata, their social interests were disguised by ethnic interests. The unsolved character of the ethnic problems was used in the struggle for domination by certain classes and social strata in the federation—feudal rulers, the rising bourgeoisie, and the urban middle classes. But the north was not united. Evidence of the sharp struggle among the politicians of the north is the variety of views put forward at the All-Nigerian Conference in 1966; at first the northerners stood by the principle of preserving the existing regions but agreed to an extension of their autonomy. Then proposals were put forward for the formation of states. Later it was again noticed that the north had serious doubts about the feasibility of forming new states on a linguistic and ethnic basis. In the view of some northern leaders any agreement could not help ruling out the expression of dissatisfaction by quite a few small ethnic and linguistic groups who found themselves in dependence on bigger peoples.<sup>150</sup>

Two months later, however, in January 1967, in a communique published by the conference of the traditional rulers of Northern Nigeria, it was declared that the chiefs recommended dividing the country into 11 or 13 states. In addition they appealed for support for measures aimed at maintaining the country as a united political entity.

In May 1967 the Military Government of Nigeria decided to abolish the previous administrative structure, and created 12 states in place of the regions. A system of states that took the ethnic factor into account would undoubtedly ease the acuteness of the national question in Nigeria.

In the view of some Nigerian scholars and politicians the formation of 12 states was not only important as regards solution of the ethnic problems and improvement of interethnic relations but also signified the rise of many centres of economic development, whose competition would encourage development of the country as a whole. The view was also expressed that the division of the country into 12 states was a mistake, since the existence of so many autonomous units could lead, not to sensible emulation encouraging general progress, but to antagonistic rivalry fraught with even more 'disastrous consequences' than the crisis phenomena of 1962-



63. This point of view was held, in particular, by the demographer Lawrence A. Adekun, of the University of Ife.<sup>151</sup>

Problems of state structure and of the form of autonomy for national minorities continue to be a matter of controversy and are furiously discussed in the Nigerian press. Discussions continue on the number of states and the principles for forming them—should they be homogeneous in ethnic structure or not, should they be economically self-supporting, and so on.

In the Western State, according to A. Rake, the London correspondent of *Jeune Afrique*, the Oyo, a Yoruba group, demanded separation. In the North-Eastern State the Kanuri wanted a Bornu state to be created. In the Kwara State certain ethnic groups demanded unification with the North-Western State. The Igala wanted to be in a Plateau State, and not in Benue-Plateau.<sup>152</sup>

The newspapers published group declaration of Nigerians for and against the formation of new states. The Lagos *Daily Times* carried a statement by representatives of 13 areas in the East-Central State, favouring the formation of an Enugu (Wawa) state;<sup>153</sup> the *New Nigerian* has published a statement by a group of residents of the Benue-Plateau State, resolutely opposing division of this state,<sup>154</sup> a statement that emphasised that close and fruitful co-operation had been established between the different ethnic groups in the state (more than 50 of them). Its authors called on the Federal Government to be guided primarily by the interests of the whole country when dealing with the matter of forming new states, and not by the narrow interests of this or that group of the population.

The Nigerian press has reported the activities of various kinds of unofficial committees in Lagos standing for separation of Niger and Rivers states from the South-Eastern State, and about agitation for separation of the Zaria Province from the North-Central State, for the division of the Benue-Plateau State, and so on.

Another leading Nigerian leader, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, had proposed dividing the existing Benue-Plateau, East-Central, South-Eastern, and Western states.

The idea of altering the administrative structure and increasing the number of states, however, is raising objections. The Lagos *Daily Times*, *Nigerian Chronicle*, and other newspapers have published articles by the state governments

and also by the traditional rulers that rebuff the defenders of a dividing up of the country.<sup>155</sup> In the view of Mr. Ukpabi Asika, the former administrator of the East-Central State, it is not possible in any case to take the ethno-linguistic features of an area as the basis when separating it as an independent politico-administrative unit. Such an approach would inevitably foster the rise of regional and ethnic separation. Mr. Asika thinks that if a striving for ethnic unification and unity were taken as the main criterion for reviewing the existing boundaries of Nigerian states, this highly unreliable criterion would lead to the formation of tribalistic islands; and that, in his view, would not be for the good of Nigerian society.<sup>156</sup>

Continuing demands for review of the existing structure, however, forced the Military Government in August 1975 to form a commission to study the question. The commission has considered the possibility of creating new states taking into account political, economic and ethnic factors.

The chairman of the commission, Mr. Justice Ayo Irikefe, declared that if Nigeria wanted to remain united it must not be split into too many states. If the commission agreed to all the existing proposals, he said, they would have to form not less than 200 states.<sup>157</sup>

The commission turned down the proposal to create states on an ethnic basis, rightly declaring that this could have a disastrous effect on the continued existence and unity of the country. In its view there could hardly be a more disruptive force in national disintegration than adherence to this principle.<sup>158</sup>

At the beginning of February 1976 the Federal Military Government announced the creation of seven new states in addition to the twelve created in May 1967. By its decision the Western and North-Eastern states were divided into three states each, and the East-Central, North-Western, and Benue-Plateau states into two each. Seven states—Lagos, North-Central, Kano, Rivers, Mid-Western, South-Eastern, and Kwara—remained unaltered except for minor adjustments of their boundaries. Most of them were given new names: Imo, Ondo, Benue, Ogun, Gongola, Niger, Bauchi, Oyo, Anambra, Sokoto, Plateau, Borno, Lagos, Kaduna, Kano, Rivers, Bendel, Cross River, and Kwara. Three cities—Lagos, Port Harcourt, and Kaduna—were separated off as special areas.<sup>159</sup>

Certain circles, however, are pressing for the creation



of new states. Alhaji Aminu Kano, for instance, a well-known Nigerian political figure, member of the Constitution Drafting Committee, has called on the government to create a larger number of states. Proposals have been made, he says, in the Onitsha area to set up an Oshimili State, while some of the people in Cross River State want their own separate state. He considers that a Port Harcourt State should be separated off from Rivers State, and another state should be created that would unite all Ijaws. In the Kwara State, the population of the Borgu Emirate, according to him, want to return to Sokoto State to which they used to belong.<sup>160</sup>

The problems of diminishing the role of the ethnic factor in Nigeria's political life and of creating favourable conditions for deepening the processes of national integration are being discussed by political scientists and public figures. At a conference organised in 1970 by the Institute of Administration of Ahmadu Bello University the idea was persistently advanced that the future constitution should ensure conversion of the state administrative apparatus into a truly Nigerian one at both federal and local levels. In the view of its supporters this could only be done if the fundamental law of the country included a provision for appointing competent people to posts in state institutions who possessed the necessary business-like qualities, irrespective of their ethnic or religious affiliation.

Important proposals on issues of the country's social and political development were expressed at a symposium held at Lagos University in April 1973. A Nsukka University's paper specially prepared for the symposium (A. Thomas, *Mechanism of Transition*, Nigeria 1976) put forward the following point of view on the problems of ethnic development. Nigeria is a vast country with many ethnic groups, each with its own culture, language, and other peculiarities; whatever structure was adopted in the future it was necessary to take their character, views, and problems into consideration; but that should be subordinated to the objectives of consolidating national integration and national unity.

In considering the problem of the formation of new states, the group also called for careful study of the matter, and suggested that modelling of the constituent parts of the federation on an ethnic principle would lead to a strengthening of local sentiments and so endanger political integration, while ignoring of this principle and arbitrary division of

the country into more or less equal parts would involve the development of artificial politico-administrative units. The paper saw the way out in taking maximum account of the wishes of the population when dealing with the issue of any changes in the structure of the federation.

The paper considered that Nigeria's most important issue was still, and would be for a long time to come, that of achieving national unity and political integration, but that national unity would not be complete without taking its social, political, and economic aspects into account.

Analysis of the proceedings of the many symposia, discussions, and conferences on issues of social and political development held in Nigeria in recent years indicates in particular that the principle of a federal structure for the country is not now disputed, that Nigerian academic, political, and public figures are paying much attention to ethnic problems and are conscious of their complexity and significance for the country's future. They are calling for maximum care in dealing with the national question, and the taking of the various ethnic factors into account, considering that the basic aim should be ethno-political unity. A heated debate on the problem during the International Seminar on the Third World and World Peace, held in July 1976 at Nsukka University, may serve as a pertinent example.

Major socio-economic shifts have thus occurred in Nigeria, and much is being done there to heal the wounds of the civil war in the sphere of national relations.

The institution of a system of states and a realistic policy of reintegration of the Ibo, and the great ideological work done to inculcate feelings of citizenship and patriotism are bearing fruit: the ethnic factor is ceasing to be the dominant issue in the country. Evidence of that, in particular, is the fact that the July events of 1975, and the assumption of power by a new government, the head of which was a northerner, did not provoke interethnic conflicts. Even ten years ago that would have been impossible.

Nigerian public opinion is more and more concerned with issues of democratisation of the country and combating corruption. The lessons of the civil war have indicated the importance and necessity of ethno-political unity for the country's future.

Meanwhile, hierarchism and a multi-level character of ethnic self-consciousness are characteristic of Nigeria like many other developing countries. Alongside processes break-

ing down tribal structure, a reinforcing of tribal ideology and isolationism is to be observed here and there. And alongside centripetal tendencies, nation-building, and the development of consciousness of an all-Nigerian community, there are centrifugal tendencies and separatist moods.

The main cause of friction between peoples is the unresolved nature of the socio-economic issues. Social conflicts are complicated by contradictions in the ethnic basis. The class and ethnic antagonisms engendered by an exploiting society, and social heterogeneity, prevent the approximating of the different peoples and complicate the processes of national consolidation and integration.

Reforms in the economic, social, and cultural spheres, the conversion of the country more and more into a single economic complex, the extension of economic and cultural links between the states, help to the backward peoples in eradicating existing inequality in levels of development, raising of the general educational standards of the population, extensive ideological and educational work aimed at uniting a heterogeneous population (as regards ethnic origin and language), the drawing of the broad masses into active political life, and the raising of their mobility—will all, as the experience of other countries indicates, inevitably lead to the break-up of pre-capitalist structures and to an intensification of ethnic processes. A consequence of that will be growth of national self-awareness and a deepening of integrational processes.

In January 1971 the government of *Chad* began to implement the 'policy of national reconciliation' proclaimed by it and aimed at resolving the acute political crisis that had existed in the country since 1965, evoked by the revolt of the Tedda and Mubi peoples against the dominant position of southerners.

In view of the dire straits of the Tedda, who live in the northern areas of Tibesti, the government decided to help them with food supplies.

The government has met a considerable part of the Mubi's demands: representation in the National Political Bureau of the Chad Progressive Party; the carrying out of administrative reforms in their area; the right to elect local leaders belonging to their ethnic group; the freeing of most political prisoners.<sup>161</sup> The National Political Bureau of the Progressive Party elected at its 7th Congress (in April 1971) included two former members of the opposition, and in May

1971 one of them was appointed chairman of the National Assembly and the other Minister of Foreign Affairs. Around 600 political prisoners were released, among whom there were many major figures. According to the foreign press, representatives of the Muslim north were in the majority in the government for the first time in Chad's political history.

In Tibesti, where one of the causes of the rebellion had been violations and abuses in the collection of taxes, the government decided to free the northern district from taxes and to help it with food supplies. Measures were planned for a certain improvement in the road system and of water supplies in these arid areas, an improvement in medical services, and so on.<sup>162</sup>

The government which came to power in 1975 after the overthrow of President N'garta Tombalbaye announced its intention to take steps to guarantee social justice for all citizens. Co-operatives were set up in the villages. The privileges of tribal headmen, extended by the former administration, were abolished. A slogan of national unity has been advanced, an element of which is national reconciliation. But the situation in Chad is not yet stabilised; according to a communique of the Supreme Military Council broadcast at the end of February 1976, around 200 insurgents had tried to seize control of Faya, the administrative centre of the BET Prefecture (Borku-Ennedi-Tibesti) on the night of 17/18 January 1976. In June and July 1977 there were clashes with government troops in the Tibesti area. The Council more than once declared that national reconciliation remained a cornerstone of its policy and that it intended to achieve the re-establishment of peace through negotiations. The government has often stressed the danger of splitting activity and tribalism. It considers that the polyethnic structure of the country and the existence of various peoples with their own cultures should not disrupt its unity but should, on the contrary, enrich society.

Speaking on the second anniversary of the Second Republic, General Félix Malloum, the head of state, called for reconciliation and unity and rejection of the spirit of division and hatred, and called on the people to work together for the good of their native land. At the beginning of August 1977 he expressed regret at a press conference at certain political forces' continuing exploitation and inflaming of disagreements between northerners and southerners, and between Christians and Muslims.

Issues of ethnic development are of great urgency in the development of Benin, Ghana, the Ivory Coast, Zaire, and several other countries. The unresolved character of the national question in them is having a definite effect on their internal political situation. Signs of tribalism and separatism have been noticed many times in recent years, manifestations that are deepening ethnic contradictions and leading to open conflicts. The problem of eradicating the real inequality in level of development has not yet been tackled in a number of countries. In Ghana, for instance, the southern areas are at a much higher level of economic and social development than the northern ones.

The north of Ghana has suffered grossly for decades from changing colonial and outside administrations. This area, *The Ghanaian Times* has said, has been treated too often as the Cinderella of Ghanaian society.<sup>163</sup>

Proposals have been made to send university and secondary school students to the northern areas during the long vacation 'to do free, unpaid work'. The imposition of a Northern Development Tax has been proposed, payable by the well-to-do section of society with an income above £1,000 a year.<sup>164</sup>

Policy in regard to language problems has also caused difficulties. In Ghana, for example, it is said openly that the languages used for radio broadcasting are foreign to the public in the north.<sup>165</sup>

The government of Ghana has been making efforts to resolve ethnic problems. Discrimination and propaganda for separatism have been banned. The equality of all ethnic groups has been proclaimed. Attention is being paid to the economic development of backward areas, and to raising the cultural standards of the different peoples of the country.

At the beginning of 1975 the government decided to organise co-operatives or *nnobua* groups (in the Twi language *nnobua* means joint clearing of a plot of land) in order to involve the public actively in the carrying out of socio-economic reforms. The head of the Military Government, General Acheampong, called on the public to set up *nnobua* groups, and said that every ten families would receive a plot of 100 acres (40 hectares) for joint cultivation. The creation of such groups was not only envisaged in agriculture. General Acheampong considers that they will make it possible to mobilise the public to create undertakings for processing agricultural raw materials, building

houses, and providing water and electricity on a self-supporting basis.

An industrial complex has been built in the Western Region—a combined wood-working and farm implement factory employing 1500 workers. The development of industry will help transform the life of the territory's population.

A development plan has been worked out for the Upper Region and its implementation has begun. The government plans to spend large sums on developing the Volta Region. It has decided to improve electricity supply and to build a system of water supply and roads, which is evidence that the talk about neglect of this area (which is mainly inhabited by Ewe) is without foundation.

In order to put an end to the activity of certain politicians who are advocating secession of the Volta Region from Ghana, the government issued an order in March 1976 banning agitation for secession of the Volta area and providing for a fine of 5000 sedi (around £2350 sterling), or a sentence of five years' imprisonment.

Much attention is being paid to the development of culture. Folk song and dance ensembles have been formed, and art festivals are being held. One such festival took place, for example, in Koforidua, centre of the Eastern Region. at the end of August 1974.

In the *People's Republic of Benin* (formerly Dahomey), the head of the military government, Lieut.-Col. Mathieu Kérékou, declared in his first statement after taking power in October 1972 that among the tasks facing the government was the struggle against manifestations of parochial tendencies.

The People's Republic of Benin was proclaimed on 30 November 1975. President Kérékou said in his address on the first anniversary of the Republic on 30 November 1976 that it had become the banner of all the progressive forces of the country in the struggle for national unity, and for rallying the areas and nationalities that had previously been feuding with one another.

The People's Revolutionary Party of Benin is paying much attention to ideological education of the masses in the spirit of Marxism-Leninism, an objective posed in both the party rules and other programmes.

A plan has been drafted to set up collective fields and farms in all the administrative units of the country. And it

is planned, with the aim of balanced development of the regions and raising of their socio-economic level, to build several industrial undertakings of local significance in each province.

In March 1977 it was decided to set up Committees of Defence of the Revolution (CDRs) as mass organisations of the PRPB, to play a cardinal role in drawing broad sections of the population into the process of building a new life, developing and deepening the people's revolution, and passing to the stage of socialist revolution. The CDRs will help in the fight against reactionary elements and tribalists, who are exploiting the ethnic factor for disruptive purposes.

In addition to measures of an economic character aimed at promoting a rise in the level of development of backward areas, much educational work has been carried out to rally the various ethnic groups and to eliminate the antagonisms inflamed in the past between northerners and southerners. Culture weeks are devoted to the educating of a new man and citizen. One such week, organised by the Dahomeyan Society for the Study of African Culture, was held in May 1975. It included talks by well-known Dahomeyan writers and cultural workers on the history, customs, and art of the peoples of Africa.

In 1976 cultural festivals were held in all six provinces of Benin. Local theatre groups, poets and musicians took part in them, and also dance ensembles whose programmes included songs and dances of the various peoples of the country. After the local festivals there was a national review of the amateur arts at which those who were to represent Benin in the Second World Black and African Festival of Arts and Culture in Lagos in 1977 were selected.

In the *Republic of Guinea* the government and the Democratic Party of Guinea (DPG), while recognising the existence of various ethnic groups in the country, have set themselves the aim not only of developing the native culture of each people but also of taking steps to integrate them in every way into a united ethno-political community. In that connection much importance is attached to ideological work among the people, stress being laid on work among the rural population. The DPG has activated work among the most backward ethnic groups on the 'bush' areas among the Kissi, Gerze, and other peoples. The party is giving the peasantry help in marketing farm produce, is advocating equality of women in the family and fighting harmful sur-

vivals of the past, in particular the exploitation of rank-and-file members of the communities by clan and tribal leaders under the guise of mutual assistance.

The government is devoting attention to the economic development of backward areas, in particular to 'Forest Guinea'. The power and other resources of the forest belt are being studied, and manufacturing and food processing undertakings built. At the beginning of 1969 the DPG's Politbureau decided to send experts and townsmen to the countryside for an agricultural campaign.

The setting up of Local Revolutionary Authorities (LRAs) has been most important for carrying out reforms in rural areas. The LRA's, which numbered around 2,500 at the beginning of 1977 and covered 80 per cent of the population of Guinea, are collective peasant farms formed on the basis of the traditional villages. Each farm has between 1,500 and 2,000 people. The LRA's mobilise all sections of the population for resolving tasks of economic, social, and cultural development and are considered by the Democratic Party of Guinea to be the key to the socialist development of Guinea. The government is supplying them with modern agricultural implements and machinery and so helping modernise farming. The main point is that these reforms are facilitating the break-up of backward tribal structures and are activating ethnic processes, bringing members of the various ethnic groups together.

Much attention is also paid to the problem of proper choice and appointment of state and party officials. One means of countering the adverse effect of the ethnic factor is the practice of periodically re-stationing responsible officials so as not to let them become 'overgrown' by kinsmen and fellow-tribesmen.

The government attaches immense significance to the development of local languages and a national culture. Systems of writing have been developed for the seven most important languages of the country, and radio broadcasting and teaching in the primary schools is carried on in them. The local languages are being widely used to liquidate illiteracy among the adult population.

Many amateur groups and ensembles have been formed among the various ethnic groups. Amateur art reviews and annual festivals of national art are held. A clear demonstration of Guinea's success in developing a national culture was its delegation's performance at the First Pan-African

Cultural Festival held in Algiers in 1969, where it took first place.

The government has called for a decisive campaign against archaic traditions and customs, which frequently have their origin in the clan and tribal system. M Sékou Touré said in October 1975 that persons using tribal talismans or fetishes would be severely punished. Fetish ceremonies at burials have been banned.

Gradualness is characteristic of the Democratic Party of Guinea, which applies in the ethnic field as well; it takes internal and external factors into account, setting objectives in accordance with the country's general stage of development, and with the concrete historical conditions.

An example of that is the attitude to various narrowly tribal organisations. In 1947, when the Guinean section of the *Rassemblement démocratique Africain* (RDA) was formed, various ethnic organisations joined it, like the Malinké Union, the Forest People Union, the Sousou Union of Lower Guinea, the organisation uniting the Peulhs of Fouta Djallon, and other bodies. In the period between 1947 and 1952 the DPG employed these tribal organisations in its work, but they were frequently at daggers drawn in the struggle for leadership. Committees that reflected the real situation in Guinea were set up inside the DPG—Peuhl, Malinké, Sousou and other committees—and also committees of women, griot-artists, and notables. While recognising these narrow, tribal organisations, however, the DPG at the same time from the very start began to rally the masses on the anti-colonial platform regardless of ethnic origin. The great explanatory work of subsequent years helped it win the confidence of the masses and convince them of the harm these organisations were doing, and then to abolish the committees.<sup>166</sup>

The carrying out of such measures of an economic, ideological, social and cultural nature is undoubtedly encouraging a rallying of the different ethnic groups around the DPG's policy, a raising of their cultural standards, and the elimination of inequality in the development of the separate peoples.

The Penal Code of Guinea provides for imprisonment for one to ten years for 'any act of racism or regionalism, and equally for any propaganda of a racial, tribal, or subversive character'.<sup>167</sup>

In the *People's Republic of Congo* (Brazzaville) the

broad measures of an economic and social nature carried out are encouraging solution of ethnic problems. Work is being done to raise the level of socio-economic and cultural development of the most backward rural areas. With this aim in mind a government policy known as *action du développement* was worked out at the beginning of 1971.

This 'development action' is a broad set of measures that includes the training of agricultural specialists, teaching the peasants progressive methods of farming and stock-rearing, the setting up of primary forms of co-operation with state help, and the building of roads and of undertakings for the primary processing of agricultural materials.

The government's main attention is taken up with the carrying out of current plans, and strengthening of the planning base in the economy and state sector. Voluntary social forms of work are being encouraged. On 16 July, 1975, for instance, Operation Party Fields was launched, which envisaged drawing the broad working masses into farm work.<sup>168</sup> More than 1,000 persons, mainly teachers, students and pupils, took part on the first day.<sup>169</sup>

Plans for enlarging settlements are being worked out and implemented. The building of such villages will help provide better medical care for the public and bring a greater number of children into the schools.

Steps are being taken to eliminate traditional chieftainships. People's councils are being formed in the localities, the functions of which include the working out and checking of programmes of economic and social development in accordance with the country's general development plans. Executive and administrative authority is exercised locally by executive committees set up within the framework of the people's councils. The new power, as the late President Marien Ngonabi declared at a meeting on 12 July 1972, would also encourage the fading out of the tribalism and regionalist tendencies that were hampering progressive development of the country.

Tribalism is not only being condemned, but also checked by state authorities. All cases of intertribal hostility in the PRC are tried by revolutionary tribunals. The newspaper *Etumba* systematically publishes reports of court proceedings against persons accused of fomenting regional attitudes and intertribal strife. In May 1971, for instance, the case was heard of the 'reactionary tribalist group of M. Mberi' (a

former deputy of the National Assembly), whose members were accused, according to the Congolese Information Agency (ACI), of distributing counter-revolutionary leaflets inciting the Congolese people to intertribal strife. The accused received sentences of from one to five years' imprisonment. Severe sentences were also imposed on the members of an anti-government conspiracy in February 1972 in which the tribalist element also played an important role.

The CPL and the Congolese government attach great importance to ideological work with the public, and to study of Marxist-Leninist theory and of the Soviet Union's experience of dealing with the national question. Seminars are held, lectures delivered, and explanatory talks given on the danger and harm of the ideology of tribalism and intertribal strife, on the general objectives of eradicating the survivals of colonialism in the field of relations between the members of different ethnic groups, and on the use of tribalism and regionalism for subversive purposes by the forces of reaction.

Considerable progress has been made in *Tanzania* in welding ethnic groups into a single ethno-political community. The conditions for this have been more favourable there than in other African countries.

No major states existed on the territory of Tanganyika in the past. Therefore no one people has dominated another. The overwhelming majority of the people are at approximately the same level of economic development, the sole exception being the Chagga people in the north-eastern part of the country, among whom capitalist relations had developed even before independence. The busy caravan routes of Arab and Swahili merchants and the constant migration of the population to mines and sisal plantations in search of work were of no little importance for active development of ethnic processes. The mutual contacts of the heterotribal population and the ever-spreading use of Swahili have encouraged a gradual smoothing out of ethnic differences and a strengthening of integrating processes.

Another important factor explaining why the ethnic problem had not had a significant place in Tanganyika's politics was the fact that there were no competing parties basing their activity on their own tribe; from the outset the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) became a mass political organisation uniting members of the most diverse ethnic groups in its ranks. Since January 1963

TANU had been open to all citizens of the country irrespective of their racial origin.

Carrying out of the TANU's programme of progressive socio-economic reforms and of President Nyerere's principles of national policy had great significance in solving ethnic problems.

TANU always paid constant attention to national problems; and the position adopted by the President, who is resolutely opposed to tribalism and is in favour of uniting all the peoples and creating a single family of peoples—the Tanzanian nation—has been of great importance. In working out concrete measures for national policy, and in appointing people to administrative posts, the government does not make a fetish of the ethnic factor, considering that there is a united people with common aims and objectives.

The national development plans also correspond to these objectives. Government spokesmen reiterate that they devote much attention to equitable development of all regions of the republic.

Party schools are to be set up in the course of 1975-80 for ideological instruction of the public, with the aim of educating citizens as active builders of the new society. Their main object, Rashidi Kawawa, the Prime Minister, said, speaking in Dodoma in January 1975, would be to train Tanzanians to govern a country that was taking the road of building socialism and to put an end once and for all to the colonial way of thinking.

Merging of the peoples of Tanzania is undoubtedly being encouraged by the government's language policy. In spite of the existence in the continental part of the country of 120 peoples, each with its own language, many of which are not mutually comprehensible, the government has declared Swahili the state language alongside English. It must be specially emphasised, moreover, that the introduction of Swahili as a state language did not encounter any resistance on the part of the public and was painlessly accomplished. That, it would seem, is one of the results of TANU's long-term policy aimed at diminishing the ethnic factor and really rallying all the citizens of the country.

The Tanzanian government and TANU have carried out enormous activity in rural areas. *Ujamaa* villages have been set up throughout the country (*ujamaa* means 'family' in Swahili), which TANU feels should become the soil for the programme of building socialism. Dr. Nyerere, speaking at



the 17th National Conference of TANU on 23 September 1975, reported that around nine million persons of the continental part of Tanzania, or 65 per cent of the rural population, were then living in 6,944 *ujamaa* villages. Each village had approximately 1,260 inhabitants.

The statute on *ujamaa* villages passed by the National Assembly in 1975 provides for the setting up of village assemblies and councils by the peasants themselves to run all the village's affairs. The revolutionary changes in the countryside, the Prime Minister declared at the same conference, were entering a new phase.

Equality of the different ethnic groups, collective labour, mutual aid, respect for human dignity, and the development of culture are creating favourable opportunities for ethnic development and the carrying through of radical economic and social reforms.

New production relations in enterprises of the public sector, the development of co-operatives, and the growth in the number of *ujamaa* villages are all uprooting the possibility of exploitation of man by man and of one ethnic group by another.

Reforms in the field of education and elimination of the segregation that had previously existed in the schools have been directed against racial discrimination and have pursued the aim of putting Africans, Indians and Pakistanis, Arabs, and Europeans on an equal footing.

In March 1967 a special directive defined the government's policy in education. In characterising the reform, Dr. Nyerere stressed its 'Tanzanian content'. Schoolchildren, he said, would not only study the history of Africa but would also sing their national songs and learn their national dances; and the national language—Swahili—'has been given the importance, in our curriculum, which it needs and deserves'.<sup>170</sup>

Implementation of the principles proclaimed in the Arusha Declaration is laying the basis needed for carrying through far-reaching reforms in the economic and social sphere. The extensive ideological work carried out by TANU to draw the broad masses into nation-building; the development of new forms of labour and of relations between people based on achieving common objectives in the interests of the whole country; measures to wipe out the existing imbalance in the standards of the different peoples; the successful language policy; the uprooting of the economic basis

for exploitation of man by man; and resolute struggle against corruption—are all important factors for resolving ethnic problems and creating national unity.

Great significance is attached in the *United Republic of Cameroon* to levelling up the development of the various areas and providing the conditions for eliminating tribal disunity and backwardness. Much has been done since independence in the Eastern Province, for instance, which used to be one of the most backward areas. The infrastructure there has been improved, and several colleges and lycées opened. The Trans-Cameroon railway, which runs through the Eastern Province, has given an impetus to development of the economy and trade. Water and electricity supplies have been improved. All these measures, President Ahidjo said during his visit to the province in April 1976, were the result of the government's policy for levelling up the development of all areas. Some progress in economic and cultural development has also been made in the North-Western and South-Western provinces. The progress in training personnel for the middle echelons of administration is particularly noticeable.

A campaign is being waged against ethnic prejudices and outmoded traditions. The *Cameroon Tribune* wrote in the middle of January 1977 that the fight against backward traditions was necessary so as to eradicate everything that was preventing the establishment of good relations between the country's various ethnic groups, in particular those that had enslaved other citizens by means of social injustice and false ethnopatriotism, alleging that their ancestors had conquered the others in tribal wars. The paper called for a resolute war to be waged against the archaic traditions that still lingered on among some of the people, and sharply condemned elements that continued to practise rituals bordering on barbarism under the pretext of preserving the cultural heritage.

It was impossible to achieve national unity, the *Cameroon Tribune* considered, without taking resolute measures against tribalists and obsolete tribal customs and rituals.

One of the basic principles of the Cameroon National Union and the government of Cameroon is proclamation of the equality of all the peoples of the country and the suppression of ethnic discrimination. The national policy being implemented pursues the aim of creating a united nation from the many ethnic groups living in the country.



The policy of the government of the *Democratic Republic of the Sudan* aimed at settling the South Sudanese problem presents considerable interest as regards its approach to the solution of ethnic problems.

The government of the Sudan that came to power in May 1969 has operated on the principle that a political solution of the problem of the south is impossible without eradicating the socio-economic roots of the antagonisms between the Arabic-speaking north and the Nilotic-speaking southern Bahr el Ghazal, Equatoria, and Upper Nile provinces.

Recognising the historically conditioned difference between the two parts of the country, the National Revolutionary Council decided to grant South Sudan regional autonomy so as to ensure equality between the two parts of the country and to establish real national and social unity.

On 9 June 1969 a programme of political and socio-economic measures for the southern provinces was adopted, which envisaged prolongation of the 1967 amnesty for anti-government groups of rebels; concrete measures for the economic, social, and cultural development of the southern provinces; the institution of a ministry for southern affairs under the Council of Ministers; the need to train competent administrators for the south; the setting up of a special body for the southern provinces for economic planning and drafting of a budget for the south.

The Sudanese government appealed to the southerners' leaders to begin negotiations to draw up forms of autonomy for the south that would best suit the local circumstances.

Without the ending of military operations in the south, however, and the establishment of peace, it was hardly possible to grant regional autonomy.

In September 1969 a Ministry for Southern Affairs was created, and a southerner, a lawyer and a member of the Politbureau of the Sudanese Communist Party, Joseph Garang, was appointed to head it.

Carrying out of the programme adopted encouraged a certain stabilisation of the political situation in the southern areas. The populace who had quit the towns and taken refuge in the forests began gradually to return. Many southerners who had fled to neighbouring countries, in particular to Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia, the Central African Republic, and Zaire, returned home. Normal economic life began gradually to be restored, and there was a quickening

of trade and local artisan production. Schools began to be opened.

The leaders of the military organisation Anya-Nya, which had led the movement in the southern areas, took up a hostile stand toward the Sudanese government. In January 1971 the commander-in-chief of Anya-Nya, Joseph Lagu, proclaimed the founding of the Azania Liberation Front. A considerable part of the area continued to be under the control of South Sudanese leaders. According to some sources two-thirds of the Sudanese Army was deployed in the south. The position was extremely complex and not only endangered carrying out of the government's intentions for solving the South Sudanese problem but also represented a danger to the national revolutionary government. It was therefore decided to develop military operations against the South Sudanese opposition, as a result of which a heavy blow was struck against the rebel forces. The position of the central government in the south was strengthened.

The carrying out of the government programme for developing the southern provinces was complicated, in particular, by shortcomings in planning and financing, by the absence of a precise division of rights and responsibilities between the Ministry for Southern Affairs and other departments, and so on.

Discussion of the mistakes made in implementing the development programme led to the Council of Minister's deciding on 6 January 1971 to do the following:

(1) to grant the National Coordination and Planning Council the necessary powers as regards planning and the implementation of planned measures and to control the development of the southern areas, provided that its plans did not contradict the aims of the national development plan;

(2) to transfer the special local development budget of the South to the National Coordination and Planning Council;

(3) to recommend the National Council of the Revolution to create a post of Assistant State Minister for Southern Affairs to be permanently resident in the south.

The National Coordination and Planning Council was headed by the Assistant State Minister for Southern Affairs and was responsible to the Minister for Southern Affairs.

A special appropriation of £S 304,000 (for the remainder of the 1970/71 fiscal year), earmarked mainly for the de-

velopment of food production, was made by the government for the southern provinces.

For the first time in the history of the Sudan southerners were appointed governors of the southern provinces.

The opposition continued to operate, however, and the position in the south remained unstable.

On 20 September 1971 a new plan for a political settlement was published in the *Nile Mirror*. It envisaged decentralisation of power and the creation of legislative and executive bodies in the south. This plan became the basis of negotiations between the government of the Sudan and representatives of Anya-Nya, held in Addis Ababa in February 1972.

On 28 February 1972 an agreement was signed granting autonomy to the three southern provinces within a federal Sudanese state (ratified in Addis Ababa on 27 March 1972). In accordance with this agreement a single region, with its capital at Juba, was created from the three southern provinces, and regional executive and legislative bodies were set up. Matters pertaining to defence, foreign policy, trade, and planning were assigned to the jurisdiction of the central government.

During the negotiations in Addis Ababa the southerners' delegation presented a secret memorandum in which it suggested the creation of a federal state consisting of four regions (North, South, Darfur, and Kordofan) instead of two (the last two provinces, in the southerners' view, could also demand self-government). This proposal, however, was decisively rejected by the Sudanese government delegation.

A subject of bitter discussion was the question of military units and the garrisons in Southern Sudan (the Anya-Nya representatives insisted on the forming of independent armed forces for the south).

In accordance with the agreement reached 6,000 soldiers from north and south, who would be under the command of a southerner, were to be stationed in the southern area for a five-year transition period. The armed forces of the southerners were to be incorporated into the Sudanese Army.

The Southern Provinces Regional Self-Government Act 1972 came into force on 3 March 1972; Article 3 said:

The Southern Provinces of the Sudan shall constitute a Self-Governing Region within the Democratic Republic of the Sudan and shall be known as the Southern Region.<sup>171</sup>

Arabic was declared the official language of the Sudan; English was recognised as the main language of the Southern Region. As regards the local Nilotic languages spoken by the population of the Southern Sudan, the Act noted that there would be no prejudice as regards the use of any other (besides Arabic and English) language or languages that could satisfy practical needs and are fit for the effective and prompt execution of administrative and economic functions in the Region (Article 5).

The Act guaranteed all citizens of the Southern Sudan equal opportunities of obtaining an education and work, and of engaging in trade. Freedom of movement within the Southern Sudan and outside it was guaranteed (except when restrictions or bans were imposed on movement for reasons of public security or public health).

The Act emphasised that the rights of the citizens are not dependent on race, tribal origin, residence or sex (Articles 31-32).

A legislature was to be instituted in the Southern Region in the form of a People's Regional Assembly, and an executive body, which was to be constituted as the High Executive Council.

The People's Regional Assembly could appeal to the President of the Republic by a three-quarters' majority, on grounds of public interest, to dismiss the President of the High Executive Council or any of its members (Article 12).

The People's Regional Assembly could, by a two-thirds' majority, ask the President of the Republic to postpone the coming into force of any act which, in its view, was harmful to the well-being and interests of the citizens of the Southern Region. The President could, if he deemed it necessary, agree to this request (Article 13).

The President has the right to veto any bill that he considers to infringe the constitution. The People's Regional Assembly may, after studying the President's opinion, again introduce the bill for consideration (Article 27).

A special article in the Act provides that the People's Regional Assembly must exert efforts to reinforce the unity of the Sudan (Article 30).

The population of the Southern Sudan thus, for the first time in the country's history, obtained the right to self-government and the opportunity themselves to decide matters of the socio-economic and cultural development of their region.

The agreement on the ceasefire in the Southern Sudan came into force on 6 March 1972. On 20 March 1972 the Sudanese government repealed the state of emergency in the south, and on 3 April 1972 the President promulgated an order ending military operations in the southern provinces.

The granting of regional autonomy, the ceasefire, and the working out of a broad programme of social and economic measures created favourable conditions for dealing with the South Sudanese problem. Full solution of the national question in the Sudan, however, depends on radical social and economic reforms.

The examples cited show that the objective of government policy in many countries is to overcome difficulties stemming from ethnic and linguistic diversity, and to promote internal integration of the different ethnic groups. The principles of the equality of the various peoples are proclaimed in the constitutions and programmes of the ruling parties of many countries. A struggle against tribal particularism and regionalism and against discrimination on ethnic grounds is being waged by means of a variety of measures of an economic, political, and cultural nature as well as by the introduction of appropriate legal norms providing for severe punishment for any manifestation of racism, tribal hostility, and separatism.

In some African countries a search is going on for forms of state system that take account of the interests of ethnic minorities.

In view of the great authority of the traditional rulers, the governments of several African countries are trying to draw chiefs into the implementation of socio-economic measures. With that aim leading politicians have given interviews and made statements explaining their governments' policies, and various courses and seminars have been organised. The participation of the heads of states in these measures is evidence of the great importance attached to them.

In Ghana, for instance, the head of the Military Government, General Acheampong, speaking at the annual festivities in Dodova, appealed to chiefs to start organising co-operatives. He asked the traditional rulers to help the government train officials for the new local councils and to develop a feeling of unity and the community of aims.<sup>172</sup>

Great attention is being paid to work with traditional chiefs and elders by the Provisional Military Administrative Committee of Ethiopia.

In Somalia, at the end of May-June 1975, a three-week seminar for imams of the Benadir region was held. The attending leaders of the country's Supreme Revolutionary Council called on the imams to take an active part in all spheres of life, and to co-operate with the government in the interests of justice, equality, and unity of the nation. They stressed that the new legislation of the country was inseparably linked with the culture and traditions of the Somali people.

In a declaration adopted by the participants, 74 imams of the Benadir mosques expressed complete and unreserved support for the government and declared their determination to oppose the intrigues of local reaction and of international imperialism and its accomplices. The declaration stressed that the 1969 revolution had saved Somalia from corruption and injustice and had put the country onto the only correct road, and that a number of progressive reforms had been carried out in the interests of the Somali people.

In Uganda President Idi Amin opened a two-week course in Makerere University in April 1973 for 500 instructors, who were to train the newly elected chiefs of the ethnic groups.

The traditional rulers (obas or kings, chiefs, emirs, etc.) have played a big role in the life of Nigeria. Several leaders and members of the staffs of academic institutions, when discussing the future constitution of Nigeria, have considered that the traditional rulers should have a definite place in the country's political structure. Some suggest that it would be expedient to set up a four-tier system for governing the Federation—a Supreme Military Council, an Executive Council composed of civilians, a parliament, and a Council of Chiefs and Elders.<sup>173</sup> Others think it necessary to create a two-chamber parliament in each state, consisting of a house of representatives and a house of chiefs.<sup>174</sup> Still others suggest creating a State Assembly as the legislature of the constituent states, in which there would be a council of chiefs as a consultative body.<sup>175</sup>

The head of the Federal Military Government of Nigeria, General O. Obasanjo, addressing a gathering of representatives of the traditional rulers at the beginning of July 1976 on the reform of local authorities, assured them that their role as elders and counsellors of their people would not be altered in any way.

Many African countries have undoubtedly done much in recent years to deal with ethnic problems.

At the same time, study of the policies of the governments of certain African countries indicates both that the significance of ethnic problems continues to be underestimated in some cases, and that a narrow understanding of these problems reduces them to intertribal strife. It is not tribal or regional peculiarities, however, that underlie ethnic conflicts, but a whole complex of socio-economic problems and their consequences. These conflicts are a reflection of the struggle of the vested interests of various strata, including clashes between the interests of the classes of capitalist society that are taking shape and pre-capitalist traditional structures.

Recent events in Africa have shown that the leaders of countries that have chosen a capitalist path of development prove to be unable to cope with ethnic problems. In many ways the retention of key positions in the economy in the hands of foreign monopolies, and the implementation of a policy that encourages the development of a local bourgeoisie (which leads to growth of social inequality and a polarisation of political forces) is complicating solution of various aspects of the ethnic problems in those countries.

In those cases in which ethnic problems are posed particularly sharply and call for urgent solution, the link between the national question and radical social reforms is often denied and simply reduced to tribalism. The carrying out of a number of measures while maintaining capitalist relations and exploitation can therefore only mitigate but not get rid of the grounds on which antagonisms rise on an ethnic basis.

Some countries are trying to break away from economic dependence on foreign capital, having chosen a path of social liberation and the carrying out of progressive socio-economic and political reforms in the interests of the working people. In these countries capitalist development has only reached an early stage, and the path of social progress has some special features. It is described in the literature by the term 'non-capitalist development'.

There are many different points of view on what is meant by a 'non-capitalist' path. The most convincing seems to be that held in recent years by most Soviet researchers, that a non-capitalist path of development cannot be identified with socialism but must be considered a transitional period

in which only the preconditions for a subsequent transition to socialism are laid down.

The development of African countries that have made it their objective to by-pass capitalist development is taking place in conditions of general economic and cultural backwardness, and of a close intermingling of economic, social, and ideological structures inherent in the tribal-clan and patriarchal-feudal modes of production with rudiments of capitalism. The uncompleted processes of class formation, and the preservation of many institutions of the past, including the power of traditional rulers and the standards of tribal-clan morality—all these put an essential impress on the processes taking place in any particular country.

As a rule, socio-economic reforms of a general democratic and anti-capitalist character are being carried out in these countries—and it is a specific feature of the non-capitalist path of development—by semi-proletarian and non-proletarian elements in the absence of the leading role of the working class.

The absence of a bourgeoisie in many of the African states that are taking a non-capitalist road, and the numerical paucity of the proletariat lead to the main political force in them being the petty bourgeois intelligentsia, civilian and military. Their tendency to waver and change orientation to some extent explains the political instability in a number of these countries, the employment sometimes of nationalistic slogans to strengthen their position. One must also take into account the close link still maintained by states electing the non-capitalist road with the world capitalist market.

In this period the block of progressive social forces (in which the non-proletarian working masses predominate), represented in the political sphere mainly by the petty bourgeois intelligentsia—national revolutionary democrats—carries out general democratic reforms that take the socialist perspective into account.

The carrying out of far-reaching economic and social reforms by the governments of countries embarking on a non-capitalist road will facilitate the elimination of exploitation of man by man, tribal hostility, and friction and antagonisms on ethnic grounds.

In this period favourable conditions can be provided for resolving many problems, ethnic included.

It is quite comprehensible that the concrete solution of different ethnic problems depends on what road an African state is developing along, and on what classes and political parties are providing leadership in nation-building.

The objective circumstances for solving ethnic problems will seemingly be more favourable in those states that have adopted the objective of reconstructing African society by democratic methods relying on the broad popular masses, and in which the movement for economic independence and social progress is led by national democratic parties and organisations.

Each country has its own specifics and objectives associated with ethnic problems, which must naturally be resolved, it would seem, by taking their historical past and peculiarities of ethnic development into account. The experience of Tanzania and Guinea, while very important for the solution of ethnic problems, nevertheless cannot be automatically transferred to Nigeria, for example, or to Zaire. In contrast to Tanzania, it is hardly possible in Ghana, Nigeria, Zaire, and several other countries at the present time to ignore the ethnic factor either in working out a policy of economic development or in elections and appointments to party and state bodies. It is also hardly possible in the immediate future to introduce some African language in these countries as the general state language, since that would immediately cause complications between ethnic groups.

In some cases people who have lived for a long time in an atmosphere of mutual hostility and distrust need more fundamental guarantees of their interests than the formal proclamation of their equality.

The governments of African states are forced to cope with great difficulties in dealing with ethnic problems. An example is the question of language and language policy, on which many problems of nation-building hang, including such matters as elimination of the existing imbalance in the level of development of different peoples or the training of national cadres. Not a few complications also arise from the lack of correspondence of ethnic and political boundaries inherited from the colonial period, and the growth of tendencies in some countries leading to separatism and disintegration.

## Notes to Chapter Four

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165. See *The Ghanaian Times*, 9 October, 1967.
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172. See *West Africa*, 28 October, 1974, p. 1329.
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## Chapter Five. DIFFICULTIES IN DEALING WITH ETHNIC PROBLEMS

### 1. Discrepancies between Ethnic and Political Boundaries

African states have been formed with the boundaries established by the colonialists, frontiers that were drawn without account of ethnic, historical, geographical, and economic factors.

The political frontiers of Africa quite often run through territories inhabited by individual peoples, dividing them into several parts.

The problem of frontiers is so important for African states that the All-African People's Conference held in Accra in December 1958 passed a special resolution 'Frontiers, Boundaries, and Federations':<sup>1</sup>

The Conference: (a) denounces artificial frontiers drawn by imperialist powers to divide the peoples of Africa, particularly those which cut across ethnic groups and divide people of the same stock;

(b) calls for the abolition or adjustment of such frontiers at an early date.<sup>2</sup>

Reality, however, has demonstrated that this solution is quite unacceptable.

Experience of the evolution of African states since independence indicates that discrepancies between ethnic and political frontiers are the cause of many negative phenomena and create additional difficulties in dealing with many problems of political, economic, and cultural development. I have had occasion, for example, to study the problem of African languages in Niger. The Hausa live in Niger and Nigeria, but those in the Republic of Niger cannot use the extensive literature published in Hausa in neighbouring Nigeria because there—in an Anglophone country—its transcription differs from that in Francophone Niger. The government of Niger is faced with the job of setting up its own

publishing industry, which will naturally entail extra expenditure of effort and money.

The discrepancies between ethnic and political frontiers give rise to territorial disputes and disagreements. The border disputes and conflicts occurring between the various sovereign states in North, West, and East Africa are a cause of serious complications of diplomatic relations.

In the literature, both Soviet and other, the thesis is frequently and very persistently expressed that the political frontiers of Africa are hindering the processes of national consolidation. As an example, let us take three peoples, the Ewe, Bakongo, and Somali. If this proposition was correct in colonial times, it now requires a different approach as regards the main tasks facing African states.

The Ewe people, who number more than three million, are divided between Ghana, Togo, Benin, and Nigeria. For many years they have been demanding unification into a single national state.

The question of the unification of all Ewe has now become a contradiction between sovereign African states and has thus taken on a quite new meaning and can give rise to political complications of a diplomatic and domestic character. The slightest deterioration of relations between African states plays into the hands of the imperialists in the long run, since it weakens the united front of the African peoples in the struggle against imperialism.

After the Second World War certain Congolese leaders, like Joseph Kasavubu and the Abbé Fulbert Youlou, called for the creation of a Bakongo state. The Bakongo people, who number around three million with related peoples, live within the borders of several states (Zaire, Congo (Brazzaville), Gabon, and Angola). Already, in the fourteenth century, there was a powerful state among them. The memory of this past unity is still alive among the people. Reactionary neocolonial circles continue to use the slogan of a Bakongo state to foment ethnic conflicts and prevent the peoples of Zaire from eliminating the consequences of the internal political crisis that has bedevilled their struggle to consolidate national independence.

The Somali problem was unusually acute for many years. The Somali are divided by frontiers into four parts. They live in Somalia, Ethiopia, Kenya, and the Republic of Djibouti.

The Somali of Ethiopia regard unification with the Re-

public of Somalia in different ways. Most of them are not interested in unification for economic and political reasons, but some of the nomadic Somali are in favour of joining Somalia. These moods are inspired by certain political forces that are interested in fanning antagonisms and worsening relations between Ethiopia and Somalia. The policy of fomenting nationalistic feelings has led to an armed conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia in 1977-78.

For many years the Somali problem agitated Kenya. Somali live in part of the Northern Frontier Province of Kenya and according to the 1969 census number 250,000<sup>3</sup>. After the proclamation of Kenyan independence in 1963 some of them demanded unification with Somalia. There was no unity among the Somali themselves, however, some favouring unification and others being against.

Several conferences and meetings were sponsored by the Organisation of African Unity with the aim of settling Somali-Kenyan relations. Finally, in October 1967, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed in Arusha (Tanzania), which helped normalise relations between the governments of Kenya and Somalia.

The measures worked out by these two governments in accordance with the Memorandum took into account the traditional, centuries-old relations between the different Somali tribes living on both sides of the frontier, and the seasonal migration of the nomads associated with this. Steps were taken in both countries to modernise stock-raising and improve the well-being of the nomadic Somali population, and to draw them into the building of a new life.

The settlement of the Somali question between the governments of Kenya and Somalia shows that mutual understanding and co-operation between sovereign African states help overcome the heritage of colonialism in the shape of artificial boundaries in a way propitious to the future of the peoples.

These examples also show that attempts to follow the slogan of unification of peoples divided by state frontiers lead first of all to complications between sovereign African states and to aggravation of relations and conflicts between ethnic groups. Whereas the struggle for unification used to be an integral part of the struggle against the colonialists for national independence and the creation of sovereign states, now (in my view), in the new circumstances, with the existence of national states, the ethnic problems should

be resolved by political settlements within the existing boundaries.

The ethnic, economic, and political development of these countries could lead to the Ewe, for example, becoming a nation, as a form of ethnic community living in Ghana, without necessarily having their own state based exclusively on the ethnic principle. A democratic approach to solution of the national question presupposes the working out of policies based on the principle of equal rights for all the peoples in a given country. Consistent implementation of such policies will help all ethnic groups, whatever their level of development and numbers, to feel themselves equal citizens. As regards the basic Marxist principle of national policy, i.e., the right to self-determination, that too can be realised in the form of the state structure. In conditions of multi-ethnic states the creation of federations containing autonomous units that take account of the ethnic, linguistic, state, and other factors associated with their specific history and traditions, realisation in practice of the right to use the mother tongue and develop their own culture, and to take part in the management of state affairs—all that provides an opportunity of equal existence and harmonious development for all the peoples forming part of a united state.

As African statesmen and political leaders have said, the main tasks facing African states are consolidation of national independence and state sovereignty and struggle against colonialism and neocolonialism. Revision of political frontiers would only exacerbate existing difficulties and harm the unity of Africa.

The Conference of the Heads of Independent African States held in Addis Ababa in May 1963 paid much attention to the frontier problem. The political leaders of many countries speaking at the Conference supported the idea of maintaining existing political frontiers.<sup>4</sup>

A special subject of discussion in this connection was the complexity of the ethnic structure of most African states and the interaction of the different peoples, and the effect of political frontiers on the processes of ethnic development. Important principles were enunciated for dealing with ethnic problems.

In the view of many African statesmen and political leaders several countries would quite disappear from the map if ethnic, religious, or linguistic differences were taken as the criteria for drawing frontiers. At any definite mo-

ment of its history any state is an aggregate of different peoples, races, religions, or languages with the inevitable ethnic, religious, or linguistic minorities; these minorities have the right to exist and should be respected. Speakers emphasised that it was impossible and undesirable to modify the boundaries of African states because of their ethnic, religious, or linguistic differences. They suggested that the various peoples grouped within the present state frontiers could rapidly merge thanks to the accelerating influence of many factors, in particular the development of all forms of communication and culture.

The President of Senegal, Léopold Sedar Senghor, stressing the need for African unity, said:

I would remind you of the 'fanaticisms'—racial, linguistic, religious—of which we must rid ourselves for a start.<sup>5</sup>

He did not say, he continued, that ethnic, linguistic, and cultural differences should be wiped out—'that would impoverish us'—but that 'they will be brought into harmony tomorrow'.<sup>6</sup>

The former head of the Mali government, Modibo Keita, dwelt on the problem of nation-building in contemporary Africa from various ethnic elements. If they wanted to see ethnic unity in their nations, speaking one language and having one psychology, he said, they would not find a single true nation in Africa. Around ten different ethnic groups lived in Mali, who had to overcome their differences, in his view, in order to form the Republic of Mali.

But do we not have Songhai, who have found their way to Niger and elsewhere as a result of the great movements of humanity; do we not have Fulbe of all colours who have made their appearance, as a result of the processes of development of their societies, in Guinea in the north, in Cameroun, and in Nigeria? Well, if it were necessary to insist that the Republic of Mali, on the basis of the definition of a nation, should be composed essentially of Mandingo, of Fulbe, or Songhai, then we should have problems—and plenty of problems—with our neighbours.<sup>7</sup>

This must be taken into account, he insisted, in approaching the problem of frontiers.

These views of African statesmen of different political convictions are evidence that they had all come to the unanimous conclusion that it was necessary to respect existing political frontiers.

The Organisation of African Unity set up at this Conference proclaimed territorial integrity one of the basic principles of its Charter, Item 3 of Article 3 of which calls for

respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State and for its inalienable right to its independent existence.<sup>8</sup>

The OAU Charter calls on African states to settle disputes by peaceful means, through negotiation, mediation, conciliation, and arbitration (Article 3, Item 4).<sup>9</sup>

Certain reactionary circles, however, both in Africa itself and outside it, are trying not only to play on the antagonisms between ethnic groups but also to inspire armed border conflicts. There is no end to the 'theoretical justifications' of the need to revise frontiers (which has come to be called 'destructuralisation' in the literature). One of the main arguments advanced is the idea that existing frontiers allegedly prevent realisation of the principle of self-determination.

While progressive politicians in Africa are calling for the settlement of ethnic problems within existing frontiers and putting forward the principle of the equality of all peoples and the creation of real national unity as a main demand, reactionary, conservative forces are insisting on the redrawing of frontiers and the creation of states on an ethnic basis. Examples are the separatist strivings of the Baganda feudal class, who were demanding the secession of Buganda, and the plan for a Bakongo state put forward by Kasavubu and the Abbé Youlou, which we mentioned above.

In May 1968 an international symposium on the boundary problems of contemporary Africa was held in the Scandinavian Institute of African Studies in Uppsala (Sweden), in which specialists from various countries took part. The foreword to the report of its proceedings, *African Boundary Problems*, claimed that the symposium

was the first truly international conference on African boundaries since the Berlin Treaty Conference in 1884-85.<sup>10</sup>

Many concrete proposals were put forward at the symposium that could be useful in the practical activity of African organisations concerned with problems of socio-economic development, and application of which could facilitate a diminution and mitigation of the consequences of existing discrepancies between ethnic and political boundaries.

The Danish economist K. E. Svendsen, while putting forward convincing arguments to show that the political frontiers in Africa were serious obstacles to potential economic development, at the same time stressed that this was not at all a specific African phenomenon. In his view it would be more rational to recall the experience of other countries, especially European ones, when dealing with such complex problems, than to put such stress on the boundary problem.<sup>11</sup>

The English Africanist, Prof. Anthony Allott, a leading legal authority, emphasised the need to tackle boundary conflicts and problems as a whole, taking account of people's traditions and concepts of boundaries. African peoples, whether peasant farmers or pastoralists leading a nomadic way of life, in fact knew the territory belonging to their tribes. No arbitrary boundaries and administrative measures could alter the traditional way of life in a short period, above all people's consciousness, or force cattle-raisers to abandon the sequence of seasonal migrations handed down for centuries.

Prof. Allott concluded his paper by posing two questions. Supposing we were given a free hand to redraw the boundaries of the map of Africa today so that they would become natural and acceptable rather than artificial and arbitrary 'what on earth would the new map of Africa look like?'<sup>12</sup> And 'could one possibly achieve such a goal?' His question implied a negative answer.

Prof. Allott suggested that it was fruitless to discuss and try to show the artificiality of existing boundaries in Africa in present-day conditions, and to seek means to eliminate it. The best effect, in his view, would be achieved in each concrete case through the conclusion of inter-African conventions relating to a specific problem, for example, interterritorial migration or interterritorial taxes.<sup>13</sup>

The years since the symposium have demonstrated the enormous significance of uniting the efforts of African states to solve a number of important problems, including the settlement of boundary conflicts. We all know of the OAU's active role in settling the border conflicts between certain African countries and normalising the relations between them. Also known is its decisive stand in the settling of the Nigerian crisis, defending the principle of territorial integrity and condemning splitting activities of the Eastern Nigerian politicians. The OAU took the same stand in the Ethiopia-Somalia conflict in 1977.

Most African statesmen, political leaders, and specialists see the way out of the existing situation in a strengthening of economic co-operation between African countries.

Consistent application of the principle of territorial integrity enshrined in the OAU's Charter, and the settling of border disputes by peaceful negotiations, consolidation of existing tendencies to economic and cultural co-operation between the sovereign African states, all-round strengthening of African unity, and the active efforts of the OAU which symbolises this unity, equally with the carrying out of socio-economic reforms within each state—all can undoubtedly help weaken the negative phenomena that stem from the discrepancy between ethnic and political boundaries.

## 2. Self-Determination and Separatism

Self-determination and the creation of their own states is a particularly acute problem in a number of countries. It is an extremely complex matter and calls for careful analysis in each specific case. Let us consider some concrete examples.

For many years the Ewe people have been struggling for unification in a single state. The slogan of creating their own states has been put forward by the Bakongo living in Congo (Brazzaville), Zaire, Gabon, and Angola.

In Ghana the Ashanti feudal leaders were demanding the setting up of an Ashanti state on the eve of Ghanaian independence. Some politicians in the Volta Region, in which the majority of the population are Ewe, are continuing (according to the Western press) to hatch plans to secede from Ghana and join Togo.

In Congo (Kinshasa), now Zaire, the Katanga declared its secession in 1960, which did great harm to unity of the national forces and weakened the national liberation struggle against imperialism and neocolonialism.

Plans were matured to create an independent state of the Tuareg living in several West and North African countries. We have already mentioned the movement for autonomy or secession in the Southern Sudan and the setting up of an Azania state there.

In Nigeria, before the achievement of political independence, plans were put forward, and in some cases are still being pushed, to create new states on the ethnic basis. The Edo's demands led to the formation of the 'Mid-Western Region' in 1963. In 1967 political leaders in Eastern Nigeria declared their secession from the Federation. What tragic consequences that secession and formation of the 'Republic of Biafra' had for the country are well known.

Separatist uprisings of the Agni in the Ivory Coast, demanding the creation of their own Sanwi state, have also been reported.

In Dahomey (now Benin) certain political demagogues spread rumours about possible secession of the north during the March elections of 1970.

In Zambia forces interested in inciting and inflaming ethnic antagonisms and conflicts between the Bemba, Lozi, and other peoples, hatched plans for secession of the Lozi in Barotseland. In the eastern provinces, according to the South African press, there was a movement to separate from Zambia and form a Luangwa state.<sup>14</sup> Zambian statesmen linked these rumours with the splitting activity of imperialist powers.

Uganda has experienced no little difficulty in connection with intensification of the tribalist and separatist tendencies of the feudal classes of the former Kingdom of Buganda and their attempts to secede from Uganda in 1966.

Some years ago the tribal-clan leaders of the Masai (who number a little more than 200,000 and live in Kenya and northern Tanzania) demanded secession and the formation of their own state.

In February 1969 an anti-government conspiracy was uncovered in Guinea. The conspirators' activity was aimed not only at overthrowing the existing regime but also, according to the then Minister of Economics of the Republic of Guinea, Ismail Touré, at separating the Labe area (in the north) from the rest of the country.

The Eritrean problem (in Ethiopia) is extremely acute.

The peoples of Namibia and Rhodesia are struggling for independence and liberation from colonial domination.

The outwardly similar calls to struggle for the creation of their own states in each of the examples cited above have a different content and hidden motives in each of them. In some it is a genuine struggle for liberation and realisation

of the right of peoples to self-determination, in others it is a manifestation of separatist frames of mind.

When analysing the movement to set up specific states or autonomous entities, it is important to note another circumstance. In the struggle against tribalism, which manifests itself in a striving for separation, the governments of African states are forced to rely on other peoples. In Uganda, for example, the Ohote government, in fighting against the separatism of the feudal and bourgeois elements of Buganda, relied on the Acholi, Lango, and other ethnic groups. Thus there was the paradoxical situation that the struggle against separatist tendencies, which was aimed at consolidating national unity, led to a strengthening of anti-Buganda attitudes. In Kenya the government opposed secession of the Somali living in the northern areas, relying on other peoples of the country. These tendencies are extremely dangerous because they can lead in time to the development of a certain ethnic stereotype and reinforce ethnic prejudices, and later from that to the rise of conflict situations that can end in armed clashes. As many African leaders have affirmed, mass educational work to explain the government's policy must therefore play a major role. A positive example of this is Nigeria. The Federal Military Government constantly stressed in the worst days of the war against Biafra that it was not a war against the Ibo as a people, because the Ibo were equal citizens of the country and their return to the Federation would be welcomed by everyone.

When studying the various movements in any African country aimed at secession and the creation of a separate state, one must obviously bear a number of factors in mind. In some cases these movements are closely linked with ethnic processes and can be taken as evidence of growing national self-consciousness, when the boundaries drawn by the colonialists and disrupting the unity of the ethnic organism act as a brake on the drive to national consolidation.

In other cases the drive for secession and the formation of a separate state is due to motives of a political order, when the slogan of self-determination is employed by the rising national bourgeoisie (Biafra and the Katanga) or by feudal circles (Buganda).

Finally, the slogan of self-determination is often put into circulation by neocolonialist circles in order to rein-

force their positions, and by nationalistic leaders in inner-party struggles, especially during elections to legislative bodies.

It must be stressed in particular that these movements are not narrowly local but involve a whole set of problems, internal and international, between states. The Ewe people's movement for unification, as we know, has caused serious complications between Ghana and Togo, and the Somali problem is affecting relations between Somalia, Ethiopia, and Kenya.

The struggle of any one people for self-determination is also linked, moreover, with relations between various states outside Africa and becomes an international problem.

The principle of the self-determination of nations is unquestionably vital to a solution of the national question in the context of existing national states. The principle, as developed by Russian Marxists, led by Lenin, is a cornerstone of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine on the national question. It means recognition of the right of every people, irrespective of its numbers and level of socio-economic and ethnic development, to determine its political and economic status independently, and to solve its own problems, up to and including the formation of an independent state.

In connection with the events in Nigeria of 1967-70 and the fight of the Nigerian people against secessionist Biafra many articles on the problem of self-determination appeared in the Western press. It was often understood very one-sidedly, simply as secession. But the principle is much broader; it may be realised in the form either of federative relations or of relations based on autonomy, full unification, and so on.

The principle of self-determination is the political and juridical basis for the solution of international, constitutional, social, and national problems. It has two aspects—external and internal. By external self-determination is meant, in Marxist literature, the fight against relics of colonialism and neocolonialism and the achievement of state sovereignty; the solution of national and territorial problems of an international character, in other words the struggle for a just settlement of relations with neighbouring states and peoples. By the internal aspect is meant the right of each people to determine its own social and state system, freely to dispose of its own resources, to struggle for economic and

social liberation, to provide conditions for the development of all the peoples within the state and eliminate ethnic antagonisms.<sup>15</sup> These two aspects of self-determination are integrally linked.

The principle poses problems not only of the formal (legal) equality of peoples but also of achieving real equality in level of socio-economic and cultural development. The right to self-determination and to independent decision of its fate belongs to any people, irrespective of its size or level of ethnic and socio-economic development. One must not, however, confuse the right of self-determination in principle, including secession and the formation of independent states, and the practical desirability of secession or even of the granting of autonomy in any concrete case. Secession does not always by any means correspond to the real interests of one people or another. The breaking up of Africa into a host of small, economically weak states is already proving a real brake on its social and economic development. Realisation of the principle of self-determination on an ethnic basis in forms intensifying break-up could only aggravate existing difficulties in present circumstances and lead to further 'balkanisation' of the continent. It is far from a matter of indifference to the peoples of Africa who is employing self-determination. In many cases it may be enlisted into the service only of neocolonialist forces interested in the existence of petty, economically and politically weak states.

The character of the self-determination of African states, which has not come out in the same way as in the history of West European states, has had a great effect on the national question. In Africa it is not nations that have been self-determined, since such still have not been formed, but the peoples of colonial administrative units formed historically in the period of colonial rule and united by the liberation struggle. This has led to interethnic antagonisms, which were relegated to the background by the national liberation struggle, sometimes becoming more acute after independence. But revision of the political map of Africa is not a realistic solution.

The Organisation of African Unity made respect for the frontiers existing at the gaining of independence a basic principle of its activity.

The view that the principle of self-determination of nations cannot be applied to peoples who once enjoyed it in



the past and who created their own states is motivated by considerations of fighting separatism. It is asserted that 'encouraging of self-determination', and its use by imperialist powers, can lead to break up of the new states and to 'balkanisation' of Africa. And in fact that danger is not excluded. But the experience of history is that it is not necessary, in order to combat separatism, to reject the principle of self-determination; on the contrary, it is necessary to observe it consistently.

The Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1970, emphasises that the principle of self-determination should not

be construed as authorising or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States *conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples ... and thus possessed of a government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed or colour*<sup>16</sup> (Emphasis mine—RNI).

The principle of self-determination of peoples is therefore one of the basic principles of the whole system of present-day international relations, observation of which is obligatory everywhere and always. Only on that condition is national and full social liberation of peoples possible, given the maintenance of world peace.

The goal of the principle of self-determination is not the break-up of states, not the estrangement of peoples, but their rapprochement, the establishment of relations of friendship and co-operation between them. Secession and the formation of independent states is an extreme measure, only to be resorted to when it is impossible or extremely difficult to establish friendly relations between peoples.

Recognition of the political undesirability of the secession of one people or another is not equivalent to denial of the principle of self-determination, because the latter can be realised in various ways. The unitary state, confederation, federation, autonomy—all these are different forms of self-determination. Furthermore, it does not mean *a priori* recognition of the legitimacy of military suppression of the striving of a people to secede. That kind of action can lead to

serious aggravation of interethnic relations in African conditions, and so cannot yield a stable, long-term solution of the problem.

African peoples have the right to independent determination of their future, and in exceptional cases, where maintenance of a single state becomes impossible, they can secede on the basis of that right. The main and determining condition for that is always the objectives of the common struggle for social liberation.

## Notes to Chapter Five

1. For the text of the resolution see R. Theobald (Ed.), *The New Nations of West Africa*, N. Y., 1960, pp. 149-52.
2. *Ibid.*, pp. 151-52.
3. *Kenya Population Census, 1969*, Nairobi, 1970, Vol. 1, p. 69.
4. *Addis Ababa Summit, 1963*, p. 72.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 72.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 73.
7. *Ibid.*, pp. 63-64.
8. *Ibid.*, *The Charter of the Organisation of African Unity*, p. 95.
9. *Ibid.*
10. C. G. Widstrand (Ed.), *African Boundary Problems*, Uppsala, 1969, p. 8.
11. K. E. Svendsen, *The Economics of the Boundaries in West, Central, and East Africa*. In: C. G. Widstrand (Ed.). *Op. cit.*, p. 37.
12. Anthony Allott, *Boundaries and the Law in Africa*. In: C. G. Widstrand (Ed.). *Op. cit.*, p. 21.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 20.
14. See the *Johannesburg Star*, 8 February, 1968.
15. For further details of the international and socio-legal problems of self-determination see G. B. Starushenko, *Nation and State in Liberated Countries*, Moscow, 1967 (in Russian).
16. United Nations. Resolution No. 2625 (XXV), 1970, p. 124.

## Chapter Six. The Interaction of National and Social Factors

Often, when considering the interaction of the national and the social, authors dealing with the Third World have only one aspect of it in mind, namely, the national liberation movement of peoples to create national states, and their struggle against the external enemy, imperialism.

The development of national states and their economic and cultural progress are in fact irreconcilably opposed to the interests of imperialism. Hence it is obvious that the winning of political independence and the creation of national statehood do not mean the end of the national liberation struggle against imperialism.

The fight for real independence is nation-wide, but not all classes and strata have the same interests in it, above all in the fight against the dominant influence of imperialist monopolies. Thus there are not only national elements in every consistent anti-imperialist struggle of peoples but also social elements, and that inevitably leads to a differentiation of social interests and a different understanding of the objectives of decolonisation.

The positions of the various classes and social strata in this struggle are not constant. They may be transformed through the effect of both internal and external factors. A shift in the national anti-imperialist front reflects deep-seated social processes taking place in African countries.

The popular masses are no longer willing to be satisfied simply with liberation from colonial slavery. They are striving both for social and national liberation. In several countries the struggle for national liberation from foreign domination has grown into a struggle against exploiter relations, both feudal and capitalist.

The main conclusion to be drawn from this is that solution of the tasks of national liberation and decolonisation in the broad sense are integrally linked with the tackling of

social objectives. Social reforms and shifts are exerting a varied influence on national development.

In one case this influence is direct, in another indirect. Thus a higher standard of education affects the tenacity of ethnic prejudices. They become less stereotyped and are more quickly eradicated, which in turn has an effect on the improvement of interethnic relations. So the preconditions are laid for intensifying integrational processes.

Or take another problem, that of bilingualism and multilingualism. The development of economic and socio-economic reforms, and the strengthening of contacts leads to rapid spread of the major languages and a gradual elimination of linguistic splintering. And that in turn promotes a diminution and the elimination of tribal exclusiveness and is reflected in ethnic processes propitious to the forming of bigger ethnic communities, which may be converted in time into a nation or nations, depending on the specific circumstances.

There is a close link between the character and the level of national processes and social factors, and national integration largely depends on the economic system prevailing in the country and the social and class differentiation of society.

The effect of social shifts on national development, furthermore, is felt not only in ethnic processes but also in the methods and forms of tackling the national question as a whole.

The principles of national policy depend on what road a given state is developing along—capitalist or socialist. In the first case they will reflect the interests of the exploiting classes and strata of society or the interests of the dominant nation, and will be counterposed to those of the oppressed nations and ethnic groups. In the other case, under socialism, national policy will express the aspiration of the workers of the formerly oppressed peoples to put an end to exploitation and national oppression. So the routes for solving the national problem—the ways of eliminating intertribal strife, the moulding of friendly relations between the different peoples living in the state, and the help for economically and culturally backward peoples—will be different in the one case and the other.

National policy in turn can promote the achievement of economic independence and the carrying out of far-reaching social reforms or, on the contrary, can block these processes.

In recent years more attention has been paid to the ethnic problems in most African states, and the previous ignoring of them is giving way more and more to an understanding that the national question plays a vital role in socio-economic development. In some cases, however, there is both an underestimation of the significance of ethnic problems and a narrow conception of them—a reducing of the complicated set of these problems to intertribal hostility and, more important still, to a denial of the link between ethnic problems and the socio-economic transformation of society.

There are certain theories and conceptions, moreover, that are complicating both study and solution of the ethnic problems of African states.

One reason for many of the negative phenomena, in particular for tribal hostility, is rooted in colonialism and its heritage. At the same time there are internal causes, as is shown by the fact that ethnic problems have not only not disappeared in African states since independence but have become much sharper in many countries in recent times. The processes of the breakdown of communal-tribal structures, and of national consolidation and integration, are very contradictory; and alongside them there has been a strengthening in some countries of separatist tendencies and frames of mind.

As we have already remarked, the accent, in explaining many of the difficulties of Africa today, is still frequently put on the artificiality of existing boundaries, drawn in their time by the colonial authorities, and on discrepancies between ethnic and political frontiers. They, of course, have a certain significance but the real basis of many of the ethnic conflicts is not arbitrary boundaries but a whole complex of social, economic, and political problems.

The nature and essence of the ethnic conflicts is often masked. The reasons for intertribal and inter-nationality hostility are often seen only in the machinations of imperialist powers, the eyes being closed to the fact that the seeds of intertribal dissension sown in fact by the imperialists fell on fertile soil. This approach considerably complicates disclosure of the roots of existing ethnic antagonisms and prevents their rapid eradication.

There is yet another point of view. Some African leaders and bourgeois political scientists reduce all difficulties to ethnic problems, denying the existence of class struggle, and on the quiet substituting intertribal struggle for it. Even

such complicated events as the Congolese and Nigerian crises were regarded solely as the result of the hostility of ethnic groups.

Researchers sometimes overestimate the rates of national processes and of the forming of nations. The degree of detribalisation is exaggerated, i.e., the weakening of the feeling of belonging to some one ethnic group. It is mistakenly asserted that the development of industry and urbanisation are leading to the breakdown of tribal structures and elimination of tribal isolation. But study of the specific material shows that these problems are much more complicated and that it would be more correct to speak of the duality and contradictory character of ethnic processes. Alongside detribalisation we often encounter diametrically opposite phenomena, namely, a strengthening of the feeling of belonging to one's tribe, a growth of tribal particularism, and so on. In Nigeria, for example, where intense ethnic processes are going on one can speak of the forming of nations among several of the peoples, among the Ibo, who have reached a high level of socio-economic and ethnic development, a return to tribal names was observed during the internal political crisis of 1966-70. Whereas all Ibo considered themselves a single people before the January 1966 coup and did not call themselves anything except Ibo in the census of 1952-53, and the later ones of 1962 and 1963, they began to call themselves Ngwa, Ika, Awka, and so on, during the years of the struggle against Biafra, i.e., by the names of tribes and ethnographic groups.

Some authors interpret the effect of urbanisation and migration on ethnic development in a one-sided and simplified way, it being commonly held that these influences always lead to detribalisation.

Mass migrations of population and the working together of peoples of different ethnic affiliation in one and the same undertaking in cities undoubtedly encourage the breaking down of tribal structures and activate ethnic processes. But migration cannot be considered, from the aspect of its links with ethnic processes, simply as a mechanical process of the mixing of different tribes and of rapid mutual assimilation. Everything depends on the concrete conditions and decades-old traditions. It is one thing when a few people come from one district to find work (as a rule they quickly adapt themselves to the alien environment and in time may become completely assimilated), and quite another thing when such

a group is rather numerous. In that case, as research in different African countries has shown, the migrants prefer to settle together and to some extent preserve ethnic features inherent in their way of life in their homeland and a certain specific character in their social organisations (striking examples can be found in the work of Rouch,<sup>1</sup> Skinner,<sup>2</sup> and others). In several cases the migrants are forced to cling together by the not always benevolent attitude of the local population and by fear of conflicts arising. Not only does this position not lead to detribalisation but on the contrary it intensifies ethnic self-awareness and the feeling of belonging to one's people, not to mention ethnic prejudices and biases.

At the same time, given favourable contacts with the local population, there will obviously be bigger chances both for eliminating tribal isolationism and for forming a broad outlook and adopting new ideas and ways of life.

In Upper Volta, for example, a quarter of a million men annually leave the country and go to neighbouring states, mainly to Ghana and the Ivory Coast.<sup>3</sup> Most of the migrants work on farms but many acquire new trades—operating machines in agriculture, lumbering, mining, and the service industries. All that naturally broadens their outlook and makes for a less stereotyped way of thinking. But when they return home, most of them cannot find application there of the knowledge or trades they have acquired. Their social status is again lowered, which evokes a corresponding psychological reaction. The most active and dynamic of the returned migrants leave the country again, often for a longer period, so weakening their ethnic links even more and acquiring a capacity to adapt rapidly to an alien ethnic environment.

With time some of the returned migrants settle in more economically developed areas, forming a trained proletariat. The transition from the peasant estate to the ranks of the working class radically alters people's consciousness. This is a normal way in which the effect of socio-economic factors on communal-tribal links makes for a breakdown of tribal structures.

Joint work encourages at any rate a considerable weakening if not the disappearance of ethnic prejudices and creates favourable conditions for the gradual moulding of national self-awareness.

The dual and contradictory character of ethnic processes, and the close intermingling of elements of detribalisation

and a heightened sense of belonging to a definite ethnic group must be kept in view when characterising the national situation in towns. One cannot agree with those research workers who consider that people break with their tribal life on coming to the cities, and become detribalised. The existence of strong tribal unions and associations of fellow-countrymen in a number of places quite convincingly refutes this point of view.

Detribalisation is a very complex phenomenon. Different writers mean different things by it. Generally they look on it as the breakdown of communal-tribal structures and a loss of tribal awareness. Some people, like Prof. Max Gluckman,<sup>4</sup> assert that a person who has lauded up in a town and become isolated from his ethnic environment does not become detribalised but on the contrary lives there only with fellow-tribesmen and so strengthens his communal-tribal ties. P. C. Lloyd, an English sociologist who has worked for more than fifteen years in Nigeria, considers that urbanisation does not disrupt tribal solidarity and that tribalism is largely its product. He is convinced that tribalism will increase as the economy is modernised.<sup>5</sup>

One must bear in mind the hierarchical character of consciousness, when analysing these complex processes. Immanuel Wallerstein is right when he considers that three different levels of loyalty are confused in analysis: loyalty to family, loyalty to tribe, and loyalty to the tribal ruler, i.e., the local chief.<sup>6</sup> When speaking of detribalisation, therefore, one generally has weakening of the authority of the local traditional rulers in mind. But a man by no means breaks with his community or his ethnic group while having ceased to be subject to the chief of the tribe. He is a member of this group as before, and has certain obligations in respect to his fellow-tribesmen, just as he himself enjoys certain rights sanctioned by the standards of his community's ways. In principle the social processes that operate rather more rapidly in cities should lead to a change of ethnic consciousness, but that depends on the specific conditions. Work in big industrial undertakings or mines, for instance, where members of different peoples are employed, can weaken the feeling of isolation of ethnic groups, given normal interrelationships, but elements of discrimination, even very insignificant ones, or the domination of some one people, can reinforce narrow ethnic self-awareness and a striving to seek the support of one's fellow-tribesmen.

Ethnic organisations in cities are frequently not simply associations of fellow-countrymen but something like a community or extended family. People are united not simply by ethnic ties but also by ties of blood relationship. Such associations have been mentioned by European Africanists in Lagos (P. Marris), Brazzaville (G. Balandier), and elsewhere.<sup>7</sup> And although the new generation is already oppressed by communal customs and striving to separate off into small families, the bonds and moral standards of the extended family are still significant in African cities.

The shifts taking place in the community sometimes lead to the rise of organisations of a new type, not even on an ethnic basis. A kind of closed industrial or trading association of entrepreneurs of one ethnic community may be formed. Examples are the Union of Fishtraders and the Consumer Goods Traders' Union existing in Sekou-Takoradi (Ghana).<sup>8</sup>

One must note yet another, one might say psychological, phenomenon when analysing the ethnic processes in cities. In some cases the new townsman who belongs to a numerically small ethnic group considers it expedient to attach himself to a more numerous (generally related) one. The French social scientist Paul Mercier, for example, writes that some Lobu in Dakar prefer to be considered Wolof, who constitute the majority of the population.<sup>9</sup>

In the town of Thiès, an industrial centre in Senegal, Savonnet, another French researcher, noted that Khasonke, Sarakole, and other Mandé-speaking peoples, and even Mossi, who belong to quite another linguistic family, preferred to call themselves Bambara because the latter were considered more developed.<sup>10</sup>

In Accra many traders prefer to be considered Hausa,<sup>11</sup> and in Abidjan—Dioula. This gives them certain advantages, above all a guarantee of protection and a chance of settling in the corresponding ethnic quarters. Research workers have noticed that these people also frequently espouse Islam.<sup>12</sup> This is, in fact, mutual assimilation.

New interethnic ties arise in the city, but that does not mean that the townsman immediately breaks with his own ethnic group. The interaction and mutual penetration of the different cultures encourages the development of natural processes of integration. With time the social shifts may accelerate detribalisation, blotting out ethnic self-aware-

ness and inculcating a feeling of belonging to a wider national community.

Of course, the attitude of various social strata to the processes of national integration is very different. The clan elite often occupy a conservative, isolationist position; the bourgeoisie and urban middle classes in the mass pragmatically make use of either the mutual attraction or the distrust of ethnic groups. Only the working class (and this is confirmed by the experience of other countries) is the incarnation of interethnic solidarity in the process of the rapprochement of peoples. And although it is still small in numbers in African countries, it brings a new, integrating ideology, differing radically from tribal isolationism and separatism.

Tribal-communal ties are preserved at various levels both among the common people and in the upper crust of society. Their significance in these cases, however, is not the same. The reason for their preservation and even reinforcement is often to be found in the political instability and economic difficulties that force a person coming to a city or into an alien rural environment to seek support among his fellow-tribesmen. The tenacity of tribalism in the higher echelons of the social hierarchy is due to tribal ties being used by certain circles as an instrument for political purposes, generally in the struggle for power.

The activities of political parties, trade unions, sports and cultural organisations that unite members of different ethnic origin unquestionably lead to a breaking down of tribal isolation and stimulate the process of national integration.

The reactionary features of nationalism do much harm to ethnic development and a proper solution of the national question. Accentuation of uniqueness, admiration of the peculiarities and special features proper to some one ethnic group, the cultivation of customs and traditional ways and moral standards associated with the institutions of tribal-clan society, engender a feeling of the superiority of 'ours' over 'theirs' and mould ethnic prejudices. By inciting tribal particularism and nationalistic frames of mind in this way nationalism creates favourable soil for separatism. These of its features also stimulate the development of conservative tendencies leading to the isolation of peoples and states. At bottom this nationalism puts national interests above social ones and passes off the interests of narrow class groups as the interests of the whole people.

There are great differences of opinion among social scientists and African politicians and public figures on how to accelerate the integration of ethnically varied populations and to put an end to the tribal isolation and ethnic discord that are so dangerous to political stability. The issue of ethnic affiliations is sharply debated, there being two diametrically opposite points of view. These were distinctly expressed at the international symposium in Bouake (Ivory Coast) in 1962.<sup>13</sup> The supporters of one view asserted that there should be a decisive abandonment of tribal self-awareness, which they thought would speed up integration of the different ethnic groups and create national unity. In some countries the use of ethnic names and appellations has even been banned and people are supposed to call themselves solely by the name of their country.

Representatives of the other view suggested that the existence of many peoples within one country should not be denied, and that every person belonged to a definite ethnic group. This view was held in particular by Sékou Touré, the President of Guinea, Dr. Julius Nyerere, the President of Tanzania, President Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya, and others.

In his programmatic article setting forth the principles for dealing with the national question in the Republic of Guinea, 'Ethnic Groups, the Party, and the National Question', Sékou Touré has emphasised that

the best form of combating ethnic exclusivism should not consist in a pure and simple negating of *ethnos* that well and truly exist, or in the use of repression of any kind. The best form of struggle against ethnic exclusivism would be to take into consideration the conditions of existence and flourishing of each *ethnos* through the development, consolidation, and even greater prosperity of the whole national community.<sup>14</sup>

President Kenyatta of Kenya shares a similar view. As we noted above, he not only has never denied the existence of different ethnic groups in Kenya but, on the contrary, stresses that every man has the right to take a pride and interest in his people—its history, its culture, and its customs.<sup>15</sup> At the same time he emphasises that every man must think and act as a citizen of his country, irrespective of differences of tribe or race.<sup>16</sup>

Some years ago Klineberg and Zavalloni made a study of the relations of ethnic and national self-awareness among African students in Uganda, Congo (Kinshasa)—now Zaire, Senegal, Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Ghana. Analysis of their



questionnaires led them to the conclusion that certain ethnic groups in each of these countries displayed a greater predilection for a trihal orientation than others. This orientation, which showed itself in choice of friends, a preference for one's own ethnic group, and so on, proved to be most marked among the Ganda in Uganda, the Kongo in Zaire, the Ashanti in Ghana, and the Yoruba in Nigeria.<sup>17</sup>

Ethnic affiliation was more important to members of these peoples than belonging to a wider national community.

As for national affiliation, 50 per cent of the students from the Congo (Zaire), 50 per cent from Uganda, 47 per cent from Senegal, but only 14 per cent from Ethiopia, identified themselves as 'I am an African'.<sup>18</sup> The country of origin (e.g., 'I am a Nigerian') was stressed by 72 per cent of those replying from the Congo (Zaire), 68 per cent from Uganda, 57 per cent from Ghana, 53 per cent from Ethiopia, 48 per cent from Nigeria, and 40 per cent from Senegal, while those naming their own ethnic group were 50 per cent among those questioned in Ghana, 46 per cent in Uganda, 38 per cent in Nigeria, 36 per cent in the Congo, 26 per cent in Senegal, and 18 per cent in Ethiopia.

Ethnic affiliation is not an abstraction; it is really counterposed to the conception of one nation adopted by a number of African governments. The working out of the principles of a national policy depends on what sense integration is understood in, and that means the attitude to the problem of ethnic minorities and national languages, to the programme for bridging the gap in level of economic, social, and cultural development, and to problems of the state's administrative and territorial structure, and so on.

Supporters of the conception of a united nation assert that there can be only one nation within the state-political boundaries, absorbing the many ethnic groups of the country. It is not excluded that a single nation will take shape in some countries in Tropical Africa, but at the present stage of social and economic development this conception is not based on any ethnic processes taking place in any one specific country, with the exception of the uni-ethnic Somali Republic.

In contemporary conditions two main trends of ethnic development are to be observed in African countries:

a) consolidation of separate ethnic communities and the transformation of some of them into nations, and

b) interethnic integration within the state.

The carrying out of a democratic policy in respect to ethnic problems and efforts aimed at rallying an ethnically and linguistically diverse population in certain countries may lead to increasing tendencies to approximation of different *ethnos*. The strengthening of economic and cultural ties between different races that accompanies migration will lead in time to a breakdown of the territorial isolation of the different ethnic groups, to a reinforcing of interethnic contacts in various spheres of life, to a growing number of mixed marriages, and so on, all of which will gradually lead to approximation in the ethnic sphere.

The socio-economic and political changes in liberated countries are making for an intensification of ethnic processes. Trends of ethnic development are determined to quite an extent by consolidating and integrating processes leading to the formation of bigger ethnic communities. This natural trend is being encouraged in most states. At the same time one must not ignore the fact that the polarisation of political forces in a number of countries in Tropical Africa, and the use made of the ideology of tribal separatism by conservative, reactionary elements, and their reliance on existing relict states and survivals of the archaic social organisation of the old tribal-clan society are leading to a deepening of the contradictory character and duality of ethnic processes, and to a struggle between the forces of national unity and those of isolationism and tribalism.

The specific historical circumstances existing in any one African country condition the different variants of national development. In some countries they may lead to the formation of a single ethnic community on the basis of the different ethnic components of the state (all of them or the main ones); in others they may develop several different communities, including nations (and in Nigeria for example they are already doing so).

It is still premature to speak of a single ethnic complex in many countries in Tropical Africa. One can suppose that the differences existing between peoples will gradually be wiped out with time, but in the immediate future in Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Uganda, and Zaire, and several other countries, ethnic development will seemingly follow the path of a consolidation and further development of the present major ethnic communities, and an intensification of their assimilation of smaller groups.

At the same time the aggregate of historical, ethnic, socio-economic and political factors is encouraging the formation of a single ethno-political structure in countries like Guinea, Mali, and Tanzania.

While the slogan of a united nation helped rally the peoples of one country or another against the external enemy, i.e., colonialism and imperialism, during the struggle for political independence the concept sometimes leads to negative results in the new stage of development, when it is necessary to resolve internal problems, some of them extremely acute. One of these results, at best, is to underestimate, and at worst to ignore, the interests of separate peoples, especially national minorities. Such a policy causes great complications and can cause even greater ones.

Any going too fast and proclaiming of the united nation when several ethno-social communities are taking shape, harms both theoretical study of ethnic problems and practical solution of the national question in contemporary African states.

Some social scientists suggest that the army can play the role of an integrating force in African society. But the events of recent years in many African countries do not confirm that view. At the same time the ethnic factor plays no little role even among the military. Normal relations are not always built up in the army between members of the various ethnic groups, even of those belonging to the same linguistic family, let alone between say Nilots and Bantu.

Let us take the events in Uganda as an example. In July 1973 the press reported a strengthening of ethnic antagonisms in the army in May and June 1973. The *London Observer* noted the existence in particular of disagreements between Kakwa soldiers (the ethnic group to which General Idi Amin, the President of Uganda, belongs) and the more numerous Lugbara. Almost all the Lugbara were removed from posts of command, including the officer commanding the Air Force. According to the *Observer* there had been a conspiracy by Lugbara officers to overthrow General Amin.

Other observers have said that the main force making it possible to realise the slogan of national integration is the educated elite in African states.<sup>19</sup> They consider that these top people, while linked by origin with their ethnic group and the social structures belonging to that group, and preserving close ties with the traditional structures, are yet at the same time separated from them by virtue of their

education and social status and have an interest in developing contacts with their fellows of other ethnic groups. This combination of vertical ties (within their own ethnic group) and horizontal ones embracing the ethnic groups of the whole country, ensures the elite (in the view of these social scientists) the role of champions of national integration.

In spite of the host of existing conceptions and points of view on specific questions affecting the ethnic development of African peoples, many western concepts have the following in common:

1) a tendency to reduce them simply to tribalism, understood in a very narrow sense, solely as intertribal hostility; and

2) a denying of links between the national question and the socio-economic development of society. Hence the search for the essence and sources of ethnic conflicts in people's psychology, and the attempts to explain ethnic prejudices simply by peculiarities of the individual psyche (theories of frustration, projection, authoritarian personality, and so on).

While ethnic communities exist, so too will national interests. Ethnic nihilism and disdain for the needs of the different peoples when deciding and carrying out programmes of economic and cultural development, can not only do as great harm to interethnic relations as reactionary forms of nationalism and chauvinism, but can also retard the movement for social and national liberation.

The interaction of social and national factors is marked by great diversity and a multivariant character, and depends on many things—the level of development of peoples, historical heritage, the forms and methods of colonial policy before independence, specific features and the general social climate in present-day conditions of independence.

There are certain stable dependencies between social development and national relations. A change in the social structure of ethnic groups; the interdependence of the individual's social status and his ethnic orientation, language, and culture; the activation of linguistic processes and spread of bilingualism and multilingualism; the superseding of ethnic interests by social ones—all these processes are having their effect on national relations in the various social groups of a population.

With that we must also remember that national relations always depend on socio-economic relations and are governed by them. Progressive changes in the structure of

social ties within ethnic communities certainly promote the processes bringing the standard of economic and cultural development of various nations and nationalities closer together.

The absence in many cases of sound statistics and ethno-sociological field data still does not permit us to explain many aspects of the problem of the relation of social and national factors in African countries. In particular, it does not allow us to analyse the interaction of the social and occupational structure of the urban and rural population and the ethnic structure of various types of settlement.

The problem of the relation of social and national factors at the present stage of development of African states is beginning to interest African social scientists and public figures. They are moreover beginning to link the problem of ethnic development with class interests. Thus J. A. Juma, in an article devoted to the development of class society in independent Kenya, writes of the petty bourgeoisie that it is the most conservative class, whose awareness is loaded down with religious and ethnic prejudices, ignorance and greed. The petty bourgeoisie, Juma thinks, has grown during the years of independence and is now becoming, in collaboration with the expatriate bourgeoisie, the influential force in the country.<sup>20</sup>

National relations are making themselves felt in various spheres of African public life—economic, political, social, and cultural. They are not only governed by socio-economic and political laws and patterns but also reflect psychological features. Their psychological aspects, moreover, are vital in people's attitudes to representatives of other peoples.

Interpersonal national attitudes are manifested in national orientations and tendencies, and in people's everyday behaviour. By national attitudes Soviet social scientists mean the system of precepts by which people apprehend situations and act in inter-nationality contacts. By precepts we mean here 'readiness to act' in such-and-such a social situation.

By national tendencies we have in mind a person's tendency to such-and-such a behaviour in a concrete situation in national contacts at work, in the home, and so on. People's national tendencies are affected by a complex set of objective and subjective factors: general conditions, determined by the economic, social and political situation in the country; the specific circumstances of the person's life, such as place of residence, ethnic micro-environment (including

the work group), personal characteristics (class origin, outlook, sense of values, individual experience of social and professional activity, and so on).<sup>21</sup>

To understand the ethnic situation in African countries it would also be important to study such national tendencies as attitude to inter-nationality contacts in work groups, attitude to leadership by another ethnic group, family contacts (e.g., mixed marriages), to personal friendly relations. But such material can only be obtained in field conditions. The data in foreign publications on this theme are not only extremely scanty but as a rule relate to the colonial period.

A comparative description of various ethnic groups by socio-economic, socio-political, cultural and psychological, and welfare indicators would help clarify the roots of positive and negative inter-nationality tendencies, precepts, and principles, and the causes of interethnic hostility and conflicts.

Many people studying social and ethno-linguistic processes in different countries have concluded, for instance, that there is a close link between a positive tendency in inter-nationality attitudes and bilingualism. Although bilingualism does not directly influence the character of inter-nationality attitudes, it is nevertheless an important factor positively influencing such contacts and attitudes and is capable of weakening and sometimes of eliminating ethnic prejudices.

In our day, when there is an active process of socio-economic and cultural change, the way of life even of the more backward ethnic groups in a country is gradually changing. But the equalising of standards of development is a slow process, especially when it is not reinforced by appropriate state measures, and ethnic stereotypes and prejudices continue to exist and affect relations between one people and another.

The American author Otto Klineberg defines the stereotype as a 'stereographic' characteristic of a whole group, whether national, religious, or racial.<sup>22</sup>

The results of the sociological study carried out at Ibadan University in 1965 by Klineberg and Marisa Zavalloni are interesting. Analysis of their questionnaires indicated the existence of a certain stable ethnic stereotype.<sup>23</sup>

Ibo, for example, thought of their people as characteris-

tically 'hard-working, dynamic, industrious, enterprising' (57 per cent of those questioned), 'hospitable, friendly, sociable' (13 per cent), 'democratic, liberal, crave fair play' (11 per cent), 'superior culture, traditions, artistic values' (7 per cent), 'courageous, fearless, spirit of adventure' (4 per cent).

Members of other Nigerian ethnic groups questioned named the following positive features of the Ibo: 'hard-working, enterprising, energetic, industrious' (50 per cent), 'intelligent, imaginative' (50 per cent), 'patriotic, liberal, egalitarian society' (45 per cent), 'progressive' (15 per cent), 'co-operative, friendly' (15 per cent).

Most of the members of other groups questioned, however, named the following as negative features of the Ibo: 'aggressive, like to dominate' (40 per cent), 'ethnocentric, tribalistic, parochial' (37 per cent), 'selfish' (28 per cent).

Most Yoruba questioned considered their ethnic group to have 'superior culture, education, tradition, most civilized' (46 per cent), and to be 'hospitable, friendly, generous' (19 per cent), 'honest' (9 per cent), 'enterprising, hard-working, industrious, progressive' (8 per cent), 'intelligent, reasonable' (7 per cent), 'democratic, liberal' (5 per cent).

Members of other Nigerian ethnic groups considered the following to be positive features of the Yoruba: 'friendly, considerate' (32 per cent), 'superior in culture, traditional music, quite civilized' (21 per cent), 'progressive' (16 per cent), and 'liberal, peace-loving' (10 per cent).

At the same time the majority in other groups questioned seemed to distrust the Yoruba and have a negative attitude to them.

As for the third biggest people of Nigeria, the Hausa, the members of other Nigerian groups questioned considered their positive features as 'honest, frank, truthful, plain dealing, not greedy' (30 per cent); then followed 'liberal, traditionally socialist, not ethnocentric' (24 per cent), 'friendly, hospitable, kind, gentle, sociable, tolerant' (20 per cent), 'simple, carefree, good, humble, unselfish' (8 per cent), 'open-minded, conscientious, non-materialist' (8 per cent), 'superiority in culture' (8 per cent), 'easy-going' (8 per cent), and 'generous' (6 per cent).

But nearly half of the other Nigeria groups questioned thought the following to be negative qualities in the Hausa: 'conservative, unprogressive, primitive, traditionalistic, not

educated, reactionary, religious' (57 per cent), 'feudalistic, undemocratic' (20 per cent), and so on.

One may or may not agree with the authors' questionnaire findings, considering their sample not to be representative on the whole in view of the small number of respondents involved as regards both ethnic affiliation (the majority were Ibo, Yoruba, and Hausa) and social origin (students). Nevertheless the figures adduced help to understand ethnic interrelationships from the angle both of existing ethnic stereotypes and of social psychology.

Klineborg and Zavalloni's findings from questionnaires probing interethnic attitudes in other countries are also interesting. These attitudes were considered good or satisfactory by 18 per cent of those questioned in Ethiopia, 6 per cent in Uganda, 4 per cent in Congo (Zaire), 23 per cent in Ghana, 38 per cent in Senegal.<sup>24</sup> It is worth noting that not one Nigerian answered this positively (the survey was made not long before the civil war).

The following variant of answer 'there are some disagreements between ethnic groups but situation is improving' was underlined by 29 per cent in Ethiopia, 4 per cent in Uganda, 17 per cent in Congo, 33 per cent in Ghana, 24 per cent in Senegal, and none in Nigeria.<sup>25</sup>

Finally, the variant 'serious intergroup tensions exist' was selected by 30 per cent in Ethiopia, 69 per cent in Uganda, 60 per cent in Congo, 92 per cent in Nigeria, 22 per cent in Ghana, and 23 per cent in Senegal.<sup>26</sup>

Two reasons were cited for complicated interethnic relations—'politics' and 'tribal favouritism'. More Nigerians questioned (38 per cent), and Ugandians (24 per cent) and Congolese (19 per cent) cited politics as the main cause, but only 2 per cent of the Senegalese and 2 per cent of the Ethiopians gave that answer. Students in Ethiopia, Ghana, and Uganda mostly considered the source of interethnic tensions to be tribal favouritism—Ethiopia (33 per cent), Uganda (22 per cent), Nigeria (17 per cent), Ghana (37 per cent), but Congo only 3 per cent, and Senegal 2 per cent.<sup>27</sup>

The most characteristic feature of interethnic attitudes in Nigeria, compared with the other countries, Klineborg and Zavalloni considered to be conflicts and rivalry between groups of roughly the same level of development, and not antagonisms linked with superiority and inferiority complexes.

The terms most used to describe relations between ethnic groups in the completed questionnaires were 'rivalry', 'jealousy', 'distrust', and so on.

The enquiry brought out points of view as regards attitudes both to traditional structures, the role of ethnic self-awareness, and the ideology of tribalism and to the processes of national integration. We shall cite a few of the most characteristic expressions met in the questionnaires.

I have been brought up to regard my tribe (Yoruba) as the most superior tribe in Nigeria.<sup>28</sup>

I think that the gap between ethnic groups in my country today is getting wider than it was a few years ago. Now, even the younger generation is becoming more and more aware of tribal consciousness. This, I think, is caused by political parties which seem to base their propaganda on tribalism (answer of an Ibo).<sup>29</sup>

Many directly accused politicians of creating an atmosphere of estrangement between ethnic groups. It was emphasised that interethnic relations among the common people were normal and that the ideology of tribalism was consciously propagated by certain political circles.

The relations look somewhat strained, but I strongly feel that this is just the handiwork of ambitious, selfish politicians. To an average Nigerian, there is nothing like tribal hatred (answer of an Ibo).<sup>30</sup>

That point of view was shared by members of other peoples, including ethnic minorities. An Urhobo respondent, for example, also accused politicians of worsening interethnic relations and said:

The uneducated, simple people live well together with little ethnic consciousness.<sup>31</sup>

It must be emphasised that some of those replying linked national attitudes directly with social factors and considered that the class interests of the bourgeoisie underlay interethnic conflicts.

Interethnic attitudes are greatly complicated by the surviving ethnic stratification of society. However differently it is manifested in one country or another, ethnic stratification everywhere reinforces tribal seclusion and makes national integration and consolidation difficult.

Ethnic stratification shows itself in there being separate ethnic groups in a number of countries that prove on the whole, for historical reasons, to be at relatively lower levels

of socio-economic development. That does not give grounds for thinking that people from these groups are less capable, yet there are such incorrect ideas, nevertheless, about some of the peoples in the north and east of Zaire, about the Azande, for example, or about the Nilotic peoples of the Southern Sudan, about the ethnic groups living in the south-west of Ethiopia, about the Dogon in Mali, and about many peoples in central Nigeria.

How unsubstantiated such views are can be seen from the example of ideas that have grown up among the Kanuri in Nigeria. In Kanuri society there is a well-ordered ethnic gradation. The main categories distinguished are:

(1) those highly considered—Europeans, Hausa, Arab Shuwa, and the Kanuri themselves (some Kanuri put their ethnic group first);

(2) a middle category of peoples who, though Muslims, are considered to be of a lower social status than those in the first category (Fulani, Yoruba, Babur, Bolewa, Kanem-bu, Mandara, and Tubu); finally,

(3) the lowest category includes certain so-called pagan Cameroon tribes, the Tiv, and the Tuareg.<sup>32</sup> The reasons for this gradation are various. A common Muslim faith and the wide dissemination of Hausa and Arabic have long enabled friendly contacts to be established between the Kanuri, Hausa, and Shuwa Arabs. That is why they occupy such a high position on the ethnic scale. At the same time such Cameroon peoples as the Banana and Gwoza, and certain peoples of central Nigeria, who were long used in Kanuri society as slaves, are still considered low in status in it.

In Freetown (Sierra Leone), according to Michael Banton, there are gradations of the population on religious and ethnic grounds.<sup>33</sup>

According to Nguyen Van Chi-Bonnardel there is also an ethnic hierarchy in Senegal, which he illustrates by the position in a small urban settlement, the important fishing centre of Kayar, north of Dakar. Wolof constitute the majority in this village but the most influential people in the local administration are Lebu, who hold first place in its ethnic hierarchy.<sup>34</sup> It is the Lebu who, in Chi-Bonnardel's view, have the most developed feelings of independence and pride, and who cling most zealously to their traditional institutions. They adopted Islam later than the Wolof, and it has not fully replaced the old traditional beliefs and cults in their life.

Apart from the Wolof and Lebu, Serer, Tukolor, and Fulbe live in Kayar. There are also a few Moors, who live an extremely secluded life and do not mix with the other ethnic groups, negroid in origin.

Between the Wolof, Lebu, and Serer there have long been close contacts and quite a few mixed marriages, and in our day it is not easy to find a 'pure' Lebu or a 'pure' Wolof, yet ethnic particularism is very tenacious in Senegal<sup>35</sup>. And in the ethnic hierarchy of Kayar the Lebu occupy first place.

In most cases the initial cause of ethnic estrangement may be a different level of economic, social, political, and cultural development of the communities. But today certain social and political circles gamble on the historical differences, erecting them into absolutes.

Differences in living conditions and economic imbalances have led to the social structure of various ethnic communities (including emerging nations) being at different levels of development. The uncompleted character of the processes of class formation has led to the existence of transitional types of social ties and to intermediate strata. This applies in particular to the urban population. That is why social heterogeneity is common to the emerging classes in Africa, a heterogeneity determined by the existence of substantial survivals of tribal-clan and feudal structures.

The variety of ways of life and social foundations of African society leave a distinct imprint both on the level and rates of ethnic processes.

Alongside the differences stemming from the existence of various modes of production in the social structures of the ethnic communities of present-day African society, the traditional occupations of one ethnic group or other have a vital significance. Ethnic trades or occupations are rooted in the peculiarities of the division of labour in the distant past. An example is the existence of artisan castes in various countries in Africa and surviving attitudes to certain kinds of work as humiliating and contemptible occupation.<sup>36</sup>

Survivals of the old social stratification are still preserved among certain African peoples—more among some and less among others. One of these is the institution of domestic or patriarchal slavery. Even in our day the descendants of slaves are customarily treated as people of a 'lower order' in many countries, a circumstance that has a definite effect on both social and ethnic attitudes.

The Wolof of the Senegambia region and the Bachama of Northern Nigeria are societies that possess both castes and slavery. Elsewhere, as among the Azande of Northern Congo and Southern Sudan, slavery coexisted with ethnic stratification.<sup>37</sup>

In appraising the significance of the ethnic factor and traditional structures in Senegal Chi-Bonnardel notes on the one hand that there is a hierarchy among the different ethnic groups, and on the other hand an intensification of the problem of caste, which he documents on the basis of his study of the position in the fishing centre of Kayar.<sup>38</sup> In spite of the intensive mixing of the population, the old social barriers based on a division of society into castes is strongly felt in the village. On the lowest rung of the social ladder is the former estate of slaves. They are fewer in Kayar than in other parts of Senegal, and they work mainly as servants. Next come the customarily despised castes of artisan specialists—jewelers, smiths, shoemakers, joiners (*laobe*) and witch-doctor, (*griot*)—singers. The members of castes only have the right to marry within their caste, intermarriage being allowed only between the castes of *griots* and shoemakers. Between jewelers, joiners, and slaves marriage is forbidden; even if a jeweler gave up his trade and became a slave, he was considered a member of his caste just the same and obliged to conform with the existing moral norms. These traditions are regularly observed in Senegalese society.<sup>39</sup> Time has not yet made essential changes.

Another vivid example of the effect of caste structure on interethnic relations is Rwanda and Burundi.<sup>40</sup>

The population of Rwanda is divided into three groups differing from each other both ethnically and in social and political status, namely Tutsi, Hutu, and Twa. The Tutsi, Nilotic in origin and cattle-raisers by their main occupation, have occupied a dominant position in society although they constitute only 15-20 per cent of the population. The Hutu, a Bantu people, constitute more than 80 per cent of the population. Their main occupation is agriculture (hoe-cultivation). By tradition the Hutu peasants took care of cattle belonging to the Tutsi and were feudally dependent on them. The Twa are a pygmoid people, and probably number little more than 1 per cent of the population. They were once exclusively hunters, but the dwindling of game has forced them to engage in crafts and to hire themselves out for work. Many have begun to work on Tutsi farms,



The ethnic stereotype which developed in Rwanda and Burundi over a long time still affects interethnic relations. The French anthropologist Prof. Jacques Maquet writes that Tutsi were said to be intelligent, ... capable of command, refined, courageous; ... Hutu, hardworking, ... extrovert, ... obedient, physically strong; Twa, ... loyal to their Tutsi masters, ... courageous when hunting, without any restraint.<sup>41</sup>

By tradition it is still considered that these qualities were given to people by nature, and that no power can alter them. Tho Hutu and Twa, it goes without saying, have their own estimate of the Tutsi and their other neighbours.

Although all these groups are closely interlinked economically and speak the same language Kinyarwanda, each of them until not so long ago was strictly endogamous and intermarriage between, say, a Hutu and a Tutsi, was exceptional. In a case of intermarriage the future of the children was decided by the social status of the father. Thus, if a feudal Tutsi gave a rich vassal Hutu a Tutsi girl, their children were considered as Tutsi, but if an ordinary Hutu married a Tutsi girl, who for some reason or other had been unable to find a Tutsi husband, their children would be considered as Hutu. If an important Tutsi married a Hutu girl, the children would become Tutsi, but if a Hutu woman married a poor Tutsi, then the children of the marriage would be considered as Hutu.<sup>42</sup>

Such marriages between members of different castes, however, were extremely rare. Each of the three groups—Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa—lived in isolation and as a result of segregation formed three sub-cultures in Rwanda society. The prosperous Tutsi, being traditionally much higher in status than the Hutu, and even more so than the Twa, have tried to maintain this segregation, while the Hutu, naturally, are striving to put an end to it. What is at bottom social protest often takes the form of an interethnic struggle, since it has been directed against the dominant Tutsi group as a whole. Tho Tutsi clan nobility, who have their own special position in society, have striven more and more to subordinate the Hutu to their authority. Conflicts between Hutu and Tutsi have often taken the character of open hostility and have been accompanied with mass murders. In short, property inequality, exploitation, and the estate-class division combined with a caste system have led to an extremely com-

plicated intertwining of social and ethnic components in Rwanda and Burundi.

Among the Nyoro people (in Uganda) a division of the people into three categories, each of which occupies a strictly defined social position, is still preserved: the Bito, the ruling group; the Huma, owners of cattle; and the Iru, the main mass of agriculturalists. Historically established custom has it that the Bito 'are born to rule' and the Iru 'born to be ruled'.<sup>43</sup> The Huma cattle-raisers look down haughtily on the peasant Iru. In olden times marriage between Huma and Iru was forbidden just as it also was between Bito and Iru.

The American anthropologist Melvin Perlman, who has studied social relations in these population groups, concluded that the ruling Bito stratum considered itself an hereditary aristocracy and that it was more pronouncedly class-conscious than, for example, the ruling estate in Buganda. The senior chiefs of the Nyoro (Banyoro), he says, 'were of Bito or Huma origin', estates which he characterises as 'ethnic classes'.<sup>44</sup>

It may be supposed in this case that the social factor is actually superimposed on an ethnic one: the majority of the population are Bantu-speaking, while the royal Bito clan traces its origin from Nilots.

Among the Galla living in the Harar Province of Ethiopia there are two endogamous groups of hereditary specialists—the *lumtu* or blacksmiths (whose wives are potters), and the *watta* or hunters (who are considered to have magical powers).<sup>45</sup>

Among the Somali three groups are distinguished: blacksmiths, and two groups of hunters, who also do leather work.<sup>46</sup>

Among the Gurage all artisans or occupational specialists are known collectively as *fuga*.<sup>47</sup>

The members of all these groups, estates, or castes are considered unclear or impure. The ordinary members of the community do not marry them. They are not permitted to enter the houses of other fellow-tribesmen and thus desecrate them by their presence. If a *fuga* did this to a Gurage, 'the homestead must be ritually cleansed'.<sup>48</sup> *Fuga* are also forbidden to handle farm implements and to deal with cattle. Other people must not eat food prepared by artisans or hunters. There is a deep-rooted idea that members of this estate possess the 'evil eye' and are linked with dark pow-

ers. They are not allowed to own land or to take part in the political life of society. Among the Galla, for example, 'the smiths and hunters were barred from participation in the important assemblies'.<sup>49</sup>

In order to ease the position of the low castes in society somewhat, their members put themselves under the protection of the most powerful nobles.

Social scientists have long disputed the nature of the artisan castes of Ethiopia and Somalia. Some consider them remnants of earlier inhabitants of the region. But H. S. Lewis thinks this hypothesis 'has no reasonable linguistic, cultural, or physical evidence to support it'.<sup>50</sup> It would be more logical, he thinks, to look at them as a distinctive division of labour, a system of production and distribution of goods and services which demand special skills and training.<sup>51</sup>

Among many African peoples there are no signs of a caste system but certain trades are considered very low and sometimes even shameful. In a number of areas the artisan is not an equal member of society. When the same work is done by members of another ethnic group, ethnic prejudices relegate them to a low social status, reinforcing their alienation, with all the consequences flowing from that. Among the Kanuri, for example, the following occupations are considered 'shameful': hutchers, blacksmiths, tanners, barbers, petty brokers, moneylenders, and drummer-entertainers.<sup>52</sup>

Thus, in addition to existing classes or the new classes and strata that are taking shape, the social stratification of African society is complicated by the existence of traditional estates, castes, and occupational groups, age grades or classes, secret unions, and so on, all of which make the processes of consolidation very difficult, not to mention that a stratified society with such internal conflicts and those between the Hutu and Tutsi does not in general lend itself to interethnic integration.

In cities in which members of various ethnic groups live, many categories of the traditional society survive, such as, for example, nobility of birth. Among many peoples, we know, there are chiefs of various ranks and other nobles, honorific titles, and so on. These marks of rank mainly have significance within such-and-such an ethnic group. People from the clan elite therefore orient themselves in cities primarily on their ethnic group. This inevitably leads to their posing as the guardians of traditional institutions and customs that often do not correspond at all to the needs of the

present day. Chiefs are often recognised as the official representatives of their ethnic group, which leads to its further consolidation. The tribal unions existing in the cities also encourage this.

Tribal unions and associations of fellow-countrymen help their fellow-tribesmen find work, help the sick and disabled, arrange family celebrations and funerals, settle disputes and conflicts. Rites and customs, and the norms of tribal ways and ethics are observed through the tribal unions in towns. The changes taking place in society since political independence have introduced new elements into the activity of tribal unions. Whereas members of the traditional nobility used to occupy a privileged position in these unions, they have been forced to admit representatives of the new classes and strata of society into their leadership, in particular the bourgeoisie and intelligentsia. Closer ties have been established with the town authorities and leading politicians, especially in small towns. The heads and leading members of other tribal unions and ethnic organisations are invited to celebrations or ceremonies of various kinds organised by one union or another. The American social scientist, Leonard Plotnicov, who studied the social situation in Jos (Nigeria), noted that the traditional ethnic leaders strictly control the behaviour of their fellow-tribesmen so that the ethnic group will not acquire a bad name or be discriminated against. He writes that tribal union halls in Jos may be provided to other ethnic groups for meetings and so on.

Many of the traditional elite with themselves set examples of peaceful interaction with other tribesmen. For instance, a Christian sends gifts of food on Muslim holy days to his Hausa neighbors.<sup>53</sup>

Traditional leaders participate in the work of the municipality and other town institutions, which

strengthens their leadership within their own ethnic groups, for it demonstrates that outsiders recognise their prominence.<sup>54</sup>

Ethnic particularism is also encouraged by the system of the settling of people in towns and big villages established in colonial times. In many African towns the peopling of quarters has an ethnic character, the members of one ethnic group preferring to settle together. In Ghana the quarters where people from other areas live are called *zongo*, in Northern Nigeria *sabon gari* (meaning 'new town' in Hausa).

In a developed industrial town like Jos in Nigeria, which is a comparatively new town founded at the beginning of the First World War, and in which there are none of the centuries-old traditions typical of the old urban centres of Nigeria and other African countries, there is a special district for new arrivals. Artisans belonging to ethnic groups not encountered in Northern Nigeria settle in this part of the town, while North Nigerians live almost exclusively in the other part of the town. Newly arrived immigrants usually settle in the quarters of their own or related ethnic groups. Since independence, it is true, there has been a tendency among southerners to settle in the so-called native part of the town, populated by northerners, but the events of 1966-70 put a stop to this process.

The preservation of ethnic quarters encourages ethnic and cultural isolation, and even harbours dangerous germs of conflict. The existence of *sabon gari* in Nigeria, for instance, (in the view of the Nigerian social scientist G. O. Ofusanya) is preventing the approximation of northerners and southerners.

Modern urbanisation is inevitably accompanied with radical changes in the occupational structure of the population. Economic development and the rise of new industries are opening up a broad field for the whole population in all spheres of economic, political, and cultural life. There is a significant speeding up of social processes. Many occupations that were only open to Europeans in the past are now being increasingly taken over by Africans, though this is proceeding very unevenly and in a contradictory manner.

There was a higher degree of literacy and more people trained for work as civil servants, clerical employees of private companies, teachers, and so on, among certain ethnic groups, due to a combination of many factors of a political and socio-economic character brought into being in the colonial period. In a number of areas, therefore, for example in Northern Nigeria where the majority of the local population was illiterate, many responsible jobs were held by Ibo coming from the eastern region of the country; in Uganda this role was filled by Baganda, in Kenya by Kikuyu and partly by Luo, in Senegal by Wolof, on the Ivory Coast by Baule, and so on.

Individual Africans who had adopted Christianity and received a European education took part in the opening up of outlying areas. They settled down in the out-back as un-

desirable alien elements. The members of the community also distrusted the traders of other ethnic groups who bought up raw materials for foreign firms. On the whole relations between the local population and alien minorities did not always take a favourable shape. As a rule the language barrier and differences of customs and morals deepened social estrangement and made contacts difficult even in favourable circumstances.

Special research (unfortunately still very limited) indicates that personal contacts between people of different ethnic origin are now more often made in African towns and are easily formed in industry and in the public and political sphere. In everyday intercourse, too, contacts are primarily determined by the social position of the family, standard of education, mastery of the languages of inter-folk intercourse, including European languages; and no small role is also played by the ethnic medium and religious affiliation. Some ethnic groups (e.g., Hausa, Yoruba, Ibo, Kikuyu, and others) have a greater degree of openness (in the view of some scholars) and make contacts comparatively easily with other ethnic elements. Others, on the contrary, are more introvert. They prevent active inter-ethnic contacts and preserve the standards of traditional African society.

Observations have shown that interethnic contacts are most developed among the intelligentsia, and primarily among the students and lecturers of universities and other higher educational establishments. There such factors as their comparative youth (all are people under 45) may be significant, and also the raising of the cultural and educational standards of families in recent decades.

In contrast to the traditionalists who are oriented on their own ethnic groups and tribal territories, the modern intelligentsia easily establishes interethnic contacts through friendships and professional ties. Plotnicov cites as an example the clubs and masonic societies in Jos that have a mixed membership. It is no longer community of origin that unites them although a feeling of ethnic affiliation is preserved, but community of professional, cultural, and other interests. The new ties also help movement up the social ladder. In Plotnicov's view the African intelligentsia cannot be said to be completely detribalised;<sup>55</sup> educated people maintain their ethnic links, are proud of their people's past, and follow the progress of their fellow-tribesmen. They

take an active part in the activities of tribal unions and, as a rule, precisely because of their devotion to the interests of their people, enjoy the respect of fellow-tribesmen. In dealings with the traditional chiefs of the tribe they demonstrate their deep respect and try to uphold, if only outwardly, the norms of traditional tribal ways.

If the social and occupation structure in towns is becoming more complicated, many of the old forms of social ties are preserved, however, in the rural areas of Africa. The gulf between town and country in this respect is very marked.

The contemporary African peasantry is already far from being a uniform, homogeneous mass; it includes, in addition to the mass of the members of communes, well-to-do farmers, farm labourers, 'middle' farmers, members of peasant co-operatives, and agricultural workers, who in turn are divided between the public and the private sectors. Even the members of communes are far from homogeneous: among them there are groups of feudally bound peasants, groups linked with the social institutions of tribal-clan society, various categories of village artisans, so-called slaves and their descendants, and so on. The development of commodity-money relations is leading to further differentiation of the peasantry.

The social processes taking place among the peasantry cannot help affecting ethnic processes as well. The intensifying of social mobility and emigration (which has a mass character in some countries) is gradually bringing about transformation of the old structures, a broadening of the peasants' outlook, a strengthening of personal contacts with members of other ethnic groups, and on the whole a considerable activation of ethnic processes.

The increasing social mobility is also promoting integrative processes in the field of culture. In this respect the spread of bilingualism (and in some countries of multilingualism) has a special role.

It is not, however, simply a matter of change in the functional load of the languages of intercourse and a strengthening of interethnic connections. Extension of the sphere of activity of the languages of broad intercourse is leading to an exchange of experience, a raising of general educational standards and vocational training, and a diminution of stereotyped thinking. New class connections restrict ethnic self-awareness and weaken ethnic prejudices. Opportunities arise for a more intensive and purposeful mastering of the cultural values created by other peoples.

Mastering of the language of interethnic intercourse creates additional opportunities for public activity, and assimilation of the wealth of social thought.

The scale of bilingualism and the degree of mastery of a second language differ in the various social groups and depend on economic, political, ethnographic, psychological, and other factors. In a uniform ethnolinguistic environment, for instance, bilingualism spreads less than in a non-homogeneous one. The working together of men speaking different languages, in other words the ethnic micro-environment, has a cardinal effect on the spread of bilingualism, and in some cases of multilingualism. The socio-economic reforms being carried out by the state in rural areas with a complex ethnic structure are having no less an effect on the level of development of bilingualism, and perhaps an even greater one.

When speaking of the processes of bilingualism, social scientists distinguish between two different trends in the spread of languages of inter-nationality intercourse—extensive and intensive. The extensive process, i.e., the spread of bilingualism in breadth, affects rural areas more, while the intensive process spreads mainly in an urban environment.

The social development of the countryside, the complication of the social and occupational structure of the rural population, the rise in general educational standards and the mastering of new methods of farming, and the intensification of migration, unquestionably promote the rise and further spread of bilingualism and multilingualism, and so a deepening of integrative processes.

The more complex the ethnic micro-environment, the more active are the contacts of people speaking different languages, and the greater are the opportunities for exchange of different kinds of information and for the reception of, or simply acquaintance with, elements of other cultures in the broad sense of the term.

In African cities, in which the social and occupation structure is more complex and multistratal than in rural areas, the various ethnic components interact immediately at different levels, both horizontally and vertically, drawing not only the members of different ethnic groups into the processes but also different classes and social strata.

The growing demand for the languages of interethnic intercourse, above all for the development of social production and political life, leads to the ever wider spread of lan-

guages like Swahili, Hausa, Wolof, and also of English and French.

The requirements of economic exchange will always compel the nationalities living in one state (as long as they wish to live together) to study the language of the majority,

Lenin wrote on the language question.<sup>56</sup>

The new socio-political situation and the intensified mixing of population are encouraging mutual adaptation and the wide spread of languages of inter-communal intercourse and a strengthening of interethnic contacts, all of which has a very direct bearing on ethnic processes and leads to a deepening of integrative processes.

In towns, of course, where the socio-ethnic structure is more complex and the opportunity of inter-communal contacts greater than in rural localities, integrative processes involve the different strata of the population as regards both ethnic and socio-occupational relations.

At the same time religious barriers and the absence of a single system of social and moral standards greatly complicate the eradication of tribal exclusiveness. The lack of intensive interethnic intercourse makes it impossible to create grounds for integrative processes as regards social psychology and culture. And that in turn retards the processes of national integration on a countrywide scale.

The various levels of socio-economic development of ethnic communities and the different character of the dominant antagonistic relations in them prevent the formation of a homogeneous social structure over the whole country, and not only prevent the coming together of these communities but also lead to a complicating of inter-community relations.

The main reason for inter-communal friction in African countries is the unresolved character of socio-economic problems. Social conflicts often assume an ethnic form, aggravating the ethnic problems. The clash of interests of exploiting elements belonging to different ethnic groups—for example the struggle of the Fanti and Ewe urban middle classes against the Ashanti clan elite in Ghana, the Ibo and Yoruba bourgeoisie against feudals of the north in Nigeria, and of feudal-patriarchal Baganda elements against the central government in Uganda—leads to ethnic differences being brought to the fore and what is essentially a social struggle being cloaked in the forms of ethnic conflict. The manifestations of chauvinism in capitals and the local activity of

tribalists sharpen ethnic relations in the same way and hinder national integration.

The complexity of ethnic problems can prove a cause of tension in some African countries, although class antagonisms are coming more and more prominently to the fore. The unevenness in socio-economic development of the geographical regions of Africa is leading to one ethnic community being in a more advantageous position than others living on the periphery (accessibility of information, commodity exchange, and wage labour). The deepening of class contradictions can lead to a strengthening of the antagonisms between different ethnic groups, antagonisms that are fomented by pro-bourgeois circles.

The social shifts taking place in African countries through economic development since political independence, and the transformation of the traditional social structures through the effect of political reforms and education, are thus fostering an intensification of ethnic processes and the formation of large ethnic and ethno-political communities that will sooner or later become nations, depending on the concrete historical conditions.

At the same time one must not ignore the fact that the polarisation of political forces in several countries in Tropical Africa, and the use being made of the ideology of tribal separatism by conservative estates and class groups, and their reliance on surviving relics of archaic tribal-clan organisation, can lead to a sharpening of the struggle of the forces of national unity against isolationism and tribalism. One must recognise that an intensification of ethnic particularism is sometimes observed in social consciousness as well as a breaking down of tribal structure. Alongside the unifying trends and processes of the forming of nations there is separatism, the social nature of which is now linked with the interests of the mercantile and industrial circles of various ethnic communities as well as with the old ethnic divisions.

A special role played by the constitutional superstructure in ethnic development is a feature of the integrative processes in present-day Africa. The state usually operates as a factor uniting different ethnic groups into a bigger community. The direction of the ethnic process largely depends on the national policy of governments—whether it will lead to the formation of a single community or will build up several communities within the state boundaries. The

state can promote, or on the contrary hinder, the coming together of ethnic groups.

In most of the liberated countries of Africa the official political doctrine and ideological banner is nationalism, but nationalism is understood differently by the various strata of society. The class orientation of governments predetermines the forms and content of national policy at each specific state of each country's historical evolution. Depending on the path of economic and political development chosen by the ruling circles, either the progressive anti-imperialist aspects of the state's ideological doctrine or its reactionary, chauvinistic features are brought to the fore.

Activisation of the processes of class formation, polarisation of social forces, and the sharpening of class contradictions in connection with the need to tackle the tasks of social reconstruction will inevitably lead to a dissociation of the vectors of ideas of national integration, the content of which will more and more be determined by the balance of socio-political forces within the state.

The revolutionary democratic parties and other progressive forces are relying on the anti-imperialist, general democratic content of national unity and are striving to link it with radical socio-economic reforms of the society emerging from a colonial environment. Explanation of the aims and objectives facing the country as a whole and calls for unity are at the same time important ideological means of combating separatism and tribal factionalism. In that sense nationalism with an anti-colonial content objectively furthers the development of national self-awareness and the processes of ethnic integration. It also has a certain positive effect on intensifying processes of economic integration.

The national bourgeoisie operates quite differently, employing nationalist ideas to strengthen its own position. It may cloak its policy with general national aims, and support consolidation of internal state unity, suppressing minorities and exploiting backward areas. In fact even positive general political trends often mask social elements. The struggle against Indians, Lebanese, and other alien traders for the evolution of local capital and the Africanisation of businesses is nothing other than a manifestation of the social interests of the bourgeoisie, who are using (and will continue to use) nationalist moods for their own ends so as to guarantee themselves a field of economic and political activity. The slogan of national unity is supported by the bour-

geoisie so as to disguise the contradiction of social interests. It gives the bourgeoisie a chance of passing the nation off as a monolithic entity in which there is no class struggle, in this way demonstrating a community of interests of exploiting classes and working people.

The conception of a monolithic African society is the basis for ideological action against the popular masses; it gives the protest movement against the colonial and neo-colonial policies of imperialism (which is at bottom progressive) not so much a social character as a nationalist one.

Conceptions of the exclusiveness and absolute distinctiveness of African peoples objectively foster estrangement and the development of new forms of ethnic prejudice, i.e., of distrust and sometimes of hostility to all non-Africans. That kind of view lies at the source of disruptive ideological trends that neocolonialists readily support.

In several African countries there is not only 'country' nationalism but also the nationalism of certain ethnic groups. When analysing the events of 1966-70 in Nigeria, for example, one can obviously speak of the nationalism of the Ibo, Yoruba, and so on. In Kenya there is the nationalism of the Kikuyu, Luo, and other peoples. This nationalism at bottom puts ethnic interests above social ones.

A special feature of social development in the liberated countries of Tropical Africa is that not one of the existing classes and social strata has yet been able, without a broad, firm alliance with all anti-imperialist forces, as a consequence of the lack of evolution of class structures, to ensure political stability and to carry out the tasks of eliminating backwardness and achieving economic independence. On the one hand, there is already a living, democratic, anti-imperialist content in nationalism among the masses, while the amorphism of the bourgeoisie in most West African countries, on the other hand, has not yet led to crystallisation of the negative essence of nationalism. One must apparently seek an explanation of the popularity and wide dissemination of basically nationalist theories of 'African socialism' in this, together with the surviving effect of ethnic consciousness.

Either the negative or the positive features may come to the fore in nationalism depending on the path of economic and social development chosen.

When evaluating such a complex phenomenon as nationalism we must remember that the term 'nationalism'



itself has acquired a broad meaning in Western and especially in African literature: it stands for the people's struggle for national independence against colonialists and neocolonialists.

Some African statesmen take just such a nationalist stand when tackling ethnic problems and uniting the peoples of their countries in cultural, economic, and political affairs. In countries like Zaire, nationalism is basically a state programme of national integration.

In other countries the ideology of nationalism is employed to inculcate civic consciousness and patriotism, but with raising of the level of socio-economic development nationalist ideas are being displaced by the class consciousness of the working people.

One must remember Lenin's warning against an abstract approach to 'nationalism in general'. Lenin distinguished between the nationalism of the dominant nation, aimed at oppressing other nations, and the nationalism of the oppressed nation, which had two aspects, namely a democratic, anti-imperialist tendency directed toward liberation from alien oppression, and a conservative tendency, which was manifested in a counterposing of its nations to others, and in a striving to cater for its interests at the expense of other peoples. At different stages of development the progressive tendency might now be uppermost in the nationalism of an oppressed nation, and now the conservative tendency. Speaking of the link between nationalism and capitalism, Lenin wrote in his article 'Critical Remarks on the National Question':

Developing capitalism knows two historical tendencies in the national question. The first is the awakening of national life and national movements, the struggle against all national oppression, and the creation of national states. The second is the development and growing frequency of international intercourse in every form, the breakdown of national barriers, the creation of the international unity of capital, of economic life in general, of politics, science, etc.

Both tendencies are a universal law of capitalism. The former predominates in the beginning of its development, the latter characterises a mature capitalism that is moving towards its transformation into a socialist society.<sup>57</sup>

Both these tendencies exist in present-day Africa, and they can exist, moreover, within the confines of a single state.

Most of the peoples of Africa preserve, and will seemingly do so for a long time to come, a host of customs and

outmoded ideas and peculiarities in human interrelations, including ethnic prejudices that go way back to a level of social evolution already surmounted both economically and politically. The vectors of retrograde ideas and prejudices maintain their influence by striving for observance of tribal ways. The ideology of tribalism hatches on this. Tribalism is employed by reactionary forces, and will seemingly continue to be, to consolidate their positions against tendencies to national unity.

In the People's Republic of Congo, for instance, the leaders of certain ethnic groups pursue a policy of setting one people against another, and of sabotage and boycott of the government's measures, and hinder national integration.

A clear manifestation of such activity was the referendum on the new Constitution of the Republic, held in June 1973. In the southern province of Niari, more than 70 per cent of the population expressed themselves against the constitution as a result of the fanning of tribalist moods. Less than half the population of the southern region of Buzanza, and less than a third in Niari, voted for the deputies to the National People's Assembly. In trying to prevent democratisation of local self-government reactionary southern circles boycotted the election of deputies to the people's assemblies of the Bouake and Mouyondizi districts and especially in Bfouati, Sibiti, and Mayoko, where only 6.7 per cent of the electorate voted for the candidates nominated.

The late President of the Congo, Marien Ngouabi, spoke many times of the danger of the regionalists' splitting policy and fomenting of tribalist and separatist moods. The revolutionary democratic government is waging a resolute fight against every manifestation of intertribal hostility and parochialism that threaten the unity and political stability of the country.

In the course of further class differentiation the social basis of tribalism will be narrowed and the social support of the movement for national integration will be broadened. The unifying trends will lead to a strengthening of the struggle between tribalism and the representatives of nationalism of the state as a whole, who are trying to rally the peoples of Africa at their present stage of development around common aims and objectives and to consolidate internal political unity and national sovereignty.

As society develops the social, class factor will play a bigger role than nationalism. The same nationalist consol-

idating slogans, of course, can be used by the exploiter classes with the aim of consolidating their domination; then a reactionary trend may come to predominate, pushing the democratic content into the background. The petty bourgeois strata who play an active role in the political life of several African countries are a receptive medium for narrow, nationalistic attitudes.

Far-reaching economic, social, and cultural reforms are of paramount importance for the processes of national integration. The broad programme for the democratisation of society proposed by revolutionary democrats, the levelling up of the socio-economic development of peoples belonging to different ethnic groups, a resolute struggle against tribal strife and ethnic prejudice—are all the best means for furthering elimination of internal conflicts and bringing the various peoples together, in other words, for furthering integrative processes.

That means that it is by no means a matter of indifference for ethnic development what orientation is adopted by one country or another—whether a socialist one or a capitalist one—and what classes and social strata exercise the leadership in nation-building, on which the final results of the integrative process will depend.

The policy of the governments of African states consists in their having to encourage the internal integration of various ethnic groups in order to surmount the difficulties arising from ethnic and linguistic diversity. The state is fighting tribal particularism and regionalism and ethnic discrimination not only by means of appropriate provisions in criminal law, severely punishing any manifestation of racism, national discord, and separatism, but also by means of various measures of an economic, political, and cultural character, including spoken and written propaganda.

The variety of conditions of socio-economic and political development and the great difference in the balance of class and political forces in the states of Tropical Africa determine both the approach to ethnic problems and the methods and means of dealing with them.

The leading progressive statesmen, politicians, and public figures of African countries are actively fighting tribalism, interethnic hostility, and ethnic conflicts, pointing out the need to strengthen state and political unity.

Much attention is being paid in several countries to diminishing the role of the ethnic factor in politics. Apart

from educational work, programmes have begun to be carried out to eliminate the inequality in level of development of the most backward areas, the ethnic approach in the building of armies is being rooted out, ethnic minorities are being given help to train cadres and develop their culture. In some countries (e.g., Mali and Guinea) laws have been passed banning ethnic discrimination and propaganda of separatism. The equality of all citizens, irrespective of ethnic affiliation, is proclaimed in the constitutions of African states.

Modern education has a big role to play. The raising of cultural standards helps extirpate survivals of the past, including ethnic prejudices, and makes people more receptive of the new.

The anti-colonial cultural revolution taking place in several countries in Tropical Africa is helping in the best way to overcome the actual inequality between peoples.

Respect for the cultural heritage of each people, which is expressed in the development of the local languages and in the organisation of folk art festivals, culture promotion days, and song and dance ensembles, is not only of significance for resolving ethnic problems but also encourages national integration. It is important to stress that the new culture, based on the best folk traditions, is taking shape within the confines of the whole country, which is of immense significance and is inculcating feelings of national community and unity.

The democratic programme for dealing with ethnic problems proclaimed in the constitutions and other programmes of the governments and ruling parties of African states is taking the sting out of the ethnic conflicts fomented in Tropical Africa by the colonial regimes. On that plane a progressive policy on the national question has a bearing on decolonisation.

National distrust is most easily overcome by drawing the majority of the population into national measures for a radical reconstruction of society in former colonies.

In countries that have elected a capitalist path of development, solution of ethnic problems is complicated by the fact that the ruling circles are pursuing a policy that is deepening social inequality and backwardness.

Some African leaders mistakenly suppose that one can decree a united nation and ignore the rights of national minorities. Such an approach aggravates ethnic antagonisms

and, given the unresolved character of the social and economic problems and the policy of the reactionary forces aimed at reviving separatist tendencies and splitting the country, inevitably leads to political instability and crisis. Evidence of that pattern is the events in Congo (Kinshasa), Nigeria, Chad, the Sudan, Rwanda, and other countries.

Exploitation of the working people of backward areas reinforces internal contradictions on ethnic grounds. The class and national antagonisms being engendered in these countries by an exploiter society, and social heterogeneity, are preventing coming together of the different peoples and complicating the processes of national consolidation and integration.

At the same time, in countries that have chosen a non-capitalist path of development, the carrying out of progressive programmes directed against the dominant influences of foreign capital and internal reactionaries, structural reforms in the interests of the working masses, broad, democratic measures, and the legal banning of racial and ethnic discrimination and of propaganda for separatist ideas, the enforcement of these laws, the tackling of social problems, and broad educational work—are all laying the foundation for abolishing exploitation of man by man and extirpating the socio-economic roots of national antagonisms and inter-tribal strife. And all that will help bring the different *ethnos* together, and mould a united ethno-political complex, but chiefly it will help create the conditions for the forming of new nations on a revolutionary, democratic basis, and in the long run on a socialist basis.

The carrying out of general democratic reforms can lead, even at the present stage, to the gradual fulfilment of a number of the programmatic directives of the ruling parties and governments aimed at eliminating discrimination on ethnic grounds and at closing the gap in levels of socio-economic and cultural development.

National integration is a goal that can only be achieved through radical political, social, economic, and cultural reforms and implementation of the principles of democratic national policy.

The fight against ethnic prejudices and the conflicts generated by them is acquiring special urgency and political significance with the building of a new life in African states. As historical experience indicates, progress is made by extirpating the economic roots of ethnic hostility, by

carrying through social reforms, and by creating a genuinely democratic society.

The social and national factors are closely interlinked, but the social factors are always the most important. The methods and forms of tackling national problems, and progress toward national consolidation and integration, depend to a considerable extent on how deeply and consistently the life of the liberated countries of Africa is decolonised, but mainly in whose interests it is decolonised.

Study of the experience of the independent life of African states provides evidence that the general laws and patterns of social and ethnic development are fully applicable to Africa. At the same time account must be taken of the specific features of African states when various problems, including ethnic ones, are analysed and dealt with, and especially of the survival in them of many archaic institutions of the old tribal-clan society.

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## Chapter Seven. Is It Possible to Live Without Ethnic Conflicts?

African statesmen and public figures evince great interest in the Soviet Union's experience of dealing with the national problem. African periodicals publish articles on the progress made by formerly backward Soviet republics as a result of socialist reforms and a proper national policy. One can cite as one example the statements published in connection with the 50th anniversary of the formation of the USSR and the 60th anniversary of the October Revolution which expressed the view of representatives of the most varied political systems and outlooks.

The writings of Lenin, the founder of the Soviet state, and the carrying out of his precepts, especially in dealing with the national question in the Soviet Union, are being studied in Senegal, where various ethnic groups live within the confines of one country, President Songhor told a parliamentary delegation of the USSR Supreme Soviet in November 1972.

For the oppressed peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, the October Socialist Revolution opened an era of national liberation, an era of people's, national democratic and socialist revolutions. It struck a crushing blow to the colonial system of imperialism, and marked a new stage in the history of oppressed peoples' struggle for freedom, democracy, and socialism. The existence of the first socialist state in history created favourable conditions for emerging countries, including the People's Republic of Congo, to make the transition to socialism, by-passing capitalism—is how Joachim Yhombi Opango, the head of the Congolese state, defined the significance of the October Revolution in an interview with the Soviet press in the middle of August 1977 on the occasion of the 14th anniversary of the Congolese revolution.

The progress made by the formerly backward periphery of Czarist Russia had only proved possible in fraternal co-operation, the *Kenya Mirror* wrote. The Russian Revolution paved the road to establishing fundamentally new relations between nations, the *East African Standard* remarked. The mutual help of the peoples of the USSR had promoted rapid growth of public prosperity in each of the Union republics and in the country as a whole.

The immense international significance of the founding of the USSR for the oppressed peoples of the world is specially stressed.

*Etumba*, organ of the Congolese Party of Labour, declared that the October Revolution in Russia had opened a new era of social revolutions. However bourgeois historians strove to minimise its significance, it was exerting a continuing influence on the contemporary world, inspiring the struggling and already liberated peoples to follow the path of complete national liberation, and to shake off exploitation and national oppression completely.

Thanks to the October Socialist Revolution, which led to a radical change in the international balance of power in favour of socialism and the liberation of nations, the President of the People's Republic of Benin, M. Kérékou, stressed in a talk with a Cuban delegation in February 1977, favourable conditions were created for all countries to take the socialist road of development.

The October Socialist Revolution has a special place among historical events because it laid the foundations for far-reaching social transformations, says the programme of measures adopted by the National Union of Angolan Workers (UNTA) in connection with the 60th anniversary of the October Revolution. The Revolution, the programme says, opened a new historical epoch, that of the transition from capitalism to socialism.<sup>1</sup>

During my stay in Africa I was often asked about the solution of various aspects of the ethnic problems in the Soviet Union. My interlocutors wanted to know not only what had been done but also how it had been done, what practical steps had been taken to end intertribal hostility and ethnic prejudices, how the backward peoples had been aided, what principles had underlain the language policy, what were the forms of autonomy, how it was possible to bring peoples together given the existence and development of more than a hundred different ethnic groups in the USSR.

I was often asked whether there was a special section in the Programme of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on national relations, formulating the Party's main tasks, or whether this was considered a stage that had already been passed.

My own personal experience helped me to answer many specific questions. My childhood and school years were spent in Siberia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan, so that I witnessed the solution of the national question in those areas of the country. By ethnic origin I am a Tatar but, although I understand Tatar, my mother tongue, as with my whole family, is Russian. In school and university, in addition to German, I had to study Kazakh and Uzbek, and in my post-graduate studies English, French, and Swahili.

I am availing myself of this opportunity to answer several questions here relating to the solution of ethnic problems in our country, especially in the early years of Soviet power.

The first acts of the Soviet authorities—the Decree on Peace, the Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia, the Declaration of the Rights of the Working and Exploited Peoples, and others—proclaimed the following basic principles of national policy: the right of nations to self-determination; the equality and sovereignty of peoples; the abolition of all national privileges and restrictions; the free development of national minorities; socialist federation.

In the very first days after victory of the October Revolution, the Soviet government adopted, on 15 November 1917, the Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia, in which the equality of nations, great and small, and the complete abolition of national oppression were proclaimed. Each people received the right to decide its future independently for itself.

The following principles were proclaimed in the Declaration, which was drafted by Lenin himself:

- (1) the equality and sovereignty of the peoples of Russia;
- (2) the right of the peoples of Russia to free self-determination, up to and including secession and the formation of an independent state;
- (3) the abolition of all and every national and national-religious privilege and restriction;
- (4) the free development of the national minorities and ethnographic groups inhabiting the territory of Russia.<sup>2</sup>



The Declaration exposed the oppressive policy of Czarism, gave all peoples equal rights with the Great Russian, and stressed the voluntary union of the peoples.

On 3 December 1917 an Appeal to the Toiling Muslims of Russia and Central Asia was issued, in which the national policy of the Soviet government was explained: respect for, and the sanctity of, the beliefs, customs, and culture of the Muslim peoples, and protection of their rights by the Soviet state, were emphasised.<sup>3</sup>

In the first Constitution of the Soviet state—the Constitution of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic—adopted in July 1918, it was stated that:

the Russian Republic is a free socialist society of all the working people of Russia... With the aim of guaranteeing working people effective freedom of conscience the church is separated from the state and the school from the church, and freedom of religious and anti-religious propaganda is recognised for all citizens.<sup>4</sup>

Article 22 of the Constitution stressed that

the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic, recognising equal rights for citizens irrespective of their racial and national affiliation, declares that the establishing or permitting of any privileges or advantages on that basis is contradictory to the fundamental laws of the Republic, and equally any oppression whatsoever of national minorities or restriction of their rights.<sup>5</sup>

The decrees of Soviet power on the national question were materialised in concrete measures. The Soviet government began, from the first days of its existence, to implement the principles of the national policy proclaimed. Lenin more than once pointed out the need for a careful approach to the national feelings, customs, and traditions of peoples.

A People's Commissariat for Nationality Affairs was set up to carry out these principles; under it, in the autumn of 1918, eighteen national commissariats and departments were formed—Byelorussian, Jewish, Armenian, Chuvash, etc. Their main job was to inform the Soviet government of the needs of a particular nationality; to inform working people of non-Russian nationality about all the Soviet government's measures; to draft the basic statutes of the administrative structure; to meet the cultural and educational needs of the working people.

In order to eliminate the existing inequality in level of development and to help the non-Russian peoples to catch

up with the more developed Central Russia, the following objectives were posed at the Tenth Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) in March 1921:

(1) to help these peoples develop and consolidate their Soviet statehood in forms corresponding to their national and domestic circumstances;

(2) to help them develop and consolidate their own courts, administration, economic bodies, and authorities, functioning in their own languages, and consisting of local people familiar with the life and psychology of the local population;

(3) to render them aid in creating a press, schools, theatre, and cultural and educational institutions in general in the local language;

(4) to help them organise a wide network of courses and schools of both a general educational and a vocational character in the vernacular (initially for Kirghiz, Bashkirs, Turkmens, Uzbeks, Tajiks, Azerbaijanians, Tatars, and Dagestanians) in order to speed up the training of local cadres of skilled workers (men and women) for all branches of government and administration, above all for education.

Lenin also drafted the basic principles for building the Soviet multinational state, and defined the essence of Soviet federation and autonomy.

The experience of evolving new socialist relationships between peoples acquired in the first five years of Soviet power urgently called for closer co-operation. Only the uniting of the Soviet republics into a single, allied state could make it possible to ensure both external security and close economic co-operation in creating a united, planned, socialist economy, effectively employing natural resources in the interests of the whole country, and developing all the peoples in an all-round way.

That, however, was not an easy business. Many difficulties connected with economic and cultural backwardness had to be overcome and the attempts of reactionary elements to foment national hostility and to make use of bourgeois nationalism and great power chauvinism had to be combated.

The question of uniting the Soviet republics was widely discussed throughout the country—at *gubernia*, *uyezd*, and *volost* congresses of Soviets, and at meetings and other gatherings. Congresses of Soviets of all the republics resolved on joining the Union; and on 30 December 1922 the First All-Union Congress of Soviets unanimously adopted a

Declaration on the Formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and a Treaty on the Formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The Declaration said:

The will of the peoples of the Soviet republics assembled recently in Congresses of their Soviets and unanimously deciding to form a Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is a sure guarantee that this Union will be a voluntary association of equal peoples, that each republic is guaranteed the right to freely secede from the Union, that it is open to all socialist Soviet republics, both presently existing or being formed in the future, to accede freely to the Union.<sup>7</sup>

Article 20 of the Treaty specially emphasised that 'each Republic retains the right freely to secede from the Union',<sup>8</sup> thus once again stressing the voluntary character of the association.

Relations between the constituent Soviet Socialist Republics are built on the principle of socialist federation, in accordance with which each of them is a sovereign state. In case an ethnic group is too small and does not constitute a majority in the territory occupied by it, such groups are granted territorial autonomy as autonomous republics, autonomous regions, or national areas. Thus all peoples are guaranteed state self-government and defence of their national interests, i.e., development of the national culture, schools, respect for their customs and religion. Citizens are guaranteed use of their mother tongue in all spheres of public and political life.

In the Soviet Union there are fifteen Union republics, twenty Autonomous republics, eight Autonomous regions, and ten National areas.

The policy of the Soviet government on the national question is based on fraternal trust and co-operation between ethnic groups, on their education in the spirit of proletarian internationalism and struggle against every manifestation of Russian great power chauvinism and local bourgeois nationalism. In building friendly relations great significance is attached to the legal banning of nationalist propaganda of any sort.

The resolution on the national question adopted by the 12th Congress of the RCP(B) on 25 April 1923 had an important programmatic character. The Congress set forth concrete measures in various spheres of life linked with national relations within the country. Its resolution stressed

that Communist party's decisions on the national question were as follows:

(a) a resolute denial of all and every form of compulsion in regard to nationalities;

(b) recognition of the equality and sovereignty of the peoples in matters of building their future;

(c) recognition of the proposition that a firm association of peoples could only be built on a co-operative and voluntary basis;

(d) proclaiming the truth that this association was only realisable as a result of overthrow of the power of capital.<sup>9</sup>

The resolution noted that national strife and national clashes were inevitable so long as capital held sway, that the victory of Soviet power was therefore the basis, the foundation, on which fraternal co-operation of the peoples in a single state union could be built.

In assessing the importance of the founding of the USSR, the Congress stressed that this association was

the concluding stage of development of forms of co-operation that had assumed at once the character of a military-economic and political association of peoples in a single multinational Soviet state.<sup>10</sup>

Noting the need to overcome the difficult heritage of the past period of national oppression—like survivals of great power chauvinism, economic and cultural inequality of the different nationalities, and so on—the Party outlined the concrete tasks necessary to implement the programme on the national question, as follows:

1. resolute struggle against survivals of great power chauvinism;

2. struggle to eliminate the existing inequality of nationalities and a fight to raise the cultural and economic standards of backward peoples;

3. struggle against nationalist survivals, above all against their chauvinistic forms.

The Congress considered that the supreme bodies of the Union should be so built as fully to reflect not only the general needs and requirements of all the nationalities of the Union but also the special needs and requirements of the separate nationalities. It therefore considered it necessary to set up a special body of representatives of the nationalities, which would make it possible to cater for the needs of the peoples, to render them the necessary aid in good time, and to create a situation of full mutual trust and

so eliminate survivals of the past on the national question in the most painless way.

The Congress recommended Party members to strive to achieve the following as practical measures:

a) a structure of the central bodies of the Union that would guarantee equality of rights and obligations for the separate republics both in their mutual relations with one another and in relations with the central authorities of the Union;

b) a special body of representatives of all national republics and national regions without exception within the system of the supreme bodies of the Union, on the basis of equality and taking into account as far as feasible representation of all the nationalities making up the republics;

c) construction of the executive bodies of the Union on principles ensuring equal involvement in them of representatives of the republics and meeting the needs and requirements of the peoples of the Union;

d) the granting of adequate financial and budgetary rights to republics so as to ensure them the possibility of exercising their own administrative, cultural, and economic initiative;

e) the staffing of the bodies of national republics and regions mainly by persons familiar with the language, way of life, ways and customs of the peoples concerned;

f) the promulgation of special laws guaranteeing use of the mother tongue in all state bodies and in all institutions serving the local, national population and national minorities—laws that would prosecute and punish with all revolutionary severity all offenders against national rights, in particular against the rights of national minorities;

g) intensification of educational activity in the Red Army in the spirit of inculcating ideas of the brotherhood and solidarity of the peoples of the Union and practical measures to organise national military units with observance of all measures necessary to ensure the full defence capacity of the republics.<sup>11</sup>

Concrete measures were also planned in the sphere of Party-building in the republics. The Congress enjoined the Central Committee:

a) to organise Marxist circles of the highest type for the local Party workers of the national republics;

b) to develop a fundamental Marxist literature in the vernacular;

e) to reinforce the University of the Peoples of the East and its local departments;

d) to set up instructor groups under the central committees of the national Communist parties, composed of local workers;

e) to develop a mass Party literature in the vernacular;

f) to intensify Party educational work in the republics;

g) to intensify work among the youth in the republics.

The Congress drew the Central Committee's attention to the need for careful selection of cadres in the localities so as fully to ensure genuine carrying out of the Party's decisions on the national question.

The Congress' decisions are evidence of the immense attention paid to the interests and needs of the nationalities, of the decisive struggle against deviations of every kind in applying the Communist Party's programme on the national question—against great power chauvinism and national survivals, nihilism and contempt for small peoples. The task was posed to train and ideologically steel local Party workers from the local nationalities, and to carry on patient explanatory and educational work, taking into account the general backward development and absence of modern industry and a formed proletariat, etc.

In June 1923, in fulfilment of the decisions of the 12th Congress of the RCP(B), a conference of the Central Committee was held with responsible workers from the national republics and regions attending. The conference outlined concrete measures to implement the Congress' decision on the national question. These measures concerned Party work on the national question, the formation of the Council of Nationalities, measures to draw the worker elements of the local population into Party work, occupational activity, and participation in government measures to raise the cultural standards of the local population, economic construction in the national republics and regions from the standpoint of their national features and way of life, practical steps to organise national military units, the organisation of Party educational work, the selection of Party and Soviet workers who would be capable of implementing the Congress' resolution on the national question.<sup>12</sup>

In the discussion on measures to raise the cultural standards of the population of the republics it was proposed:

a) to set up clubs (non-party) and other educational institutions functioning in the local language;

b) to extend the network of educational establishments at all levels and to set up workers' faculties in the local language;

c) to draw more or less loyal national teachers of local origin into the work of the school;

d) to set up a network of societies for the spread of literacy in the local languages;

e) to organise publishing, and to set up a special fund under the Central Committee to subsidise publishing in republics and regions;

f) to include financing of the primary schools of culturally weak nationalities in the central budget.<sup>13</sup>

In the economic field it was proposed to provide the local working population with land from the state land fund, to grant negotiable farm credits to the local population, to intensify irrigation work, to give every kind of help to co-operatives, to transfer mills and factories to republics rich in the appropriate raw materials, to set up trade and technical schools and agricultural courses for the local population.

Party educational work among the population of the republics was envisaged as follows: to create a Marxist literature in the local language and a well-distributed press in the vernacular; to extend the work of the University of the Peoples of the East in the centre and localities and to make financial provision for it; to found a Party discussion club in the University of the Peoples of the East and to involve members of the Central Committee resident in Moscow in its work; and to intensify work among the youth and women in the republics and regions.

The Communist Party and the Soviet government did everything necessary to eliminate the existing inequality of the republics. Stress was put on the development of industry, and that led to the formation of a national working class, speeded up the training of national cadres, and promoted growth of literacy, culture, and the organisation and political activity of the population.

The levelling up and raising of the standard of economic, social, political, and cultural development were an important factor in the rapid and all-round progress of all the republics of the USSR. The essence of the national policy of the CPSU and Soviet government consisted in constantly taking account both of the general interests of the whole state and of those of each of the constituent republics.

A harmonious combination of statehood of both the whole people and the separate nations and nationalities is a characteristic feature of socialist society.

The national form of Soviet statehood finds expression in its taking account of the peculiarities of ethnic structure; in broad representation of local ethnic groups in the forming of state bodies; in carrying on business in the national languages; in certain special features of the structure of government bodies to take local conditions and traditions into account.

The highest legislative body of the country is the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, which consists of two chambers, the Council of the Union and the Council of Nationalities. Both chambers have equal rights. All the peoples of the Soviet Union are represented in the Council of Nationalities, and they all have equal rights in deciding state business. In accordance with the newly adopted Constitution each Union republic elects 32 deputies, each Autonomous republic 11 deputies, each Autonomous region five deputies, and each National area one deputy.

Solution of the general tasks—strengthening of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the carrying through of radical social and economic reforms (industrialisation, collectivisation, the upsurge and development of culture) provided the basis for solving ethnic problems. And the solution of the ethnic problems proper by means of Soviet statehood (the overcoming of interethnic friction and distrust; the ensuring of national equality and actual equality of the peoples; consolidation and integration processes that led to the formation and coming together of nations, and so on) in turn had great significance for carrying out the tasks of building socialism.

An important result of successful solution of ethnic problems in the USSR has been the all-round development of the languages of all the peoples of the Soviet Union. Alphabets and systems of writing were created for more than 40 peoples that in the past had not had them. Many people are bilingual or multilingual. The overwhelming majority know Russian in addition to their mother tongue.

The Programme of the CPSU has a special section that defines its objective in the field of national relations in the new stage, i.e. the stage of full-scale communist construction, which is characterised by a further coming together of nations and by their achieving of full unity.<sup>14</sup> The wiping out of the boundaries between classes and the devel-

opment of communist social relations is intensifying the socialist homogeneity of nations. But the elimination of national differences, in particular of languages, is a much longer process than the elimination of class boundaries. The programme emphasises that

the Party does not tolerate either the ignoring or the exaggerating of national peculiarities.<sup>15</sup>

In the field of national relations the CPSU puts the following objectives forward:

1. to continue all-round development of the economies and cultures of all Soviet nations and nationalities, ensuring their ever closer fraternal co-operation and mutual aid, uniting and drawing them together in all spheres of life, and achieving consolidation of the USSR in every way, and to use the forms of national statehood of the peoples of the USSR to the full and to perfect them;

2. in the economic field, to follow a course in the future also of all-round development of the economies of the Soviet republics; to ensure a rational distribution of industry and planned development of natural resources, to improve the socialist division of labour between republics, uniting and co-ordinating their efforts, and correctly combining the interests of the state as a whole with those of each Soviet republic.

'The closer intercourse between nations is, and the broader understanding of the common objectives, the more successfully will displays of parochialism and national egoism be overcome,' the Programme emphasises.<sup>16</sup>

The Party will pursue a policy, as before, ensuring full equality of all the nations and nationalities, taking their interests fully into account and paying special attention to those areas where faster development is needed;

3. to achieve a further all-round bourgeoning of the socialist culture of the peoples of the USSR. The Programme notes that, as history shows, national forms do not become ossified but are modified, improved on, and drawn closer together in being purged of everything antiquated and obsolete that contradicts the new conditions of life. The development of an international culture common to all the Soviet nations is promoting enrichment of the culture of each nation. The CPSU will encourage further mutual enrichment and drawing together of these cultures, consolidation of their international basis, and so mould-

ing the future united culture common to all mankind of communist society; and by supporting the progressive traditions of each people, and making them the property of all Soviet people, to develop new revolutionary traditions of the builders of communism in every way, common for all nations;

4. to ensure a further free development of the languages of the peoples of the USSR, full freedom for every citizen of the USSR to speak, bring up his or her children, and educate them in any language, without permitting any privileges, restrictions, or pressures to use one language or another. With fraternal friendship and mutual trust of nations, national languages develop on the basis of equality and mutual enrichment. The process of voluntary study of Russian along with the mother tongue that is taking place encourages mutual exchange of experience and the acquisition by each people of the cultural achievements of all the peoples of the Soviet Union and of world culture. Russian has in fact become the common language of inter-national intercourse and co-operation of all the peoples of the USSR.

5. to follow the principles of internationalism consistently in the future as well in the field of national relations; to consolidate friendship of the peoples as a most important gain of socialism; to wage an unrelenting fight against manifestations and survivals of any kind of nationalism and chauvinism, against tendencies to national bigotry and exclusiveness or to idealise the past and gloss over the social contradictions in the history of peoples, against customs and manners hindering the building of communism.<sup>17</sup>

Noting that the scale of communist construction calls for constant exchange of cadres between nations, the Programme of the CPSU stresses that any display of national isolation in the education and employment of workers of the different nationalities in Soviet republics is impermissible.

Elimination of manifestations of nationalism corresponds to the interests of all the nations and nationalities of the USSR. Each Soviet republic can only flourish and become further consolidated in the great family of the fraternal socialist nations of the USSR.<sup>18</sup>

Such is the Programme of the CPSU on the national question.

With the creation of developed socialist society in the USSR a new stage in national relations has been ushered

in; these are now relations between peoples that have achieved a high standard of economic and cultural development. This has been reflected in the new Constitution of the Soviet state adopted by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on 7 October 1977. Citizens of the USSR, it says, are equal before the law, without distinction of origin, social or property status, national or racial origin, sex, education, language, attitude to religion, type and nature of occupation, place of residence or other status.

The equal rights of citizens of the USSR are guaranteed in all fields of economic, political, social, and cultural life.

The Constitution states that Soviet citizens of different nationalities and races have equal rights. Exercise of these rights, it says, is guaranteed by the all-round political development and drawing together of all nations and nationalities of the USSR, the education of citizens in the spirit of Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism, and by the possibility to use their native language and the languages of other peoples of the USSR.

Any direct or indirect limitation of these rights, or the establishment of direct or indirect privileges for citizens on grounds of race or nationality, and equally any preaching of racial or national exclusiveness, hostility, or contempt is punishable by law.

Freedom of conscience is recognised for all Soviet citizens, that is the right to profess any religion and conduct religious services, or not to profess a religion and to conduct atheistic propaganda. Incitement of hostility and hatred on religious grounds is forbidden.

In developed socialist society the processes of the flourishing and drawing together of the socialist nations and nationalities have been intensified. Socialism does not eliminate the nationally specific but it does remove the social causes for the counterposing of one people against another. The ethnic factor therefore is not a barrier dividing peoples in our country.

The objective reasons and conditions that could generate inter-nation conflicts and antagonisms have long been eliminated in the Soviet state; but very tenacious ethnic prejudices and prejudgements may still persist for some time in the psychology of individuals. They may manifest themselves in a hypertrophy of national feelings, in national narrowness and bigotry and conceit, in idealisation of patri-

archal ways, and in parochialism. An untiring struggle is waged against all these backslidings of the past, and much educational work is carried on.

Survivals of the past are not easily overcome. To do so calls for tact and consideration. One must not, of course, scorn traditions that contain much that is wise, good, and edifying. In Uzbekistan, for example, one of these traditions that has stood the test of time is *khoshar*, a custom of mutual aid, of supporting one another in difficult moments, of disinterested work for the common good.

Such customs and traditions are upheld by society and carefully preserved. And many genuine folk traditions and rituals have taken on a new life as it were and become filled with new wine. Archaic prejudices and manners have been relegated to the past, giving way to modern customs and traditions. The national pride proper to every people is taking on a new content and is developing together with the common pride of all Soviet people, and is integrally linked with proletarian internationalism. Ideas of superiority over any other people, and of a scornful attitude to the achievements of other nations are alien to Soviet people. A patriotic feeling of pride common to all the people is combined in peoples of the USSR with the deep respect for the peoples of the whole world.

The positive experience of dealing with the national question in the USSR can prove helpful to many peoples in Asian and African countries, most of which are polyethnic in structure. Let us consider certain factors.

1. The democratic method of realising the principle of self-determination excludes any compulsion from the side of the former dominant nation; in the earliest stages of tackling the national question the peoples of Soviet Russia received the constitutional right of self-determination in the demarcation of national, state boundaries and the creation of Union and Autonomous republics.

2. The Communist Party rejected in principle the bourgeois conception of the formal, juridical equality of nations, and affirmed the Marxist-Leninist conception of proletarian internationalism. History has shown that the juridical equality of peoples within the boundaries of one state, for all its positive value, still does not fully resolve the national question if the factual inequality of these peoples is maintained in the socio-economic and cultural spheres. Socialist democracy, victorious in the Soviet Union, having decided



the matter of establishing state and juridical equality in short order, did not stop at that but went further toward establishing real, actual equality between all peoples, great and small, on the basis of the radical interests of the working classes. And that is the fundamental difference between the socialist approach to the national question in a multinational country and the bourgeois-democratic approach.

The socialist system made it possible to apply the most effective and painless methods for overcoming the backwardness of the eastern areas in short order. By the early 1960s, the economic and cultural potential of all the national republics of the Soviet Union, both western and eastern, had been basically equalised.

3. The national policy of the CPSU and the Soviet government has a clearly expressed class character. It is consistently pursued in the interests of the working masses, i.e. of the working class, the working peasantry, and the intelligentsia, and that predetermines the radical character of the measures to wipe out all forms and survivals of national-colonial oppression, and of feudal-separatist and bourgeois-nationalist tendencies. And that, precisely, is the reason for the unprecedentedly profound democratism and effectiveness of the reforms carried out.

4. All-round co-operation between the peoples of the Soviet state, the overcoming of national and provincial insularity, and integration played an immense, progressive role in solving the national question. The main principle in the interrelations of Union and Autonomous republics was division of labour and economic co-operation, controlled by the objective opportunities of one republic or another and by considerations of profitability for the whole state. The socialist collaboration and co-operation of all the Soviet republics in the field of the national economy were not only the main factor in eliminating the existing imbalance in the development of the various peoples but also created the economic platform for friendship of the peoples and for their moral and political unity.

5. Application of the principles of Lenin's national policy did not mean the swallowing and assimilation of the peoples of the Soviet Union by the Russians, as some bourgeois sociologists maintain. The internationalist class character of a national policy based on the principles of scientific socialism did not lead to a belittling of the 'ethnic' principles, did not interfere with the traditions, customs, and

culture of the peoples, great and small, of our country. The national policy carried out not only did not hinder the development and burgeoning of the culture of existing ethnic communities, but encouraged it in every way. The development of any national culture is always accompanied with a withering away, on the one hand, of old, obsolescent elements of culture, customs, and manners that are becoming objectively reactionary, and on the other hand with a mutual enriching of the different cultures. In this process, however, the national features are preserved and carefully developed.

6. The USSR's experience of dealing with the national question has confirmed the conclusion of the founders of Marxism-Leninism on the reactionary character of bourgeois and reformist ways of 'solving' it through the isolation of nations, the preaching of national insularity, and of the 'superiority' of one people over another. At the same time this experience has shown the danger of leftist, anarchistic views that concepts, such as 'nation', 'national sovereignty' and 'national freedom' are 'obsolescent' or unnecessary. Lenin's national programme is irreconcilable alike with various forms of racism, chauvinism, and national bigotry and with leftist notions of national nihilism.

Such are some of the main features of Soviet national policy that have had the greatest international impact.

As a result of far-reaching and all-round socio-political and economic reforms and the implementing of the Communist Party's scientifically substantiated programme on the national question in the USSR, a new historical community of people has been created, namely the Soviet people. The Soviet people are not a 'supernation' as some Kremlinologists claim. Their formation has not meant the 'swallowing' or assimilation of the separate nations, since they preserve the features of stable national communities.

In his speech in Alma Ata when presenting the Order of the Friendship of Peoples to the Kazakh SSR on 15 August 1973, the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Leonid Brezhnev said:

In speaking of a new historical community of people, we certainly do not mean that all distinctions between nationalities have disappeared in our country, let alone that all its nations have merged into one. All the nations and nationalities in the Soviet Union retain their distinguishing features, national traits, language, and their best traditions. They have

every opportunity to achieve a still greater advancement of their national culture.

At the same time, the Soviet people is not just the sum total of a number of nations living side by side in the same state, under the same roof, so to speak. Our people, irrespective of their nationality, have many common features which help to unite them into a monolithic entity. These features are identity of ideology and identity of historical destinies. They are identity of the conditions of their socio-economic life, of their basic interests and goals. They are the developing communion of Soviet socialist culture which cumulates all the real values of every national culture.<sup>19</sup>

Under socialism there is no antagonism between tendencies to the flourishing of nations and tendencies toward their coming together; both are harmoniously combined. But nations remain stable forms of the community of peoples. And the stability of national differences has to be reckoned with in politics. That is why the Programme of the CPSU has a special section defining the Party's tasks in the field of national relations at the new stage of the all-out building of communism. The CPSU is guided in its policy by Lenin's precept to be as attentive as possible to each nation and its interests. At the same time it poses the objective of all-round collaboration, mutual assistance, unity, and rapprochement of the different nations, and stresses the need for unrelenting struggle against any show of chauvinism and nationalism or of national bigotry and exclusiveness.

The experience of building the Soviet multinational state has shown that the national question can be tackled consistently only on the basis of a socialist reconstruction of society.

Lenin called socialist industry the foundation on which, in combination with democratic organisation of the state, to develop

the practical elimination of even the slightest national friction and the least national mistrust and to accelerate the drawing together and fusion of nations.<sup>20</sup>

## Notes to Chapter 7

1. *Pravda*, 26 August, 1977.
2. *Obrazovanie Soyuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublic* (Formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Anthology of Documents) (Moscow, 1972), p. 22. (Further see *Obrazovanie SSSR*.)
3. *Ibid.*, pp. 23-25.
4. *Constitution of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic. Obrazovanie SSSR*, p. 45.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 46.
6. See Resolution of the Tenth Congress of the RCP(B) on the next tasks of the Party on the national question. In *Obrazovanie SSSR*, p. 189.
7. Declaration on the Formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. *Obrazovanie SSSR*, p. 380.
8. Treaty on the Formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. *Obrazovanie SSSR*, p. 386.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 403.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 404.
11. *Ibid.*, pp. 408-409.
12. *Ibid.*, pp. 411-17.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 415.
14. *Programma Kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo Soyuz* (Programme of the CPSU) (Moscow, 1961), pp. 114-16.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 113.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 114.
17. *Ibid.*, pp. 114-16.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 116.
19. L. I. Brezhnev, *Following Lenin's Course*. Speeches and Articles (1972-1975), Moscow, 1975, p. 241.
20. V. I. Lenin, *The Discussion on Self-Determination Summed Up, Collected Works*, Vol. 22, p. 325.

## Conclusion

Ethnic problems are part of the general question of fundamental social and economic reforms in Africa and cannot be fully resolved without such transformations. But the interconnection of ethnic and economic cum socio-political elements has a dialectical character: the former largely determine the rates and character of the latter's development. For a whole number of reasons, including the general backwardness of Africa, the ethnic factor exerts a greater influence on the course of socio-economic processes there, and especially on political life.

The special features of the historical development of many of the states of Tropical Africa that determine the alignment of forces have led to many problems (among them ethnic ones) not having been resolved in the years passed since independence. The difficulties of socio-economic development, moreover, the continuing domination of the economies of most African states by foreign monopolies, the absence of political stability, the wide property gap, and the growth of indigenous exploiting strata linked with the development of capitalist relations cannot help sharpening economic, social, ethnic, and political contradictions.

Social protest often takes the form of ethnic conflicts, given the general backwardness of Africa and the survival of many traditional institutions.

Most African peoples have already passed the tribal stage of development; nevertheless many customs, rituals, norms of tribal-clan morality and ethnic prejudices and biases survive that originated in this stage of social development, now ethnically and politically past. In Africa, as elsewhere, phenomena of the superstructure prove more conservative than those of the basis. A very clear example

of this is the survival almost everywhere of traditional chieftaincies and tribal unions, even when capitalist relations have long been developed among one people or another.

Tribalism is a serious obstacle to solving problems associated with ethnic development and the consolidation of state independence and national unity. It not only fosters the survival of archaic institutions and ethnic pluralism but is actively employed by reactionary political forces to propagate separatist attitudes, isolate peoples and states, and disrupt national, state, and pan-African unity.

The complexity of the ethnic problems in Tropical Africa, which leads in a number of cases to conflict situations, can be a cause of difficulties in the future, too, especially as the processes of class formation become activated. One may suppose that class contradictions in the specific circumstances of Africa will often take on ethnic forms.

It is not only a matter of intertribal hostility but also one of the extreme complexity and contradictory character of ethnic processes, the intensification in some cases of tribalist and separatist tendencies, and the acuteness often acquired by problems of self-determination.

In addition, the development of capitalist relations in some countries and the deepening of class contradictions can lead to intensification of the antagonisms within single ethnic communities as well as between different ethnic groups.

One must not exaggerate the significance of the ethnic factor, but we must also not minimise its role in the life of independent African states; it would hardly be right, for example, to ignore the interests of individual peoples when drafting economic development plans. Undoubtedly, the principles of the equality of peoples proclaimed in African constitutions are very important, but much work is called for to eliminate the actual existing inequality of the different ethnic groups in any one country.

The national question has now ceased to be an internal, domestic problem. A whole complex of international matters must apparently be taken into account when dealing with it. The events in the Sudan or the former Congo (Kinshasa), now Zaire, the Nigerian crisis and the attempt of the eastern part of that country to secede, the Somali problem, and the border disputes and conflicts in several areas of Africa directly affect relations between African states, the situation within the Organisation of African Unity, and policies toward and interrelations with other countries.

It is impossible to analyse any one phenomenon connected with ethnic problems without taking account of imperialist states' struggle to consolidate their dominant position in Africa, and of the objectives of the national liberation movement as a whole.

The tasks facing African governments in regard to overcoming the consequences of the boundary structure inherited from colonialism, and as regards the approach to the problem of self-determination in the new circumstances, to solution of the language problem and the development of appropriate language policies, are evidence of the immense difficulties they are encountering. These difficulties also largely condition the solution of ethnic problems.

In recent years certain new features have appeared in the approach to these matters.

1. More attention has begun to be paid to ethnic problems in most African states. The ignoring and underestimation of them that was common some years ago is more and more giving way to realisation that the national question plays a vital role in a country's socio-economic development.

2. Although ethnic problems are mainly understood in some cases as ethnic antagonisms and intertribal hostility, many leaders are already including a complex of various matters under the heading 'ethnic problems'.

3. The romanticism of sorts of earlier years is not only giving way more and more to a realistic approach to the solution of many of the problems of national development, in particular to linguistic matters, questions connected with boundaries and border disputes, and problems of self-determination, but the policy itself is also becoming more and more flexible and adaptable to changing conditions.

4. Not only has a tendency to a theoretically grounded approach to ethnic problems been noted, but also a need to deal with them stage by stage and, in some cases, to draft long-term and short-term development programmes, evolve language policies, and so on.

5. Finally, and this is the main point, the solution of ethnic problems is being linked more and more with socio-economic transformation of society. On this point progressive African leaders frankly state that their complete solution is impossible under capitalism. The progressive African intelligentsia is increasingly linking solution of

ethnic problems with the need for sweeping democratic and social reforms.

Practical solution of the ethnic problems in African countries, however, is still only beginning.

By calling the peoples of their states single nations, constitutions and party programmes thus stress national unity, the more so when the state unites peoples of different ethnic affiliation.

It is not impossible that a single nation may be formed within the confines of a single state in the future, for example a Tanzanian or a Malian nation, but at present the process of national integration and consolidation is still far from complete.

In some countries ethnic development may lead to the formation of a single ethnic community on the basis of the state's various ethnic components, in others several communities may be formed, including nations.

In such countries, in my opinion, government policy should naturally correspond to the processes of ethnic development, in other words should promote the formation, and then harmonious development, of several national communities within the state's boundaries.

At the same time identification of the nation with the state sometimes leads to negative results. By declaring all the peoples within the confines of the state's political frontiers to be one nation, without taking the actual ethnic processes into account, really vital ethnic problems are removed from the agenda. State political unity is a goal that can only be achieved by carrying out a correct national policy. Many African leaders start from the premise that a united nation exists and that the job is to consolidate it. In our view the job is to create this unity. And in so doing any exaggeration of the role of the ethnic factor, and equally any ignoring of it, can only magnify existing difficulties.

The complex ethnic structure of many countries is an indisputable fact, but some African leaders deny the existence of different ethnic groups within their countries and consider the ethnic names themselves as something to be ashamed of. It will be some time yet before the Masai stop calling themselves such, or the Bakongo renounce ethnic self-awareness and begin calling themselves simply Congolese, or the Ibo and the Yoruba simply Nigerians. Ethnic consciousness is still strong, which is undoubtedly having its effect on the development of the ethnic stereotype and

ethnic prejudices, and on reciprocal relations with members of other ethnic groups.

Survivals of the past are especially tenacious in the sphere of relations between peoples. The experience of other countries indicates that only elimination of the economic bases of national hostility, and the carrying through of radical social reforms can do away with ethnic conflicts and antagonisms. This is confirmed by the work of certain social scientists abroad, who are opposed to racism. In studying the Black problem in the USA American sociologists have concluded that such seemingly mass means of education as radio broadcasts in defence of oppressed and discriminated against minorities, calls to fight racism, and so on, have very limited effect. It is found that they are listened to, as a rule, by members of the ethnic minorities themselves. The majority of those for whom they are intended simply do not listen to them. Explanatory talks in small groups have some effect, according to research workers, and personal contacts, above all joint work, have the most favourable effect in moderating relations between different ethnic groups. It is impossible not to agree with the view of the American psychologist, Dr. G. W. Allport, that stereotyped orientations can be weakened by the personal contacts of different ethnic groups not only when there is equality of status but also when the interactions enjoy the support of the authorities, the law, or custom. When these conditions are absent, contacts do not yield positive results and may sometimes even intensify mutual dislike and hostility.<sup>1</sup>

To struggle against ethnic prejudice means above all to extirpate the social roots engendering this dangerous disease.

Each of the independent states of Africa has its own specific features, which undoubtedly put their stamp on various aspects of the national question. Ethnic problems, I therefore feel, should be tackled by taking the historical past and peculiarities of development into account. One also cannot ignore the extremely complicated and contradictory character of the ethnic processes taking place in any particular country when, alongside detribalisation and growth of national self-awareness and the forming of ethnic communities, retribalisation is also to be observed, and an intensifying of nationalistic and separatist attitudes.

The concrete solution of ethnic problems depends on what path the country is developing along and on what

classes and political parties are exercising leadership in nation-building.

The political system largely determines the method of dealing with ethnic problems, but their solution depends on which forces possess political and economic power in the state and on whose interests it serves, rather than on its forms of organisation. The future development of African states will show whether federation will be a union of equal peoples or whether one people will dominate another and there will be national oppression and exploitation of one people by another.

Rejection of the capitalist path of development, and the carrying out of measures to abolish exploitation of man by man and division into small peoples and great will create more propitious conditions for the development of all ethnic groups, and of their economies, national statehood, and cultures.

In countries in which radical reforms are being made in the interests of the broad strata of the population, in which a resolute fight is being waged against the legacy of colonialism and the dominant position of foreign monopolies in the economy, and in which the key positions in guiding economic reforms are held by the national government, there will obviously be more opportunities for applying the principles proclaimed in government and party programmes.

Solution of ethnic problems is a component of the struggle for social progress and corresponds to the stage of revolutionary struggle in each separate country.

The initial step in working out the complex of national reforms in new states is to analyse the objective process of the forming of the ethnic community (nationality, nation). This study helps determine the trends of ethnic processes, and which of them should be given maximum support.

Historical experience indicates that attempts to alter the natural process of the forming of an ethnic community by force are usually unsuccessful and only aggravate the internal contradictions. The creation of favourable political and socio-economic conditions encourages acceleration of the natural national processes least painful both for the peoples and for the states. Furthermore when really favourable equal conditions are created for the development of ethnic groups, and relations between them are reorganised on the principles of friendship and internationalism, there is a process of their coming together, a strengthening of co-operation be-

tween them, and a consolidation of unity of the polyethnic state.

The experience of the Soviet Union and other multinational socialist countries is that only a national policy based on scientific theory promotes the coming together of peoples and accelerates maturing of the main elements of a nation, i.e. common language, stable economic relations between the different parts of the country, the forming of a cultural community and community of territory.

A progressive national policy is aimed at preserving and developing valuable shoots of national self-awareness and at gradually ridding it of everything reactionary and hostile to other peoples.

In developing the national self-awareness of their citizens many African states are endeavouring to underpin it with the broader basis of the country at large. Whereas patriotism in Africa used to be based, until recently, on nationalism, a fight is now beginning to purge it of all nationalist limitedness or bigotry.

The main thing in the conditions of contemporary Africa, it would seem, should be to consider a complex solution of the ethnic problems, i.e. not merely the juridical equality of peoples but primarily elimination of the imbalance in the development of the different areas and peoples, solution of problems of state organisation taking into account the interests of ethnic minorities, and so on. That would make for equally favourable opportunities of economic, social, and cultural development for all the country's citizens, irrespective of their ethnic affiliation.

Solution of ethnic problems is unrealisable without simultaneous solution of the language problem, which is very acute in almost all African countries, and a radical restructuring of the system of education and of training national cadres corresponding as far as possible to the interests of the small peoples as well as of the big ones.

Consistent application of the principle of actual equality, the granting of various forms of autonomy (taking historical and political development into account) on the maximum democratic basis compatible with a strong central authority would undoubtedly, in our view, encourage a more effective solution of the problem of national minorities. The training of an adequate number of cadres belonging to all the ethnic groups in any one country, without exception, would give the state authorities and ruling parties the chance to carry

out the personnel policy adopted in their programmes more consistently. One of the ugliest ulcers of the contemporary African state machine—its monopolisation by individual ethnic groups—would then gradually be healed.

An important factor in speeding up national integration will be cultural reforms. The development of a national culture built up within the confines of existing political frontiers calls in turn for the speediest solution of the language problem. At present there is no unanimity in independent African countries as regard the ways and means for dealing with this matter. In most of Tropical Africa the position of the language of the former metropolis remains essentially unshaken, even when there are quite developed languages with their own systems of writing (Nigeria, Zaire, and other countries). The sole exceptions are Tanzania and Kenya, where Swahili has already become the official language, Somalia, and a few others.

It is impossible to resolve ethnic problems without a resolute fight against every sign of intertribal hostility and ethnic prejudice, tribalistic ideology, and separatist tendencies.

Any veiling of the contradictions existing between one ethnic group and another and arising from clashes of the interests of various classes and social groups in conditions of capitalist development, any ignoring of the interests of individual peoples, and any conceptions of illusory 'national unity' can only lead to additional difficulties.

Wide dissemination of the system of education helps raise the individual's general cultural standards, uproot negative survivals of the past from his consciousness, and make his thinking more receptive to new ideas and consequently less stereotyped and hidebound. And that is an essential condition for overcoming ethnic prejudices.

Although complete abolition of national oppression is impossible under capitalism, intertribal hostility, however, can be diminished even under pre-capitalist formations. As Lenin wrote in his theses on the national question:

Radical democratic reforms can establish national peace in capitalist states.<sup>2</sup>

Democratic measures to deal with ethnic problems presuppose the following: equal rights for all peoples, big and small; the rooting out and suppression of discrimination of every kind or, on the contrary, of any kind of ethnic priv-



ilege; a democratic state structure that guarantees the equal development of ethnic minorities; an absence of compulsion in dealing with the language question, respect for the national culture, creeds, and traditions of backward peoples, and help for them in closing the gap in standards of economic and social development, and so on. Most of these principles have been proclaimed in the constitutions of African states and other programmes of African governments and ruling parties.

Application of these principles of a democratic programme for dealing with ethnic problems will help considerably to allay ethnic contradictions and antagonisms at the present stage of socio-economic and political development in Tropical Africa.

The building of national unity, by which we mean here not the forming of a single nation within the confines of political, state entities, but the inculcation of a feeling of belonging to one state, and self-identification with the other peoples of that state who have the same goal, is a lengthy process. In order to speed it up the progressive forces of Africa will therefore have to wage a resolute struggle against every manifestation of intertribal hostility, against separatist and ethno-chauvinist attitudes and trends, so as to educate the members of the various ethnic groups in a spirit of mutual respect and co-operation.

The progressive forces of African states interested in strengthening their independence and in developing their countries along the path of social progress, attach great importance to establishing the relations of equality, complete trust and co-operation among all the peoples so as to prevent the internal and external reactionary forces from taking advantage of interethnic friction and difficulties.

In analysing the ethnic problems of contemporary Africa one must very definitely stress that it is a matter of lengthy processes that do not lend themselves to administrative measures, processes that can only be completed given a successful fight for social liberation.

## Notes to the Conclusion

1. See G. W. Allport, *The Nature of Prejudice*, Cambridge, Mass., 1954, pp. 281, 469, 470, 473.
2. V. I. Lenin, *Theses on the National Question*, *Collected Works*, Vol. 19, p. 251.

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